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ABSTRACT 
WOODROW WILSON’S CONVERSION EXPERIENCE: THE PRESIDENT 
AND THE FEDERAL WOMAN SUFFRAGE AMENDMENT 
FEBRUARY 2012 
BETH A. BEHN, B.S., UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Joyce Avrech Berkman 
This study explores President Woodrow Wilson’s evolution between his 1912 
presidential campaign and the mid-point of his second term from staunch opposition to a 
federal woman suffrage amendment to an active advocate for the cause.  Besides clearly 
identifying the array of forces within and outside Congress that pressured Wilson and the 
extent to which he was, in turn, able to influence Congress and voters, this study more 
fully integrates the suffragists and anti-suffragists into American political history and 
situates the issue of woman suffrage in the broader context of Wilson’s two 
administrations.  I argue that the National American Woman Suffrage Association, not 
the National Woman’s Party, was decisive in Wilson’s conversion to the cause of the 
federal amendment because its approach mirrored his own conservative vision of the 
appropriate method of reform: win a broad consensus, develop a legitimate rationale, and 
make the issue politically valuable.  Additionally, I contend that Wilson did have a 
significant role to play in the successful congressional passage and national ratification of 
the 19th Amendment, though powerful currents of sectionalism, race, and economic 
interests sometimes limited the extent of his influence. 
vii 
 
A deeper understanding of the final stages of the woman suffrage movement 
holds relevance for our understanding of both Progressive Era America and our present 
times.  Observing Wilson treading the fragile line between executive interference and 
reasonable influence provides great insight into Progressive Era conceptions of separation 
of powers and presidential power and leadership.  Furthermore, debates over woman 
suffrage contributed to the larger late-19th and early-20th century debates over the 
meaning of citizenship and the role of the state in an increasingly industrialized nation.  
Enfranchising one-half the population marked a significant moment in our nation’s 
history.  This study deepens and enriches our understanding of the process by which that 
momentous event came to pass. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As Woodrow Wilson traveled the 1912 presidential campaign trail, he confided to 
one of his staff members that he was “definitely and irreconcilably opposed to woman 
suffrage; woman’s place was in the home, and the type of woman who took an active part 
in the suffrage agitation was totally abhorrent to him.”1  Just six years later, though, 
halfway through his second term, he pleaded with the United States Senate to pass the 
federal woman suffrage amendment.  In the midst of a world war and with significant 
mid-term elections looming just days away, Wilson took the unprecedented step of 
personally injecting his voice into the Senate debate over woman suffrage. The future 
direction of the nation rests on granting women the right to vote, he argued, because “we 
shall need their moral sense to preserve what is right and fine and worthy in our system 
of life as well as to discover just what it is that ought to be purified and reformed.  
Without their counselings we shall only be half wise.”2
What had transpired during the first six years of his presidency to bring about 
such a dramatic change in Wilson’s position?  How had the federal suffrage amendment 
been elevated to an issue of such importance that the president felt compelled to 
personally intervene with Congress on its behalf?  Did Wilson’s support indicate a 
principled shift on the issue or was it mere political expediency?  This study seeks to 
   
                                                 
1  Frank P. Stockbridge, "How Woodrow Wilson Won His Nomination," Current History 20 (July 
1924): 567. 
 
2 Congress, Senate, President Woodrow Wilson’s message to the U.S. Senate urging passage of 
the suffrage amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 65th Congress, 2nd sess., Congressional Record (30 
September 1918), vol. 56, pt. 1, 10900-10901. 
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understand the array of forces that pressured Wilson and the extent to which he was, in 
turn, able to influence Congress and voters.  Its aim is to more fully integrate the 
suffragists into American political history and to situate the issue of woman suffrage in 
the broader context of Wilson’s two administrations.  In doing so, this study has the 
potential to enhance our understanding not just of Wilson and the woman suffrage 
movement, but also of the nature of legislative change in our representative system and of 
presidential power during the Progressive Era.  Failure to fully understand the process by 
which one-half of the population attained the franchise will – to use Wilson’s words - 
leave us only “half wise.” 
 By focusing on Wilson’s relationship to woman suffrage, this study is designed to 
both fill voids in the existing scholarship and to weigh in on key historiographical 
debates.  Historians of woman suffrage have devoted a great deal of attention to Wilson’s 
relationship to the 19th Amendment.  Women who personally participated in the suffrage 
campaign authored the earliest histories, published in the decades immediately following 
passage of the federal amendment.  The manner in which these accounts described 
Wilson’s role in securing the amendment depended on whether the authors had worked 
with the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) or with the smaller 
and more militant National Woman’s Party (NWP).  Both groups agreed that Wilson 
eventually became an advocate and that his support helped secure the necessary votes in 
Congress and, later, in the state ratification campaigns.  However, they disagreed sharply 
on the cause of his conversion.   
Those affiliated with NAWSA insisted that Wilson was won over to the cause by 
their organization’s tireless campaigning along nonpartisan lines at both the state and 
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national level and by women’s home front service during World War I.3  In contrast, 
women affiliated with the NWP argued that, as a result of their campaign to “hold the 
party in power responsible” and the publicity-generating militant tactics they employed, 
Wilson recognized the urgency for passing the federal suffrage amendment under a 
Democratic administration.  Furthermore, NWP activists adamantly believed that 
NAWSA abandoned the cause of suffrage during the war, focusing all of its efforts on 
war service and leaving the NWP to shoulder the brunt of the suffrage work.4
As the field of Women’s History emerged and grew during the last half of the 20th 
century, a wide range of studies on the suffrage movement appeared.  Most of these 
ground-breaking works wrestled in some way with the relative effectiveness of the 
NAWSA and NWP strategies.  With the publication of Century of Struggle in 1959, 
Eleanor Flexner launched what was to become the traditional interpretation of the 
influence both the NWP and NAWSA had on the president.  Flexner concludes that the 
real contribution of the NWP was to bring the federal amendment back to a central 
position in the suffrage movement through the work it performed between 1913 and 
  
                                                 
3 Early suffrage histories written by NAWSA members include Ida A. Husted Harper, ed. The 
History of Woman Suffrage, Vol. 5, 1900-1920, (New York: Arno and the New York Times, 1969). 
Originally published in 1922, Volume 5 of The History of Woman Suffrage was quickly followed by Carrie 
Chapman Catt and Nellie Rogers Shuler, Woman Suffrage and Politics: The Inner Story of the Suffrage 
Movement (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923).   The pro-NAWSA position in both of these works 
was later supported by  Maud Wood Park, Front Door Lobby, ed. Edna Lamprey Stantial (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1960). 
 
4 The first full history of the NWP, published in 1921, was Inez Hayes Irwin, The Story of the 
Woman’s Party.  It was republished in 1977 as Inez Hayes Irwin, The Story of Alice Paul and the National 
Woman's Party (Fairfax, Virginia: Denlinger's Publishers, Ltd, 1977) .  Additional first-hand NWP 
accounts include Doris Stevens, Jailed for Freedom (New York: Liveright Publishing Company, 1920), 
Caroline Katzenstein, Lifting the Curtain: The State and National Woman Suffrage Campaigns in 
Pennsylvania as I Saw them (Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1955).   Although these accounts make clear that the 
participants were aware that woman suffrage had become entangled with other political objectives like 
prohibition, progressive labor protection laws, and Southern voting qualifications designed to 
disenfranchise potential black voters, they rarely connect Wilson’s actions on woman suffrage to those 
other issues. 
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1916.  Beginning in January, 1917, however, the party began to use militant tactics that 
included picketing in front of the White House, lighting bonfires in which Wilson’s 
speeches about democracy were burned, and conducting hunger strikes after they had 
been arrested.  Flexner asserts that the militant phase of NWP activity probably did not 
help the cause and certainly did not endear suffragists to Wilson.  She concludes that 
NAWSA, under the strict control of Carrie Chapman Catt and her moderate, nonpartisan 
approach, found the most effective path to win over the president and eventually gain the 
vote.5  With minor changes in points of emphasis, subsequent scholars adopted Flexner’s 
interpretation.6
 Importantly, Flexner notes that winning the support of the president was not the 
only challenge suffragists faced.  Even with his support, the suffrage amendment was 
defeated twice in the Senate (first in October 1918 and again in February 1919) before 
finally passing by the slim margin of two votes in June 1919 under a Republican-
controlled Congress.  Flexner lists the multitude of other issues facing elected officials.  
Southern representatives had to contend with constituents fearful that woman suffrage 
threatened white supremacy.  Select congressmen also faced pressure from the liquor and 
    
                                                 
5  Eleanor Flexner and Ellen Fitzpatrick, Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in 
the United States (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996), 262-268. 
 
6 See William L. O'Neill, Everyone was Brave: A History of Feminism in America (New York: 
The New York Times Book Company, 1971) and Sidney R. Bland, "Techniques of Persuasion: The 
National Woman's Party and Woman Suffrage, 1913-1919" (Ph.D. diss., George Washington University, 
1972),.   O’Neill argues that it was NAWSA’s gentler, persuasive approach that converted Wilson.  He 
criticizes the NWP for its policy of “holding the party in power responsible” and damaging the cause 
through militant actions.  O’Neill contends that the NWP was an embarrassment to both NAWSA and 
Wilson by continuing to focus its attacks on him after he had already come out in support of suffrage. In an 
exceptionally well-balanced study, Bland contends that the NWP increased enthusiasm for the federal 
amendment and paved the way for more moderate reform.  He sides with Flexner, though, in arguing that 
the NWP’s period of greatest influence was from 1913-1916.  Like O’Neill, Bland concludes that 
campaigning against all Democrats in 1914 and 1916 was politically foolhardy and that the NWP tactics 
after late-1917 were counterproductive. 
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textile industries that feared woman voters would support reformist legislation such as 
prohibition and protective child labor laws.7
 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the traditional interpretation was challenged by 
a number of new publications.  This new generation of historians argued that the NWP 
had received short shrift in the existing scholarship.  They offered a revisionist 
interpretation in which the political pressure wrought by the militant tactics of the NWP 
received credit not only for converting Wilson, but also for forcing Congress to pass the 
19th Amendment.  In their view, NAWSA’s nonpartisan, persuasive approach had been 
appropriate when women did not have any other tools available to them.  But by 1914, 
more than four million women (mostly in western states) had been enfranchised by their 
states.  As a result, a new approach was in order. 
  In pointing out the influence of these 
outside factors on Congressmen, though, Flexner neglects to explicitly connect them to 
Wilson’s decision to withhold or exert executive influence. 
According to the revisionist version, the NWP rightly chose to use women’s 
voting power to convince politicians from both parties that they must accede to the 
suffragists’ demand for a federal amendment or face the consequences of inaction in 
future elections.  Additionally, revisionists argue, the picketing, arrests, and harsh 
treatment suffered by NWP members at the hands of the Wilson Administration 
generated enormous publicity and public sympathy for the militant suffragists.  The NWP 
was successful in pointing out the hypocrisy of a president committed to “making the 
world safe for democracy” while denying democratic rights to women in his own nation.  
While acknowledging a secondary role for the ongoing work of NAWSA, the revisionists 
                                                 
7 Flexner and Fitzpatrick, Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United 
States, 286-297. 
 
6 
 
assert that it was the NWP’s militance that eventually forced Wilson to support the 
federal amendment in order to avoid continued embarrassment to his administration and 
electoral damage for his party.8
 With the exception of some critical reviews, little new scholarship has appeared to 
either rebuke or temper the revisionist version.
 
9  The heroic NWP narrative – in which 
women stop pleading with men to “give” them the vote and instead use women’s political 
power and militant tactics to “win” the right to vote – seemingly found a ready audience 
among post-Second Wave Feminism scholars.  The revisionist interpretation even found 
its way into popular culture with the airing of a 2004 HBO film entitled “Iron Jawed 
Angels.”  Starring popular actresses Hilary Swank as the young, vibrant Alice Paul and 
the older Angelica Huston as Carrie Chapman Catt, the film serves as a perfect 
dramatization of the heroic pro-NWP narrative.10
                                                 
8 The revisionist version was first fully articulated in Christine A. Lunardini, From Equal Suffrage 
to Equal Rights: Alice Paul and the National Woman's Party, 1910-1928 (New York: New York University 
Press, 1986).  Interestingly, in an earlier article co-authored with Thomas Knock, Lunardini offered an 
assessment that was more in keeping with the traditional interpretation.  See Christine A. Lunardini and 
Thomas J. Knock, "Woodrow Wilson and Woman Suffrage: A New Look," Political Science Quarterly 95, 
no. 4 (Winter 1981): 655-671.  Other versions of the revisionist argument appear in Sara Hunter Graham, 
"Woodrow Wilson, Alice Paul, and the Woman Suffrage Movement," Political Science Quarterly 98, no. 4 
(Winter 1984): 665-768. , Sara Hunter Graham, Woman Suffrage and the New Democracy (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1996), Linda G. Ford, Iron-Jawed Angels: The Suffrage Militancy of the National 
Woman's Party, 1912-1920 (New York: University Press of America, 1991), Susan D. Becker, The Origins 
of the Equal Rights Amendment: American Feminism between the Wars (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1981), Katherine H. Adams and Michael L. Keene, Alice Paul and the American 
Suffrage Campaign (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008)  More than a decade before the emergence 
of this new school of thought, Aileen Kraditor had indicated a bias toward the NWP approach in the 
original 1965 publication of her seminal work, The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920.  
However, in the preface to the 1981 edition, she indicated that she had adopted a “more neutral approach” 
toward the controversy between NAWSA and the NWP.  See Aileen S. Kraditor, The Ideas of the Woman 
Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1981), vi-vii. 
   While providing a wide audience with 
 
9 In fact, recent suffrage scholarship tends to cite the revisionists without even acknowledging that 
the effectiveness of the competing NAWSA / NWP strategies is contested historiographical terrain.  For 
example, see Rebecca J. Mead, How the Vote was Won: Woman Suffrage in the Western United States, 
1868-1914 (New York: New York University Press, 2004).  In her analysis of the 1914 mid-term elections, 
Mead relies heavily on Lunardini’s From Equal Suffrage to Equal Rights. 
 
10  Katja Von Garnier, Iron Jawed Angels, ed. HBO and Spring Creek Productions, 2004). 
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at least some knowledge of the obstacles faced by suffragists, the film is unabashedly 
biased toward the militants.11
In both the traditional and revisionist interpretation, the bulk of the scholarly 
disagreement centers on the competing influence of NAWSA and the NWP on Wilson’s 
conversion.  This analysis often comes at the expense of a more thorough examination of 
the competing pressures on the president from other progressive reform movements, 
Southerners determined to defend their entrenched racial hierarchy, and powerful 
business interests.  One notable exception to this trend is David Morgan’s Suffragists and 
Democrats: The Politics of Woman Suffrage in America.  Morgan carefully examines 
Wilson’s choices about when, where, and with whom to exert his influence in favor of 
the federal suffrage amendment.  He methodically places Wilson’s actions in the context 
of sectional rivalries, economic realities, and party politics.
 
12
                                                 
 
  Published in 1972, 
Morgan’s account does not enjoy the benefit of more recent scholarship on the goals of 
the suffrage leaders or on Wilson’s state of mind during his second term in office.  
Additionally, he wrongly discounts the importance of NAWSA’s active participation in 
war service on Wilson’s decision to serve as an advocate for the 19th Amendment.  Still, 
Suffragists and Democrats represents the most comprehensive political history in the 
existing suffrage literature.   
11 In a review of the film in the Journal of American History, historian Carla Bittel laments, “Is 
this what it takes to attract new audiences to women’s history?”  While acknowledging that the film may be 
useful for teaching students about history and popular culture, she concludes, “The challenge, then, remains 
to promote interest in women’s history and still teach about who we think the suffragists were, rather than 
who we want them to be.” See Carla Bittel, "Review of Iron Jawed Angels," Journal of American History 
91, no. 3 (December 2004): 1131-1132.  For a film on woman suffrage that takes a more scholarly 
approach, see Ruth Pollak, One Woman One Vote (Alexandria, VA: PBS Video, 1995).  
 
12 David Morgan, Suffragists and Democrats: The Politics of Woman Suffrage in America 
(Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1972). See especially Chapter 11: Liquor, Cotton, and 
Suffrage, p. 155-178. 
 
8 
 
 While most suffrage historians have tended toward a myopic view of the Wilson 
Administration, Wilson scholars have erred in the other direction.  They have paid 
relatively little attention to the way the suffrage campaign weighed in among the other 
issues of Wilson’s Administration.  Sadly, one could browse through shelves of 
monographs on Wilson’s foreign and domestic policy and not realize that one-half of the 
nation’s population gained the right to vote during his administration.13  The presence of 
an organized suffrage movement of more than two million women, not to mention more 
than 700,000 organized anti-suffragists, is notably absent from these accounts.14
Wilson’s primary biographer, Arthur S. Link, mentions the President’s interaction 
with suffragists only a few times in his five-volume history of Wilson’s two terms.  His 
most extensive discussion concerns Wilson’s decision to vote in favor of the state 
suffrage referendum in New Jersey in 1915 – a pronouncement that Link contends was 
intimately tied to the President’s simultaneous choice to announce plans to remarry just a 
little more than a year after the death of his first wife.  While Wilson’s affirmative vote in 
New Jersey was certainly significant, Link’s over-simplified explanation of the decision 
fails to connect this action to the president’s broader experience with the suffrage 
movement.
   
15
                                                 
13 While the 19th Amendment was a significant step toward greater democracy, it is important to 
note that although it technically enfranchised all women, millions of African-American women living in 
southern states were excluded from voting for another fifty years as a result of state constitutions that 
prohibited almost all African-Americans – male and female - from exercising their voting rights. 
  Wilson’s later advocacy of the federal suffrage amendment is almost 
 
14  For example, presidential historian Lewis Gould’s assessment of Wilson’s domestic 
accomplishments does not even mention woman suffrage.  Lewis L. Gould, The Modern American 
Presidency (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 41.   
 
15 Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crises, 1915-1916 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1964), 1-14. 
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entirely absent from Link’s account.  Other biographies do not devote much more time to 
the suffrage issue than does Link. 16
Much scholarly work has been done on Wilson’s relationship to progressive 
legislation, but suffrage is usually excluded from those investigations in favor of a focus 
on economic reforms.  Historians and political scientists have thoroughly debated 
Wilson’s move toward progressivism in advance of the 1916 presidential election.  The 
debate centers on whether Wilson was simply a political opportunist – pandering to the 
labor movement and to progressive voters that he desperately needed in order win re-
election – or whether his shift indicated an actual transformation in his thinking about the 
role of the federal government in an increasingly urban-industrial nation.
   
17
                                                 
16 For example, see Kendrick Clements, The Presidency of Woodrow Wilson (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1992), Daniel D. Stid, The President as Statesman: Woodrow Wilson and the 
Constitution (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), Arthur Walworth, Woodrow Wilson, 3d ed. 
(New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1978).  More personal biographies such as A. Heckscher, 
Woodrow Wilson (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1991) and Phyllis L. Levin, Edith and Woodrow: 
The Wilson White House (New York: Scribner, 2001) mention Wilson’s wives’ distaste for women’s 
political participation and, later, the actions of the NWP.  However, neither author devotes more than a few 
sentences to Wilson’s reaction to suffrage pressure.  His interaction with Congress on the issue is 
completely absent from these accounts.  In two more recent biographies, the authors do specifically address 
Wilson’s relationship to the woman suffrage campaign, but there is little analysis of his conversion.  See 
John Milton Cooper Jr., Woodrow Wilson: A Biography (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009), 411-415. , 
Kendrick Clements and Eric A. Cheezum, Woodrow Wilson (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2003), 119-122. 
Cooper devotes only four pages of his 600 page biography to Wilson’s action on woman suffrage.   
  Intertwined 
 
17 Link claims that the president’s newfound commitment to “advanced progressivism” was born 
out of his belief that the Democrats must stay in power in order to guide the nation through the challenges 
of industrialization and urbanization.  According to Link, Wilson had “broad political principles” but was 
not “an inflexible dogmatist.”  In order to win re-election, he was willing to transform himself into “a new 
political creature.”  See Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917 (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1954), 224. and Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crises, 1915-1916, 321-323.  The 
“advanced progressivism” to which Link refers includes Wilson’s nomination of Louis D. Brandeis to the 
Supreme Court, his support of the rural credits, workmen’s compensation, and child labor bills, his backing 
of the LaFollette Seaman’s Act, and support for the principle of woman suffrage.  See Link, Woodrow 
Wilson and the Progressive Era, 250. For accounts that portray Wilson as even more conservative, see 
Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916 (New 
York: The Free Press, 1963), 205-211. , James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900-
1918 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), 162-166. Some scholars have challenged Link’s interpretation of 
Wilson’s 1916 shift.  The challengers argue that Wilson’s positions in 1912 showed an openness to the type 
of legislation that he ultimately supported in 1916.  Without denying the importance of electoral politics, 
they assert that Wilson’s shift was more evolutionary than Link and his adherents allow.  See Stephen B. 
Wood, Constitutional Politics in the Progressive Era: Child Labor and the Law (Boston: Beacon Press, 
10 
 
throughout this debate is the impact of the First World War and the role that Wilson 
viewed for himself and for the United States in determining the nature of the post-war 
world order.18
One additional void in the existing scholarship is a thorough analysis of anti-
suffragists’ entreaties toward the president.  A number of solid works on the anti-
suffragists received publication in the last two decades, contributing to both the existing 
literature on women’s political activism at the turn of the century and to Progressive Era 
politics and society, in general.  With specific respect to the relationship of anti-
suffragists to Wilson, though, significant questions remain.
  Despite this wealth of research and analysis on Wilson’s progressive shift, 
particular consideration of his transformation on the issue of woman suffrage is largely 
absent from these accounts. 
19
                                                                                                                                                 
1968), 89. , Marshall E. Dimock, "Woodrow Wilson as Legislative Leader," The Journal of Politics 19, no. 
1 (February 1957): 124. , Richard L. Watson, "Woodrow Wilson and His Interpreters, 1947-1957," The 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review 44, no. 2 (September 1957): 217-219. , Walworth, Woodrow Wilson, 
288.    
 
 
18 N. Gordon Levin argues that Wilson’s domestic and foreign policies were driven primarily by 
his desire to attain a “peaceful liberal capitalist world order under international law, safe both from 
traditional imperialism and revolutionary socialism.”  See N. Gordon Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World 
Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968). Quote 
from p. vii.  The importance of the war to Wilson’s decision-making as early as 1915 is also emphasized by 
Richard E. Abrams, "Woodrow Wilson and the Southern Congressmen, 1913-1916," The Journal of 
Southern History 22, no. 4 (November 1956): 437. and, more recently, Alan Dawley, Changing the World: 
American Progressives in War and Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 121-123. 
   
19 For the most comprehensive works on the anti-suffragists, see Anne M. Benjamin, A History of 
the Anti-Suffrage Movement in the United States from 1895-1920: Women Against Equality (Lewiston, 
U.K.: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1991), Thomas J. Jablonsky, The Home, Heaven, and Mother Party: 
Female Anti-Suffragists in the United States, 1868-1920 (Brooklyn: Carlson Publishing, 1994), Jane 
Jerome Camhi, Women Against Women: American Anti-Suffragism, 1880-1920 (Brooklyn: Carlson 
Publishing, 1994) and Susan E. Marshall, Splintered Sisterhood: Gender and Class in the Campaign 
Against Women Suffrage (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1997).  For a community study that 
examines an earlier period of anti-suffrage activity, see Joyce C. Follet, "Gender and Community: Kenosha, 
Wisconsin, 1835-1913" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1991),. Benjamin’s work is almost 
entirely narrative with minimal analysis, but she does carefully chronicle Wilson’s slide toward the pro-
suffrage camp and suggests that this caused great frustration among the anti-suffragists.  The three latter 
works offer greater analysis of the anti-suffrage movement’s ideology, membership, strategy and tactics, 
alliances, and impact.  However, none offer a focused examination of the movement’s relationship to 
11 
 
One notable exception to the Wilson scholarship described above is a piece by 
Victoria Bissell Brown published in 2008 in a superb collection of essays entitled 
Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson.  Noting the same historiographical voids, Brown urges 
Wilson scholars in particular to take woman suffrage more seriously.  She calls for 
recognition of the fact that the president’s evolving stance on this issue tells us a great 
deal about, “his leadership style, his negotiation of political principle and political 
practicality, his management of the South and race, and his identification with the social 
justice agenda of the era’s progressives – not to mention his assumptions about the 
female half of the human race and his relationships with the leaders of the divided 
woman suffrage movement.”20
This study, then, is an attempt to at least partially fill the suffrage movement void 
in the existing Wilson scholarship while also providing a broader picture of Wilson’s 
political conversion to the body of suffrage history.  It is designed to build on the 
foundation described above by incorporating both the suffrage and Wilson scholarship of 
  Brown’s brief but powerful essay is a call for a more 
integrated narrative of Wilson and woman suffrage – a call that the remainder of my 
work attempts to answer. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Wilson or his response to the anti-suffragists’ entreaties.   As stated previously, the existing Wilson 
scholarship largely ignores the anti-suffragists.    
 
20 Victoria Bissell Brown, "Did Woodrow Wilson's Gender Politics Matter?" in Reconsidering 
Woodrow Wilson: Progressivism, Internationalism, War, and Peace (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson 
Center Press, 2008), 126. Brown is refreshingly explicit about her aim: “The evidence here is intended to 
persuade those who spend their scholarly lives in the Wilson archives to cease avoiding woman suffrage as 
if it were a boyish case of sexual insincerity and, instead, pursue it as a serious example of Wilson’s 
evolution as a party leader, chief executive, and social justice progressive.” Quote from p. 130.  Brown’s 
essay goes on to argue that Wilson converted to the principle of woman suffrage when his assumptions 
about the decline of society that might result from women crossing the boundary from private to public 
sphere were shattered by the fact of women’s increasing civic activism and the fact that this increase was 
not accompanied by some sort of social armageddon.  While acknowledging that he did “play politics” with 
the issue – particularly during his first term – she argues that this is not evidence of his opposition to the 
principle of white women’s enfranchisement.  Rather, his political maneuvering is evidence that, “he 
embraced the fact of white female suffrage and moved on to treat it like every other political fact; 
something to be leveraged, controlled, and exploited.” Quote from p. 154. 
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the last three decades.  I argue that suffrage became an issue of tremendous political 
value during Wilson’s second term.  Not out of a sense of justice or any wholesale 
feminist conversion, but out of knowledge of political reality, Wilson came to support the 
federal amendment.  The degree to which he grew to personally regard women as 
deserving members of the franchise is difficult to discern.21
There were limits to Wilson’s capacity to influence events within his own party 
and in Congress as a whole.  Included in this study is a thorough examination of his 
inability to secure the needed two votes in the Senate during the October 1918 and 
February 1919 Senate debates.  I explain the manner in which the federal suffrage 
amendment created enemies among Southern Democrats, the liquor industry, and the 
  Regardless of the extent of 
his private conversion, though, his public support of the principle of suffrage was key in 
several crucial ways: 1) He lent assistance in various state referenda, thereby increasing 
the number of Congressmen from suffrage states and improving the chances of successful 
passage for the federal amendment;  2) He played a role in creating a separate House 
committee on woman suffrage that removed a large legislative hurdle for the suffragists; 
and 3)  He secured the votes of several legislators through personal appeals, including the 
one crucial vote needed to push the federal amendment through the Senate in June 1919. 
                                                 
 
21 I am somewhat less convinced than Brown is of the extent of Wilson’s personal conversion.  
Still, comparing Wilson’s deep distaste for women in politics during his academic years and his early 
political career with the enormous level of support he gave to the suffrage movement during the final push 
for passage of the federal amendment, it certainly appears as if his experiences with women in the public 
sphere eroded his personal opposition to their participation in politics.  For example, female social 
reformers such as Julia Lathrop and Grace Abbot of the Children’s Bureau and Florence Kelley of the 
National Consumers League petitioned Wilson on a range of reform issues.  These women were also 
committed suffragists who most likely contributed to Wilson’s personal and political conversion on the 
issue of suffrage.  Unfortunately, this connection is not explicit in any of the documents I encountered in 
my research.  I have been unable to find any record of these reformers explicitly raising the issue of woman 
suffrage with Wilson as they advocated for other progressive reforms such as protective labor legislation 
for women or children.  Still, even the absence of such evidence is intriguing and, warrants greater 
exploration and research. 
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textile industry.  These enemies had an impact on the president.  He was least willing to 
push those members of his own party whom he knew faced constituents panicked about 
threats to white supremacy.  Wilson was also aware that some Congressmen could not 
vote in favor of suffrage without losing the support of industry leaders back home who 
feared that women voters would do just as many suffragists promised – end child labor, 
limit working hours, and usher in national prohibition.  To see suffrage as one of many 
competing priorities on Wilson’s agenda to maintain party unity and retain Democratic 
control of the White House and Congress is to place it in a new light. 
Alongside this exploration of the ability of the president to persuade Congress, I 
assess the impact of the various factions that pushed and pulled at Wilson over the 
suffrage issue.  While crediting the NWP with revitalizing the campaign for the federal 
amendment, I develop the argument that ultimately the NAWSA strategy was infinitely 
more successful at gaining the president’s support than that of the NWP.  In taking a 
more critical stand against the NWP than even historians of the traditional interpretation 
school, I explain why the policy of “holding the party in power” was ineffective in both 
the 1914 and 1916 elections.  A close examination of Wilson’s correspondence reveals 
that his most-trusted advisors told him not to worry about women in the West becoming 
single-issue voters and abandoning the Democrats.  The election results indicate that 
Wilson’s advisors were right. 
Furthermore, the militant tactics employed by the NWP beginning in 1917 hurt the 
cause of suffrage more than they furthered it.  By appearing to be disloyal during 
wartime, the militant pickets damaged the image of the suffrage movement just as the 
president was beginning to become more supportive of the cause.  The argument made by 
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the NWP leaders was that the publicity they were generating would force the president to 
act.  However, the overwhelming majority of the correspondence from NWP members all 
over the country back to the NWP headquarters indicates that publicity, if it existed at all, 
was mostly negative in local papers.  A tiny minority of Americans protested the 
violation of the pickets’ civil rights.  A vast majority, many of whom were ardent 
suffrage supporters, believed that attacking a president who was trying to conduct a war 
was reprehensible.  
The NAWSA strategy, on the other hand, made the president an ally to the cause.  
Catt’s decision to remain nonpartisan and to support the war strengthened Wilson’s hand 
as he prevailed upon members of Congress and the general public to reward women’s 
war service and aid his goal of “making the world safe for democracy” by granting full 
democratic rights in the United States.  NAWSA’s disavowal of the NWP and active 
campaign to distinguish itself from its more militant and partisan sisters succeeded in 
bringing the president and his cabinet more closely in line with the NAWSA leadership.  
Catt, in fact, fostered a personal and political relationship with Wilson that was vital to 
gaining his support for the federal amendment.  The failure of NAWSA’s leaders to 
protest the violation of their fellow suffragists’ civil rights certainly needs to be 
recognized and condemned.  Ultimately, though, NAWSA’s decision to distance itself 
from the NWP and to continue to work on winning state suffrage referenda in addition to 
pursuing the federal amendment paid big dividends with the president, members of 
Congress, and the general public. 
This argument is a clear refutation of the revisionist interpretation.  It may be 
disappointing to those who long for a more heroic narrative to accept the fact that the 
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NAWSA strategy was more effective than the NWP’s confrontational militance.  But it is 
more important that we understand what actually happened than to bend the historical 
reality to fulfill a vision of what some would like the truth to be.  With the nation at war 
and “100 percent Americanism” being the watchword, the pickets were viewed by most 
people as a detriment to their cause.  Further, some opponents of suffrage in the Senate 
used the actions of the NWP as an excuse to continue to oppose the federal amendment.  
To deny these facts – as distasteful as they may be – is to do an injustice to the historical 
record.   
In order to contextualize the final phase of the suffrage campaign during Wilson’s 
second term, the second chapter reviews key events leading up to and including Wilson’s 
first term in the White House.  This review includes an examination of the evolution of 
Wilson’s stance on women in politics from his earliest days as a young professor at the 
all-female Bryn Mawr College to his years as America’s president.  Wilson’s negative 
attitude toward teaching female students about politics and his disgruntlement at having 
to work under a woman, Bryn Mawr President M. Carey Thomas, help to show the 
depths of his opposition to an increased public role for women during that stage of his 
life.  His attitude did not appear to change during his subsequent academic career, nor 
during his time as governor of New Jersey.   
Additionally, this chapter places the suffrage movement into the broad spectrum of 
the women’s movement of the late-19th and early-20th century.  It includes a thorough 
discussion of the divisions that existed within the women’s movement and how those 
divisions often spilled over into the suffrage movement.  For example, during its 1896 
national convention, NAWSA struggled mightily with developing an organizational 
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stance on Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s highly controversial The Woman’s Bible, eventually 
voting to disavow any responsibility for or association with the work.  While a minority 
within NAWSA welcomed Stanton’s critique of organized religion’s role in subjugating 
women, a majority of suffragists feared alienating support for their cause by embracing 
Stanton’s radicalism.22
The third chapter recounts the gradual growth in the number of suffrage states.  
Regional differences figure prominently.  By the end of 1914, almost every western state 
and territory had enfranchised women, but suffragists in the East and South were yet to 
win a single victory.  This chapter explains the regional nature of both support and 
opposition to suffrage.  One of the results of the regional opposition to a federal suffrage 
amendment was the introduction of the confusing and controversial Shafroth-Palmer 
Amendment in March 1914.
  This type of controversy repeated itself over and over as 
suffragists attempted to deal with socialism, pacifism, nativism, prohibition, marriage 
reform, and perhaps most importantly, sectionalism.  A desire to foster sectional 
reconciliation and to respect “states’ rights” is largely what explains NAWSA’s 
important decision in 1893 to focus on state referenda rather than a federal amendment.  
Therefore, along with its detailing of the ethnocentrism and social class biases of many 
suffragists, this chapter includes a discussion of the racism of white suffragists and the 
manner in which they, more often than not, sacrificed the principle of universal suffrage 
for the expedient attainment of white woman suffrage.   
23
                                                 
22 For coverage of this specific controversy, see Flexner and Fitzpatrick, Century of Struggle: The 
Woman's Rights Movement in the United States, 212.  
  Simultaneously supporting the original federal suffrage 
 
23 The Shafroth-Palmer Amendment required that if eight percent of voters in any state signed an 
initiative petition requesting a referendum on woman suffrage, the state then must submit the question of 
suffrage to the voters.  This new variation offered relief from two major problems facing suffragists.  First, 
it held the potential to force a vote in states that had so far managed to defeat campaigns for state referenda.  
17 
 
amendment and the Shafroth-Palmer Amendment up until December 1915 led NAWSA 
into confusion and disarray that was not resolved until Catt assumed the presidency in 
December 1915.  This coincided with the emergence of a militant insurgency within 
NAWSA, led by Alice Paul.  Paul and her co-chair of NAWSA’s Congressional 
Committee, Lucy Burns, represented a younger generation of suffragists, frustrated with 
the conservatism of the National and intent on making passage of the federal amendment 
the organization’s singular focus.  Disagreements between traditional NAWSA leaders 
and Paul’s insurgents culminated with the definitive split between NAWSA and the NWP 
in late 1914.  An exploration of this divide and its impact on the 1914 mid-term elections 
makes up the final section of the second chapter.  
Wilson’s conversion from a states’ rights supporter to an advocate of the federal 
amendment occurred between the Democratic National Convention in June 1916 and the 
vote on the amendment in the House in January 1918.  The significant events that took 
place in between serve as the basis of the analysis in chapters three, four, and five.  
Chapter three charts Wilson’s actions with regard to woman suffrage in advance of his 
1916 re-election campaign.  Additionally, it analyzes the diverse strategies employed by 
NAWSA and the NWP as they followed divergent paths toward attaining the federal 
suffrage amendment.  Chapter four focuses specifically on the 1916 campaign and 
election, to include a comparative analysis of Wilson’s changed stance on child labor and 
8-hour day legislation.  Heading into the election, Wilson recognized the need to make a 
bow toward progressive voters whom he had offended during the previous two years.  
His opposition to rural credits, refusal to grant the AFL immunity from the Sherman Act, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Secondly, it could gain the support of Senators who opposed suffrage on the principle of states’ rights 
because it contained no provisions for federal enforcement and the voters of each individual state would 
still make the decision on suffrage.   
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approval of racial segregation in federal service, and refusal to support the Palmer Child 
Labor bill had alienated progressives of every stripe and from every section of the 
country.  Wilson’s need to win back some of those voters played a major role in his 
decision to appear both pro-suffrage and pro-labor in the months leading up to the 
November 1916 election.  Yet, he also needed to stay true to the conservatives within his 
own party, particularly those from the South.  This chapter reveals the president treading 
carefully through a re-election campaign.  Catt astutely recognized Wilson’s dilemma.  
She crafted a strategy designed to win presidential support that took his difficult political 
position into full account.  NAWSA, the NWP, and the Wilson Administration all 
developed different interpretations of the 1916 election results.  A discussion of this post-
election analysis – and its impact on the strategies adopted by each group for 1917 - 
comprises the final portion of chapter four. 
The aftermath of the 1916 election, to include the NWP’s decision to launch more 
militant tactics and the NAWSA decision to distance itself from the NWP and work in 
support of the war effort, serves as the focus of the fifth chapter. The president’s primary 
focus during 1917 was U.S. entry into the war.  Suffrage histories sometimes 
miscalculate the relative importance of their subject.  Wilson’s attitude toward suffrage 
during 1917 will be placed into context with the larger issues he faced – issues that had 
the potential to affect the entire world.  To the extent that he did involve himself with 
suffragists, he usually did so in concert with Catt’s vision for securing the federal 
amendment and in spite of the hostile actions of the NWP.  Wilson and Catt’s vision for 
the proper suffrage strategy changed over the course of 1917 as events unfolded, but their 
vision evolved together, through constant and careful correspondence.  Chapter five 
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illuminates the process by which Catt and Wilson developed a joint vision for a suffrage 
victory. 
The sixth chapter outlines the opponents of woman suffrage.  It examines the basis of 
opposition and the lobbying strategies of the cotton textile and liquor industry 
representatives, with particular attention to their attempts to influence Wilson.  Many 
southern white supremacists opposed a federal suffrage amendment for fear that it would 
re-open the question of voter eligibility in the South.  In the two decades surrounding the 
turn of the century, almost every southern state had succeeded in amending its state 
constitution in order to disenfranchise black citizens.  A federal woman suffrage 
amendment, which would include enforcement provisions, threatened to overturn white 
political supremacy in the South.  Sadly, southern suffragists chose to defend their 
movement from racist attacks by claiming that black women could be disenfranchised 
just as easily as black men.  Part of chapter six examines the nature of this debate in the 
South.  This section also explains the ideology, membership, strategy and tactics, 
alliances, and impact of the anti-suffragists, with particular attention to how they 
attempted to stop the president’s slide toward the suffrage camp and his response to their 
entreaties. 24
From January 1918 until its final passage in the Senate in June 1919, Wilson actively 
campaigned for the federal amendment.  Chapter seven examines his specific actions and 
the reaction of those he tried to influence.  It explores the manner in which suffrage 
  Additionally, I chart the impact of the Catholic Church’s opposition to 
suffrage and the methods employed by anti-suffragists to utilize prominent clergy 
members as part of their campaign strategy.  
                                                 
24 My use of the term “anti-suffragists” refers specifically to women who joined organizations and 
campaigned to block any measure designed to extend the franchise to women.    
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competed with other political priorities and played a critical role in the Republican 
victories in the 1918 mid-term elections.  Additionally, it explains why Wilson was 
unable to obtain the two votes necessary to shepherd the amendment through the Senate 
while Congress was still controlled by his party – a party whose Southern members 
privileged maintenance of white supremacy above the pleas of their party’s leader. 
The ratification process lasted from June 1919 to August 1920.  It became, in many 
ways, a race between the two political parties to see which one could claim they had 
helped the cause the most, thereby winning the votes of women in the 1920 Presidential 
and Congressional elections.  Although Wilson was actively involved in trying to speed 
ratification, his was but one voice among many as suffragists battled local interests and 
prejudices in each individual state.  Further, the fight for ratification largely coincided 
with the period in which a stroke left the president severely impaired and largely absent 
from active governing for more than six months.  In that this study is principally 
concerned with Wilson’s ability to influence Congress, the ratification process is only 
briefly examined. 
 The concluding chapter reiterates the arguments made here – that Wilson did have 
a significant role to play in the successful passage of the 19th Amendment, but that more 
powerful currents like sectionalism, race, and economic interests sometimes limited the 
extent of his influence.  Ultimately, Wilson was won over to the cause of the federal 
amendment by NAWSA because its approach mirrored his own conservative vision of 
the appropriate method of reform: win a broad consensus, develop a legitimate rationale, 
and make the issue politically valuable. 
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 A deeper understanding of the final stages of the woman suffrage movement 
holds relevance for our understanding of both Progressive Era America and our present 
times.  Observing Wilson treading the fragile line between executive interference and 
reasonable influence provides us with great insight to Progressive Era conceptions of 
separation of powers and presidential power and leadership. Debates over woman 
suffrage contributed to the larger late-19th and early-20th century debates over the 
meaning of citizenship and the role of the state in an increasingly industrialized nation.  
Enfranchising one-half of the population marked a significant moment in our nation’s 
history.  It is important that we fully and accurately understand the process by which that 
momentous event came to pass. In our contemporary political environment, when 
politicians accused of “flip-flopping” are routinely crucified by their political opponents, 
understanding the ability of past political figures to change their stance on an issue seems 
even more pressing.  Furthermore, there are groups of Americans today still seeking full 
citizenship and access to the fruits of liberty.  For them, this study has the potential to 
serve as a template for how a group of their predecessors learned to operate within the 
political system and achieve victory for a noble cause. 
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CHAPTER 2 
WILSON’S FIRST TERM 
 
Near the end of a long session of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee 
on Woman Suffrage in December 1915, NAWSA President Carrie Chapman Catt 
testified to the committee, “I have discovered that when a man believes in woman 
suffrage it is a national question and when he does not believe in it he says it is a question 
for the states.”25 At the time of Catt’s testimony, President Woodrow Wilson represented 
the non-believers.  He supported woman suffrage only as an issue to be decided by the 
voters of each state.  On the same day that Catt testified to the House Committee, 
President Wilson gave an interview to the New York Times in which he restated his 
position on the issue.  Pointing to the fact that he voted in favor of the state amendment in 
his home state in New Jersey in October of that year, Wilson said he believed suffrage 
was an issue to be decided by the voters of each state.  He conceded, however, that he 
would take the idea of a federal amendment into consideration.26
This chapter outlines Wilson’s early evolution on the question of woman suffrage.  
It explains how and why his position softened when he transitioned from a state governor 
to a national political figure and charts the evasive tactics he employed during his first 
  This concession was a 
significant step forward for a man who had expressed strong opposition to woman 
suffrage in any form only a few years before. 
                                                 
25 Harper, The History of Woman Suffrage, Vol. 5, 1900-1920, 469.  
 
26 “Wilson Hears Pleas of Pros and Antis; Tells Suffragists That He is Considering Their Federal 
Amendment Request,” New York Times, December 16, 1917, 8. 
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two years in office.  Also included in this chapter is a report on the volatile state of the 
suffrage movement as Wilson assumed the presidency.   
 As early as 1885, Wilson wrote to his soon-to-be wife, Ellen Axson, that he did 
not approve of the notions floating around society that women should be liberated from 
the bonds of family to lead independent lives or become involved in the public sphere.  
Wilson believed that family was the bedrock of society and that increased political rights 
for women would alter the precious balance within families.  Ellen totally supported his 
ideas about women’s place in the home and in society.27  Having been raised in a 
traditional, southern family in which gender roles were clearly defined and differentiated, 
Wilson developed similarly traditional views on the ideal of womanhood.  Upon his 
mother’s death in 1888, he remembered her in a letter to his wife: “My mother, with her 
sweet womanliness, her purity, her intelligence, prepared me for a wife . . . love of the 
best womanhood came to me and entered my heart through her apron-strings.”28
                                                 
 
   
27 Levin, Edith and Woodrow: The Wilson White House, 26.; and Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow 
Wilson: Life and Letters (New York: Doubleday, Doran, and Company, 1939), 240-241.Hereafter referred 
to as Life and Letters.  See also Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The Road to the White House (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1947), 2. Wilson’s second wife, Edith Bolling Galt, also held very 
traditional views of women’s inferior intellectual and political status.  Within Wilson’s familial circle, two 
of his daughters developed a more progressive view.  His eldest daughter, Margaret, served as the chair of 
NAWSA’s Honorary Committee during preparations for the 1915 National Convention and was given a 
seat of honor on the platform at the convention’s final session.  Additionally, she was a guest of honor at 
the February 1917 NAWSA Conference at which the organization took an affirmative stand on the 
President’s war position.  See HWS, Vol. 5, 440, 459, and 724.  Jessie Wilson was also sympathetic to the 
suffrage cause, lending her support to the campaign for state suffrage referendum in New Jersey in 1915.  
See “Conversations with Alice Paul: Woman Suffrage and the Equal Rights Amendment,” Interview by 
Amelia Fry (Suffragists Oral History Project, University of California, Berkeley, 1976), 91-92. There is no 
evidence that Margaret and Jessie’s suffrage activity caused a rift between them and their father.  On the 
contrary, Wilson remained close to all three of his daughters throughout their lives.  See Heckscher, 
Woodrow Wilson and the memoirs of Wilson’s youngest daughter, Eleanor Wilson McAdoo, The Woodrow 
Wilsons (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1937). 
 
28  Woodrow Wilson to Ellen Wilson (April 18, 1888), The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed. Arthur 
S. Link, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986. Hereafter referred to as LWWP.  While 
some scholars have argued for a psychoanalytical approach to understanding Wilson’s views on a number 
of issues, to include the appropriate role for women, most historians reject this approach.  See Edwin A. 
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After completing graduate work at John Hopkins University in 1885, Wilson 
began his first teaching assignment at Bryn Mawr College, a recently founded women’s 
college in Pennsylvania.  The college president, M. Carey Thomas, was an ardent 
supporter of women’s rights and increased educational opportunities for women.  Ellen 
was troubled that Wilson had to answer to a woman, and Wilson confided to a friend that 
Thomas represented to him that which he most detested – “advanced women.”29  
Nonetheless, Wilson needed a job. His first choice for employment – Princeton – did not 
have any open positions.  Plus, his primary goal was to write, and he believed the Bryn 
Mawr position would allow him time to work on his own scholarship.30
 Wilson’s years at Bryn Mawr were difficult for him and for those with whom he 
worked precisely because of his view that higher education was largely wasted on the 
minds of young women.  As the head of the History Department, Wilson taught courses 
on Ancient Greece and Rome as well as on European History and American politics.  He 
also gave informal talks on current affairs and constitutional development.  The young 
professor was extremely popular among the undergraduate students who attended his 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Weinstein, James William Anderson, and Arthur S. Link, "Woodrow Wilson's Political Personality: A 
Reappraisal," Political Science Quarterly 93, no. 4 (Winter 1978-1979): 585-598. The authors of this 
article discard psychoanalysis as a way to understand Wilson’s political decisions.  They acknowledge that 
Wilson’s relationship with both of his parents clearly influenced his personality, but argue that – from a 
medical perspective – the neurological results of the various strokes that Wilson suffered had much more to 
do with his evolving personality than any emotional scars from his youth.  For the psychoanalytic 
approach, see Sigmund Freud and William C. Bullitt, Thomas Woodrow Wilson: Twenty-Eighth President 
of the United States, A Psychological Study (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), Alexander L. George and 
Juliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover 
Publications, Inc., 1964). 
 
29 For detailed accounts of Wilson’s experience at Bryn Mawr and conflicts with M. Carey 
Thomas, see Levin, Edith and Woodrow: The Wilson White House, 140. , Heckscher, Woodrow Wilson, 80-
94. 
 
30 Cooper, Woodrow Wilson: A Biography, 53-54.  
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lectures, but the feelings were not mutual.31  Wilson confided his sentiments about the 
students to his diary, writing “Lecturing to young women of the present generation on the 
history and principles of politics is about as appropriate and profitable as would be 
lecturing to stone masons on the evolution of fashion in dress.”32
 Wilson was assigned a graduate fellow for each of his three years on the Bryn 
Mawr faculty.  Writing to a Wilson biographer in 1926, one of his graduate students 
recalled that Wilson was ill-suited for teaching women because he assumed that their 
minds were somehow different than men’s.  She thought it was unfortunate for both 
Wilson and his students that he never made an effort to find out whether his assumptions 
were true.
 
33  Regardless, Wilson abruptly left Bryn Mawr in 1888 after a contract dispute 
with the college.  He accepted a position at Wesleyan University in Connecticut, 
confiding to a friend, “I have long been hungry for a class of men.”34
                                                 
 
 
31 For an excellent summary of Wilson’s years at Bryn Mawr, see Henry Wilkinson Bragdon, 
Woodrow Wilson: The Academic Years (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1967), 143-161.  See also Walworth, Woodrow Wilson, 47.  Both of these historians support the 
conventional wisdom that Wilson was unhappy at Bryn Mawr because he was not particularly engaged by 
teaching women and because he resented Thomas.  John Milton Cooper, Jr., though, argues that it was 
solely the conflict with Thomas that soured Wilson on Bryn Mawr.  According to Cooper, Wilson was a  
supporter of women’s higher education, despite his wife’s disapproval.  See John Milton Cooper Jr., The 
Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1983), 373. , Cooper, Woodrow Wilson: A Biography, 58. Cooper’s support for 
this argument – the fact that Wilson encouraged his daughters and some female cousins to attend college – 
does not overturn the very clear evidence from Wilson’s diary entries and correspondence at the time 
indicating his distaste for teaching political science and history to young women. 
 
32 Woodrow Wilson, Diary Entry (October 20, 1887), Woodrow Wilson Papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (Hereafter referred to as PWW)   
 
33 Bragdon, Woodrow Wilson: The Academic Years, 152.  The graduate student who provided this 
account was Lucy Maynard Salmon who, after leaving Bryn Mawr, taught history at Vassar College for 
nearly forty years.  Salmon was also a staunch suffragist who later served as an advisor to the NWP.  See 
Ford, Iron-Jawed Angels: The Suffrage Militancy of the National Woman's Party, 1912-1920, 54. 
 
34 Bragdon, Woodrow Wilson: The Academic Years, 162. 
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 His views on the inappropriateness of women’s interest in politics changed little 
over the next two decades.  He ran for governor of New Jersey in 1910 at the behest of 
the state’s Democratic Party bosses, but quickly established his independence from those 
same bosses once he attained the party’s nomination.  In a direct challenge to the machine 
politicians, he campaigned on a platform centered on progressive change to include 
increased regulation of railroads and public utilities, a stringent corrupt practices act, and 
direct nomination of candidates.  New Jersey was a state that, according to Link, was 
“ruled by an oligarchical alliance of corporations and politicians and completely 
dominated by big business and bossism.”35  But even New Jersey could not escape the 
tidal wave of progressivism that swept across the nation in the early 20th century.  The 
temper of the state’s voters was clearly in line with the reform sentiments Wilson 
expressed.  He won the election by 50,000 votes in a state that had elected a Republican 
by more than 80,000 votes just two years before.  True to his progressive promises, 
Wilson threw his weight behind a number of reform bills in his first year in office to 
include direct nomination of candidates for office, clean elections, workmen’s 
compensation, and public utility regulation.36
As Governor-elect, Wilson offered no reply to a January 1911 letter from the New 
Jersey Woman’s Suffrage Association.  The association’s leaders complimented him on 
the “fearless and courageous manner” in which he was handling the state’s problems.  
They explained to Wilson that they did not ask for the vote in order to cure all “existing 
  He did not, however, support the fledgling 
woman suffrage movement in his state.   
                                                 
35 Link, Wilson: The Road to the White House, 135.  
 
36 For a detailed account of Wilson’s 1910 gubernatorial campaign and his first year in office, see 
David Hirst, Woodrow Wilson, Reform Governor: A Documentary Narrative (Princeton, NJ: Van 
Norstrand, 1965). 
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evils.” Rather, “We ask it simply in the name of right and justice.”37  The new governor 
did respond, however, to a letter from a Vermont newspaper editor who asked his 
position on equal suffrage.  Wilson wrote, “I must say very frankly that my personal 
judgment is strongly against it.  I believe that the social changes it would involve would 
not justify the gains that would be accomplished by it.”38
Over the next year and a half, Wilson developed a two-pronged strategy for 
dealing with the question of woman suffrage.  First, he argued that – as a presidential 
candidate - he did not need to address the issue because it was not a national question.  
Rather, it was a question for the voters of each state to decide.  Secondly, he altered his 
personal opinion from complete opposition to undecided.  This newly-refined stance 
allowed him to simultaneously placate women voters in the West and to avoid offending 
the staunch states’ rights southern Democrats who comprised his political base.  As the 
1912 election drew closer, he articulated this new position to the Democratic Governor of 
Massachusetts who wrote to solicit Wilson’s opinion on woman suffrage.  Since this 
newly-refined stance would remain Wilson’s position for most of his first term in office, 
his letter to Governor Foss is worth quoting at length: 
  This was the last time Wilson 
offered such a concrete statement of his personal opinion.  With an eye on running for the 
White House, his position began to soften as he faced a national audience.   
I am very much obliged to you for your considerate and candid letter of 
yesterday.  I may say to you very frankly that I do not think that it would 
be best to bring the woman suffrage question into the national campaign, 
so far as we are concerned.  It is not a national question but a state 
question.  So far as it is a state question, I am heartily in favor of its 
                                                 
 
37  Clara Schlee Laddey (President, New Jersey Woman Suffrage Association) and Mary Loring 
Colvin (Corresponding Secretary) to Wilson (January 2, 1911), LWWP. 
 
38 Wilson to Mr. Witter Bynner (June 20, 1911), LWWP.  
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thorough discussion and shall never be jealous of its submission to a 
popular vote.  My own judgment in the matter is in an uncertain balance, I 
mean my judgment as a voting citizen.39
 
  
In one form or another, Wilson repeated this position to anyone who sought to know his 
stance during the 1912 campaign.40
Popular opinion was not with the suffragists in New Jersey or any other states east 
of the Mississippi in 1912, but Wilson did spend time in western states where women had 
been enfranchised via state constitutional amendments.  According to Frank Stockbridge, 
the director of publicity for Wilson’s 1912 presidential campaign, the future president 
was horrified by the idea of women voters.    As Stockbridge reported in a 1924 
reminiscence, Wilson “was definitely and irreconcilably opposed to woman suffrage; 
woman’s place was in the home, and the type of woman who took an active part in the 
suffrage agitation was totally abhorrent to him.”
 
41
The refined position that Wilson adopted as a presidential candidate reflected his 
political acumen.  The base of the Democratic Party was the South.  In the two decades 
preceding the 1912 campaign, southern Democrats had completed their campaign to 
disenfranchise black voters via state constitutional amendments that effectively made the 
  However, Wilson could not escape the 
question as he campaigned in the West.  Stockbridge explained that Wilson decided to 
adopt a states’ rights stance during the campaign in order to effectively “dodge the issue.”   
                                                 
 
39 Wilson to Governor Eugene Noble Foss (August 17, 1912), LWWP.  
 
40  See Wilson to Edith M. Whitmore (February 8, 1912), Excerpts from An Address at the 
Academy of Music in Brooklyn (October 19, 1912), and News Report about Wilson’s Arrival in Pittsburgh 
(April 11, 1912), LWWP. 
 
41 Frank Parker Stockbridge, "How Woodrow Wilson Won His Nomination," Current History 20 
(1924): 567.  Stockbridge’s report paints a much different picture that we get from Wilson’s own letter to 
Governor Foss of Massachusetts.  Given the fact that Foss and Wilson were political allies and this letter 
was presumably private correspondence, it seems reasonable to conclude that Wilson was actually in an 
“uncertain balance” about the principle of woman suffrage and that Stockbridge’s portrayal of Wilson 
being “horrified” by women voters is somewhat exaggerated.  
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15th Amendment null and void.42  The same Southern Democrats who led the charge for 
black disenfranchisement were also the most outspoken opponents of a federal woman 
suffrage amendment.  For them, such an amendment posed a threat to the racial and 
political hierarchy they had worked so hard to create.  They opposed anything that might 
involve federal regulation of who was or – more importantly – who was not allowed to 
vote in the South.43
The second part of Wilson’s refined stance – claiming that he was personally 
undecided on the issue – allowed him to reach out to pro-suffrage voters in the North and 
the West.  This became even more important when both the Bull Moose Progressive 
Party under Theodore Roosevelt and the Socialist Party under Eugene Debs came out in 
support of woman suffrage.
  Wilson’s states’ rights stance was designed to please his political 
base.  However, he recognized that the southern wing of the party alone could not propel 
him to victory.  
44
                                                 
 
  At an August 1912 meeting with the prominent journalist 
Oswald Garrison Villard, Wilson confessed that he knew Roosevelt’s support for woman 
suffrage would aid his opponent in the suffrage states.  However, he expressed his belief 
to Villard that Roosevelt had taken up this position merely to win votes – a move that 
42 See J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the 
Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-1910 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974). 
 
43 Elna C. Green, Southern Strategies: Southern Women and the Woman Suffrage Question 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 52. , Glenda E. Gilmore, Gender and Jim Crow: 
Women and the Politics of White Supremacy in North Carolina, 1896-1920 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1996), 203-224.  
 
44 For an account of how the Progressive Party and Socialist Party developed their 1912 platforms, 
see James Chace, 1912: Wilson, Roosevelt, Taft and Debs - the Election that Changed the Country (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 162-163 and 186.  
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Wilson was not willing to make.  He explained, “You certainly cannot change now unless 
you are converted, without putting yourself in Roosevelt’s class.”45
In a theme that was to repeat itself in the 1916 campaign, Wilson’s advisors gave 
him reason to believe that he did not need to pander on the suffrage issue in order to win 
the support of women voters.  His campaign manager, William McCombs, wrote to him 
in August to report on a meeting with Mrs. J. Borden Harriman – a prominent New York 
reformer and suffragist.  According to McAdoo, Harriman had committed herself to 
Wilson’s campaign, despite the Democratic candidate’s failure to endorse woman 
suffrage.  The campaign manager informed his boss, “I send you this [news] as an 
indication that the ladies are falling in line for you as well.”
 
46
 Wilson’s victory in 1912 was dominant in terms of the electoral vote.  He won 
435 electoral votes as compared with 88 votes for Roosevelt, and eight votes for the 
incumbent Republican William Taft.  The ascension of a Democratic president was 
accompanied by the election of a Democratic House and Senate.  The popular vote, 
however, revealed that Wilson did not have the mandate that the electoral vote indicated.  
Wilson received just over six million votes while Roosevelt garnered more than four 
million, Taft secured nearly three and half million, and the Socialist candidate, Eugene V. 
  So, the candidate headed 
into the 1912 election with the belief that he had placated his base in the South by 
adopting a states’ rights stance.  He was convinced, too, that by softening his personal 
position on the issue, he had not alienated pro-suffrage women. 
                                                 
 
45 From the Diary of Oswald Garrison Villard (August 14, 1912), LWWP.  Villard later wrote to a 
leading suffragist in Boston to relay the disappointing news that Wilson would not support woman suffrage 
in the 1912 campaign.  While frustrated with Wilson’s stance, Villard did admit, “I respect him for his 
consistency and honesty however sorry I am to differ from him.” See Oswald Garrison Villard to Susan 
Walker Fitzgerald (August 14, 1912), LWWP. 
 
46 McCombs to Wilson (August 10, 1912), LWWP.  
31 
 
Debs, captured another 900,000.  All together, the other candidates received three million 
more popular votes than Wilson.  The president-elect recognized that the Democrats were 
not the dominant party in the nation and that they were only guaranteed a two-year hold 
on the House of Representatives.  His first term, then, had to be focused on those issues 
he considered key provisions of his “New Freedom” campaign platform – tariff and 
currency reform.47
 The two decades preceding Wilson’s first term had been extremely difficult for 
the suffrage movement.  Almost no progress had been made on securing a federal 
amendment, and, despite numerous state campaigns, only nine states had granted women 
the right to vote by the end of 1913.   Under the guidance of Susan B. Anthony during the 
early 1890s, NAWSA had focused its efforts on securing a constitutional amendment that 
would grant suffrage at the national level.  In 1893, however, the organization decided 
instead to seek amendments of state constitutions.  In effect, the movement for a federal 
amendment was abandoned.
  Changes in the status of the woman suffrage campaign over the next 
several years would also force the new President to alter his position for the 1916 
election. 
48
 One of the chief reasons for this shift in focus was the issue of race in southern 
states.  As discussed above, between 1890 and 1910, all twelve southern states succeeded 
in disenfranchising black male voters who had been granted suffrage through the 15th 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution at the end of the Civil War.  They completed this 
task through an elaborate set of literacy and property qualifications and use of a poll tax.  
 
                                                 
 
47  Link, Wilson: The Road to the White House, 524-525.  
 
48 Flexner and Fitzpatrick, Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United 
States, 212-213. 
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When those tools also resulted in the exclusion of many poor, white voters, southern 
politicians created flimsy loopholes about “good character” and “understanding” that 
allowed whites to vote, but still excluded blacks.  White supremacy was guaranteed in the 
South so long as the states were allowed to establish electoral qualifications and conduct 
elections.49
 A federal woman suffrage amendment threatened this system because it granted 
Congress power to enforce the provisions of the amendment.  To white southerners, the 
enforcement clause of the amendment evoked negative memories of Reconstruction when 
federal troops were stationed in the South in order to enforce the voting rights of black 
men.  The fact that black women could just as handily be disenfranchised as black men 
did little to assuage their fears.  The specter of federal intervention into voting practices 
in the South made discussion of a federal amendment impossible for southern 
politicians.
 
50
 It is important to take a moment here to review the records of both NAWSA and 
the NWP on the issue of black voting rights.  The record is less than complimentary for 
either organization.  As numerous historians have pointed out, time and time again white 
suffragists from both national organizations abandoned their black counterparts if a 
coalition of the two groups threatened the chances for white women gaining the right to 
  Using “states’ rights” as a thinly veiled disguise for preserving white 
supremacy, they eschewed any association with suffrage sympathies.  The only hope, or 
so it seemed to NAWSA at the dawn of the twentieth century, was to work for state 
referenda. 
                                                 
 
49 Morgan, Suffragists and Democrats: The Politics of Woman Suffrage in America, 74-75. 
 
50 Green, Southern Strategies: Southern Women and the Woman Suffrage Question, 11. , Morgan, 
Suffragists and Democrats: The Politics of Woman Suffrage in America, 76.  
33 
 
vote.51
On the extreme were women like Kate Gordon of Louisiana who was as much of a 
white supremacist as any of her male counterparts.  Gordon, an ardent states’ rights 
suffragist, broke with NAWSA when Catt began to focus the organization on the federal 
amendment.
  Often, suffrage leaders found themselves in the awkward position of promising 
southern white men that enfranchising women would not threaten white political 
supremacy because black women could be barred from the polls in the same manner that 
black men had been disenfranchised.   
52  During the ratification campaign, she went so far as to join forces with the 
anti-suffragists and work to prevent ratification in Louisiana and Mississippi.53
                                                 
 
  
Fortunately, few southern suffragists followed Gordon into the ranks of the “anti’s.” 
51 For general descriptions of the relationships between white and black women in the suffrage 
movement see Flexner and Fitzpatrick, Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United 
States, Kraditor, The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920. For a more focused examination, 
see Rosalyn Terborg-Penn, African American Women in the Struggle for the Vote, 1850-1920 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), Green, Southern Strategies: Southern Women and the 
Woman Suffrage Question.  An illuminating theoretical examination of race and feminism can be found in 
Louise M. Newman, White Women's Rights: The Racial Origins of Feminism in the United States (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999). Newman points to the manner in which imperialism, white women’s 
participation in reform movements, and the combination of misogyny and racism simultaneously brought 
women of different races together and drove them apart.  For a case study written from the perspective of 
African-American women, see Gilmore, Gender and Jim Crow: Women and the Politics of White 
Supremacy in North Carolina, 1896-1920. 
 
52 In 1913, Gordon founded the Southern States Woman Suffrage Conference (SSWC) – an 
organization devoted to pursuing state constitutional amendments and in opposition to the federal 
amendment.  She defended her rationale in NAWSA’s official journal, Woman’s Journal and Suffrage 
News, in January 1914.  Gordon characterized the SSWC as a flank movement: “Unquestionably the 
greatest resistance to the National Amendment will come from a solid Southern delegation.  
Unquestionably the strongest opposition to forcing the amendment will come from a hesitancy on the part 
of the other States to repeat another coercive amendment upon a section that resists it.  Herein lies the 
usefulness of the Southern Conference – to educate the Democratic party, in control of the political 
situation in the South, that woman suffrage is no longer a theory to be debated but a condition to be met.” 
See “Kate Gordon on State Rights; Southern Leaders Wants to Make Flank Movement Before Trying 
Federal Amendment,” Woman’s Journal and Suffrage News, January 3, 1914. 
 
53 Kenneth R. Johnson, "Kate Gordon and the Woman-Suffrage Movement in the South," The 
Journal of Southern History 38, no. 3 (August 1972): 392. Lebsock convincingly argues that the aggressive 
racism of the anti-suffragists “constrained the options available to all the other players.”  See {{29 
Lebsock,S. 1993/s64-66;}}   
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Historian Suzanne Lebsock, in a case study of Virginia suffragists, argues that Gordon is 
actually atypical of white southern suffragists.  Lebsock asserts that white women who 
became involved in the suffrage movement were not primarily motivated by a desire to 
preserve the racial hierarchy in the South.  She concedes that most southern suffragists 
failed to disavow white supremacy, but goes on to demonstrate that they also did not 
embrace that ideology.54
In addition to divisions over race, the unity of the suffrage movement was also 
fractured by the nativist tendencies and social class biases of many of its leaders.  
Historians have shown that suffrage leaders were drawn almost exclusively from the 
ranks of the middle and upper classes of American society.
  Still, even those that remained within NAWSA and the NWP 
took an accomodationist position on the issue of black voting rights in the South.   
55
                                                 
54 Lebsock convincingly argues that the aggressive racism of the anti-suffragists “constrained the 
options available to all the other players.”  See Suzanne Lebsock, "Woman Suffrage and White Supremacy: 
A Virginia Case Study," in Visible Women: New Essays on American Activism (Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 1993), 64-66.  
  In a study focused on 
NAWSA’s evolution from the late 19th century to the final suffrage victory in 1920, Sara 
Hunter Graham explains how the organization transformed itself from a radical group to 
one representing middle-class respectability.  According to Graham, Catt led the charge 
during the first decade of the 20th century to bring elite women into the organization:   
 
55 See Kraditor, The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920, 44,53,125, and 261. , 
Flexner and Fitzpatrick, Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United States, 266. , 
O'Neill, Everyone was Brave: A History of Feminism in America, 72.  One exception to this near-consensus 
among historians regarding the elitism of the suffragists is Linda Ford’s Iron-Jawed Angels.  Ford contends 
that the NWP does not fit the pattern of elite control often used to describe both NAWSA and the NWP.  
Rather, the NWP leaders – who were admittedly drawn from the middle and upper class – were able to 
move beyond their own class interests toward “a collective sensibility with all women.”  As evidence, Ford 
points to the NWP’s attempts to reach out to a broad section of American women, to include Socialists and 
working women.  Ford does concede, however, that Paul and her lieutenants often took an equivocal stand 
on matters of race and class when it came to recruiting efforts.  See Ford, Iron-Jawed Angels: The Suffrage 
Militancy of the National Woman's Party, 1912-1920, 91-113.  
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Suffrage leaders recognized the problem of diverse ideologies housed 
under one shaky roof, and they endeavored to maintain unity at the 
expense of principle.  In a period of low membership totals and financial 
woes, association leaders chose a path of moderation in an effort to boost 
the organization’s numbers without an ideological split.  Elite women had 
the resources and prestige to rescue the movement from oblivion; if 
principle was to be the cost of salvation, then many suffragists were 
willing to pay the price.56
 
 
While critical of many aspects of NAWSA’s transformation into an “eminently safe 
program for middle-class club meetings,” Graham does point out that – in terms of 
membership numbers – the strategy worked.  NAWSA increased its membership from 
12,000 in 1906 to 117,000 by 1910.57
Not all women were willing to stand by and watch as NAWSA became an 
organization dominated by white, native-born, middle-class clubwomen.  Harriot Stanton 
Blatch, daughter of suffrage pioneer Elizabeth Cady Stanton, was one who rejected and 
resented Catt’s strategy.  Blatch founded a number of parallel suffrage organizations in 
New York whose goal it was to bridge the gap between working class and professional 
women.  The most notable of these organizations was the Equality League of Self-
Supporting Women.  Founded in 1907, the Equality League courted any woman who 
earned her own living – whether that living was earned by an immigrant woman on the 
factory floor or by a native-born, college-educated professional woman.
 
58
                                                 
56 Graham, Woman Suffrage and the New Democracy, 32. 
  The Equality 
League achieved many of its aims, but its impact was primarily limited to New York 
 
57 Ibid., 51-52. 
 
58 Ellen C. DuBois, Harriot Stanton Blatch and the Winning of Woman Suffrage (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1997), 94-100. DuBois notes that while Blatch led the way in bringing working-
class women into the suffrage movement, she simultaneously reached out to women of great wealth.  Like 
Catt, Blatch knew that political victory would be impossible without the resources – both material and 
symbolic – that upper-class women could bring to the campaign.  See p. 106. 
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State.  On the national scale, the movement by 1910 was largely dominated by relatively 
conservative, elite women who argued for the vote both in terms of natural rights and in 
terms of how woman suffrage would benefit society.  This fact was to have important 
implications for the eventual NAWSA / NWP split. 
 With NAWSA’s new focus on state campaigns beginning in 1893, women had 
been granted full suffrage in four western states by 1896.  However, between 1896 and 
1910, NAWSA failed to win any new suffrage states.  In that 14-year span, only six state 
referenda were held.  Between 1910 and 1913, six more states granted women full 
suffrage, but the cumulative electoral votes of all nine suffrage states only totaled 74 out 
of a possible 531.  As a result of this slow rate of progress a rift had developed within 
NAWSA over the appropriate strategy to secure woman suffrage.  In 1912, two young 
women, recently returned from working with the militant suffragists in England, asked 
NAWSA President Dr. Anna Howard Shaw to appoint them to NAWSA’s Congressional 
Committee.  Alice Paul and Lucy Burns hoped to revive the defunct committee whose 
purpose it was to press for a federal amendment.  Rather than fighting the suffrage battle 
state-by-state, Paul and Burns hoped to win one sweeping victory at the national level. 
 Alice Paul was born into a Quaker family in Moorestown, New Jersey in 1885.  
She graduated from Swarthmore College in 1905, received an MA at the University of 
Pennsylvania two years later, and a Ph.D. from the same in 1912.  Between her MA and 
Ph.D. work in America, Paul spent more than two years in England as a graduate student 
in sociology and economics at the University of London.  During her time in England, 
37 
 
she became involved with the Women’s Social and Political Union (WSPU) of London 
and also met Lucy Burns, another American studying abroad.59
Burns, the fourth of eight children born into an Irish-Catholic family in Brooklyn, 
was a 1902 graduate of Vassar College.  She briefly worked as a high school teacher 
before beginning graduate work at Yale.  In 1906, she moved to Germany to intensively 
study foreign languages at the University of Berlin and, later, at the University of Bonn.  
After three years in Germany, Burns transferred to Oxford University in England for 
additional graduate work and became involved in the English militant suffrage 
movement.
  
60
Both women participated in British suffrage activity, were arrested for their actions, 
and served time in British jails.  They became familiar with militant tactics such as 
showing up to protest and heckle members of Parliament at different speaking 
engagements, organizing suffrage parades, and participating in hunger strikes while in 
jail.  They also became familiar with the political strategy employed by the WSPU of 
“holding the party in power responsible” for passing suffrage legislation.
   
61
Under the British parliamentary system, one party could be held responsible and 
ousted from power for failure to pass specific legislation.  Although the American system 
of government differed, Paul and Burns came to believe that since the Democrats held the 
   
                                                 
 
59 Irwin, The Story of Alice Paul and the National Woman's Party, 7-9.  For additional information 
on Paul’s formative years, see Adams and Keene, Alice Paul and the American Suffrage Campaign. 
 
60 Stevens, Jailed for Freedom, 356.  See also Sidney R. Bland, "'Never quite as Committed as 
we'd Like': The Suffrage Militancy of Lucy Burns," The Journal of Long Island History (Summer/Fall 
1981): 4-23. 
 
61 Adams and Keene, Alice Paul and the American Suffrage Campaign, 11-15. , Irwin, The Story 
of Alice Paul and the National Woman's Party, 7-9. 
 
38 
 
presidency and a majority in Congress, that party should push through a federal suffrage 
amendment.  If it failed to do so, it should have to face the consequences of being 
campaigned against by the suffragists in states where women had secured the right to 
vote. 
Paul was appointed chair of NAWSA’s Congressional Committee when she was just 
27 years old.  She brought her experience from England, youthful energy, tremendous 
organizational skills, and persuasive powers to the task of securing a federal amendment.  
Prior to her arrival, the Congressional Committee was in a stagnant state.  As a result of 
the lack of emphasis from the NAWSA leadership, the federal amendment had never 
been voted on in the House and had only been voted on once by the Senate in 1887.  It 
had not had a committee report since 1896 and had not been debated in Congress since 
1887.62  Paul also brought the immense talents, experience, and energy of Lucy Burns 
who was appointed as her vice-chair.63
Nearly 8,000 women from all over the country participated in the parade that moved 
from the Capitol, up Pennsylvania Avenue, and ended at the Hall of the Daughters of the 
 These two women immediately infused the 
campaign with a sense of purpose and direction never seen before.  Their first major 
accomplishment was planning, organizing, and executing a suffrage parade in 
Washington, D.C. on the day before Wilson’s inauguration in March 1913.   
                                                 
62 Ford, Iron-Jawed Angels: The Suffrage Militancy of the National Woman's Party, 1912-1920, 
47.  
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American Revolution.  Toward the end of the parade route, rowdy members of the crowd 
began to press forward and some physically attacked the marchers.  Marchers had their 
suffrage banners ripped from their hands.  Several were knocked to the ground and 
trampled by the crowd.  The police failed to intervene in a timely manner, and a 
detachment of soldiers from nearby Fort Meyers had to be dispatched to settle the 
disturbance.  Two days after the parade, the Senate passed two resolutions demanding an 
investigation into the police department’s failure to safeguard the marchers.64
 Shortly after her appointment as chair of the Congressional Committee, Paul 
formed a parallel organization called the Congressional Union (CU) to support the 
activities of the Committee.  The CU was primarily designed to aid the Committee with 
fundraising, although by November it was publishing its own journal – The Suffragist – 
and beginning to chart an independent course toward attaining the federal amendment.  
Eventually, this parallel organization would bring Paul into conflict with some of 
NAWSA’s older leaders.  In early 1913, though, conflict did not appear inevitable.  In 
fact, the work that Paul’s Congressional Committee performed in 1913 seemed to be well 
received by most NAWSA leaders and members.   
  Paul’s 
suffrage parade, coupled with the intense lobbying of members of Congress that she 
initiated, abruptly awakened politicians from both sides of the aisle to NAWSA’s desire 
for a federal amendment. 
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The editor of the NAWSA organ Woman’s Journal and Suffrage News, Alice 
Stone Blackwell, repeatedly praised the Committee’s work throughout 1913.  In reporting 
on the preparations for the March 1913 parade, Blackwell opined, “Too much cannot be 
said of [Paul’s] spirit and ability.”65  At year’s end, Blackwell featured Paul’s 
organization on the journal’s front page under the headline, “Congressional Union Makes 
Fine Showing.”  The article went on to say that when the CU presented its report to 
NAWSA’s annual convention, “the convention received the report with enthusiastic 
applause, giving three cheers while the whole Convention rose to its feet to show its 
appreciation.”66
 Accepted only as an auxiliary to NAWSA but under the direction of a NAWSA 
officer (Paul), the CU took actions that seemingly violated fundamental tenets of the 
National’s policy.  These actions led to sharp dissension within NAWSA and eventually 
to a split among the organization’s members.  As Catt explained in an article written three 
years after the split, “A break with the National occurred because [Paul and the CU] 
refused to accede to certain established rules of the Association.”
  Based on Blackwell’s reporting, relations between the CU and NAWSA 
appeared to be good.  Tensions were brewing, though. 
67
                                                 
 
  She went on to list 
the infractions which included using NAWSA funds for CU activities, conducting work 
in individual states without coordinating with NAWSA state officers, and campaigning 
65 “Wonders Worked in Washington,” Woman’s Journal and Suffrage News, March 1, 1913.  
Additional praise for Paul and the Congressional Committee came after the suffrage parade.  See “Parade 
Struggles to Victory Despite Disgraceful Scenes,” Woman’s Journal and Suffrage News, March 8, 1913.   
 
66 “Congressional Union Makes Fine Showing,” Woman’s Journal and Suffrage News, Dec. 13, 
1913.  
 
67 Article by Carrie Chapman Catt, “The Winning Policy” (1916) National American Woman 
Suffrage Association Records, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Box 82, Reel 
59. (Hereafter referred to as NAWSA Records) 
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against Democratic candidates in western states.  The conflict came to a head at the end 
of the December 1913 NAWSA convention where the charges were debated at length.  
Following the convention, NAWSA’s executive council demanded that Paul eliminate 
any conflicts of interest by resigning her position as head of the Congressional Union.  
When she refused, they requested her resignation as chair of the Congressional 
Committee, which she provided.   
Historians and historical actors alike disagree over some of the underlying causes of 
the rift.  Alice Paul biographer Christine Lunardini argues that the NAWSA leadership 
generally accepted Paul’s melding of Congressional Committee and Congressional Union 
funds.  The real source of the conflict, she contends, was Catt’s jealousy of Paul’s status 
as a rising star coupled with disagreement over tactics.  The CU plan to “hold the party in 
power responsible” – outlined by Lucy Burns during the December 1913 NAWSA 
Convention – smacked of partisan politics and upset many of NAWSA’s old guard.68  
Historian Linda Ford takes Lunardini’s argument one step further.  Rather than a fight 
over money or membership, Ford asserts that the conflict was really about competing 
versions of feminism: “The CU stood for a militancy, an aggressive unapologetically 
egalitarian, feminist style, which NAWSA members could not countenance.”69
                                                 
 
  Given, 
the work that Catt and others had done over the preceding two decades to make the 
suffrage movement acceptable to mainstream American society, Ford is undoubtedly 
correct that NAWSA leaders worried that the CU’s militance would damage NAWSA’s 
68 Lunardini, From Equal Suffrage to Equal Rights: Alice Paul and the National Woman's Party, 
1910-1928, 43-44.  For an account of Burns’ speech to the December 1913 NAWSA Convention, see 
Stevens, Jailed for Freedom, 26. 
 
69 Ford, Iron-Jawed Angels: The Suffrage Militancy of the National Woman's Party, 1912-1920, 
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carefully cultivated image.  The correspondence among the suffrage leaders also supports 
the idea that issues deeper than financial record-keeping were at the heart of the dispute. 
Paul denied most of the charges Catt levied in her 1916 “The Winning Policy” 
article.  In an extensive set of correspondence through intermediaries, Catt and Paul 
argued over minute details such as what type of stationary the CU used to raise funds and 
whether or not CU officials cooperated or worked independently with NAWSA officials 
in various states during 1913.70
Like the dynamic duo leading the Congressional Union, Blatch was also a veteran of 
the British suffrage campaign.  She had assisted Paul and Burns with their preparation for 
the 1913 suffrage parade in Washington, D.C. and generally supported their enthusiastic 
work for the federal amendment.  After the tumultuous 1913 NAWSA convention, Blatch 
wrote to Burns, “I was distressed, but not amazed, to read the news in regard to the action 
of the National Association, in reference to Miss Paul’s chairmanship . . . I say I was not 
surprised because again and again I have seen vigorous young women come forward, 
only to be rapped on the head by the so-called leaders of our movement.”
  Their letters suggest that financial and administrative 
concerns may have been a cover for deeper philosophical and generational issues.  While 
Catt’s 1916 article focuses on the lack of political wisdom in Paul’s “holding the party in 
power responsible” plan, an interesting letter from Harriet Stanton Blatch suggests that 
the generational issue may have been even more important than political strategy.   
71
                                                 
 
  Clearly, the 
rift between NAWSA and the CU was at least in part a turf war between suffrage 
veterans and younger women with less patience for the long haul of state campaigns. 
70 See Dora Lewis to Alice Paul (July 14, 1916) and Paul to Lewis (July 25, 1916) National 
Woman’s Party Papers, Microfilm Edition, Reel 1.  (Hereafter referred to as NWPP) 
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 Whatever the reasons for the split, nothing could heal the growing divide.  In the 
first few months of 1914, representatives of the Congressional Union met with NAWSA 
leaders in an attempt to keep the groups from developing into rival organizations, but 
disagreements over strategy prevented any such rapprochement.  Blackwell ran an 
editorial in the May 14th edition of the Woman’s Journal and Suffrage News pleading for 
cooperation between the two organizations.72  Her efforts were in vain.  The 
Congressional Union, in flagrant violation of NAWSA’s non-partisan policy, campaigned 
against all Democratic candidates in the western states during the midterm elections of 
1914 and announced their plans to campaign against Wilson and the national Democratic 
slate in the elections of 1916.  After one final failed attempt at reconciliation in December 
1915, the two organizations severed all ties.73
Paul’s replacement as head of NAWSA’s Congressional Committee, Ruth Hanna 
McCormick, further muddled the already cloudy suffrage picture by bringing about the 
introduction of an additional suffrage-related amendment to the Constitution in March 
1914.  An experienced suffragist from Illinois, McCormick discerned that gaining 
suffrage by the state initiative method was much more palatable to the majority of 
Congressmen than a federal amendment.  Working with Senator William Shafroth of 
Colorado and Representative A. Mitchell Palmer of Pennsylvania, McCormick and her 
committee tried to meet the tastes of the majority of Congressmen by developing a new 
suffrage constitutional amendment.
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72 “Team Play is Best,” Woman’s Journal and Suffrage News, May 16, 1914.  
 
73 Lunardini, From Equal Suffrage to Equal Rights: Alice Paul and the National Woman's Party, 
1910-1928, 49. , Jacqueline Van Voris, Carrie Chapman Catt: A Public Life (New York: The Feminist 
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The Shafroth-Palmer Amendment required that if eight percent of voters in any state 
signed an initiative petition requesting a referendum on woman suffrage, the state then 
must submit the question of suffrage to the voters.  This new variation offered relief from 
two major problems facing suffragists.  First, it held the potential to force a vote in states 
that had so far managed to defeat campaigns for state referenda.  Secondly, it could gain 
the support of Senators who opposed suffrage on the principle of states’ rights because it 
contained no provisions for federal enforcement and the voters of each individual state 
would still make the decision on suffrage.75
 Opponents of the new amendment believed the measure was difficult to 
understand and only prolonged an already difficult process.  Even if the bill passed both 
houses of Congress and was ratified by three-fourths of the states, a battle to win state 
referenda would still have to be fought in each non-suffrage state.  Shaw was flooded 
with angry letters from NAWSA members all over the country after the new amendment 
was introduced.   She responded with a blanket letter to all NAWSA members that 
indicated just how directionless NAWSA was in the final years of her presidency.  She 
wrote, “The National Association is not abandoning the old Constitutional amendment.  It 
worked for it all this winter until it was voted down by a majority, which showed there 
was no hope whatever of passing it . . . While we are pushing the new amendment we are 
also pushing the old amendment, and it is hoped that the new one will help the old one 
and it was introduced for that purpose.”
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74 Catt and Shuler, Woman Suffrage and Politics: The Inner Story of the Suffrage Movement, 246-
247. 
  She went on to blame the Congressional Union 
 
75 Ruth Hanna McCormick made the case for the Shafroth-Palmer Amendment at the 1914 
NAWSA Convention.  See Harper, The History of Woman Suffrage, Vol. 5, 1900-1920, 412-418. 
 
76 Shaw to Ellen Douglas Hoge (April 11, 1914), NWPP, Reel 1. 
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for any confusion over the matter, claiming that the CU was trying to gain support for 
their organization by giving “the impression that we have forsaken the old amendment, 
which is absolutely false.”77
 For the remainder of that year and well into the next, NAWSA simultaneously 
supported the traditional federal amendment and the Shafroth-Palmer amendment.  It was 
not until the December 1915 NAWSA convention that the latter was officially 
disavowed, although little work had been done on its behalf for the last half of that year.  
The confusion within the National’s ranks only fueled the fire of the CU as they headed 
west to campaign against Democrats in the 1914 mid-term elections.  As Burns explained 
to Blatch, “It seems to me foolish to propose that we should undertake the tremendous 
labor of getting the Constitution of the United States amended and, at the end of that 
work, have gained nothing except the right to submit the question to the electors, which, 
by a little intelligent and concentrated labor, we can do already.  The procedure combines 
all the difficulties of state and national work in one.”
 
78
 The CU campaigned against all Democrats, suffrage supporters or not, in Western 
states during 1914.  They urged enfranchised women to withdraw their support from the 
Democratic Party until it complied with their demands to enfranchise all women through 
support of a federal amendment.  Their frustration with the Democrats was 
understandable.   As previously described, Wilson’s two major goals during his first term 
were reducing tariffs and reforming the banking system.  The legislative sessions of 1913 
were devoted to these causes and, using all the tools of persuasion available to his office, 
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Wilson was able to pull together the support of western and southern Democrats to pass 
both measures.79
Wilson could not completely ignore the suffragists, though.  Throughout 1913, 
Paul was relentless in bringing deputations of women to ask for his support of the federal 
amendment.  Just days after his inauguration, Paul led a group of five women to meet 
with the new President.  In a blatant lie, he told the women that he had never given the 
issue of woman suffrage much thought.  He went on to say that there were too many 
other pressing issues for him to concern himself with woman suffrage, but asked that the 
suffragists not think that he was against them just because he could not presently take up 
their cause.
  Woman suffrage was an issue that he continuously avoided in 1913 by 
claiming that his administration was too busy with New Freedom legislation to give the 
matter serious consideration.  
80
                                                 
 
  Undaunted, Paul arranged for two more deputations to visit Wilson in 
March 1913.  She also applied pressure on the Democrat-controlled Congress.  Through 
the aggressive efforts of NAWSA’s Congressional Committee under Paul’s leadership, 
the amendment was reported out of the committee in the Senate in June 1913 for the first 
time since 1896, although Senate Democrats blocked an actual vote on the measure.  It 
was reported with a favorable majority again in 1914 and was headed to a vote in the full 
Senate when the Democrats caucused in February.  The Senate Democrats published their 
position that suffrage was an issue to be decided by individual states – a position that 
79 Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The New Freedom (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1956), 186-197. 
 
80 For accounts of this first meeting between Paul and Wilson, see “Suffragists See Wilson,” New 
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Wilson supported.81  When the vote came in the Senate on March 19, the amendment was 
defeated by a count of 35 in favor and 34 opposed (11 votes short of the required two-
thirds).  Democrats cast the majority of negative votes.82
Paul continued to pressure Wilson.  She arranged for a delegation of women from 
Wilson’s home state of New Jersey to meet with the President in November to ask him to 
announce his support for the federal amendment during his annual message to Congress 
in December.
 
83  Wilson’s refusal to even mention suffrage in his address was enough to 
draw the ire of the usually patient NAWSA leaders.  NAWSA President Anna Howard 
Shaw demanded a meeting with the President in the days following his address.  In a 
rather confrontational meeting by NAWSA standards, Shaw rejected Wilson’s assertion 
that he could not stand up for suffrage because he was the spokesman of a party that was 
not in favor of the measure.  She pointed out to the President that he should be the 
spokesman for his country, rather than for his party.  She also highlighted the number of 
states controlled by Democratic legislatures in which suffrage measures had passed.84
The President’s evasive tactics continued into the following year.  He told a 
deputation of working women in February 1914 that – although his personal opinion was 
still undecided – he was bound by the will of his party.  When leaders of the General 
Federation of Women’s Clubs presented him with their organization’s resolution in favor 
 
                                                 
 
81 Morgan, Suffragists and Democrats: The Politics of Woman Suffrage in America, 79-80. 
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for and 22 against.  “Suffrage Loses in Senate Vote,” New York Times, March 20, 1914, 1. 
 
83 “Wilson Heartens Jersey Women,” Woman’s Journal and Suffrage News, November 22, 1913.  
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of woman suffrage in June 1914, he again refused to support a constitutional amendment 
and instead encouraged the women to take their fight to the states.85
Armed with ample evidence of Democratic obstruction and presidential inaction, 
the CU attempted to raise the consciousness of women voters in the West during the 1914 
mid-terms.  They sent at least two organizers to each state in which women had won the 
vote.  In these states, the CU organizers educated women voters about the federal 
amendment and the failures of the Democrats.  They urged women voters to vote against 
all Democrats, regardless of the candidate’s individual position on woman suffrage.  
Central to their campaign was the belief that women would behave as single-issue voters.  
As the election results showed, however, this was a faulty assumption.  Democrats 
maintained control of both the House and the Senate, although their majorities were 
significantly reduced.   
 
Despite CU claims to the contrary, this reduction was not related to suffrage 
agitation.  Most election analysts agreed that the chief cause of Democratic setbacks was 
the decline of the Progressive Party and the return of many former members to the 
Republican Party.  Setbacks notwithstanding, White House spokesmen released 
statements claiming victory for the Democratic Party because they had increased their 
strength in the Midwest and Pacific Coast in a year during which they had enacted 
unpopular tariff reform.86
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So what was the net effect of the CU activity in the 1914 elections?  There is no 
evidence that CU agitators were, in fact, able to swing a significant number of women 
voters against the Democrats.  They did succeed in angering western Democratic 
candidates – particularly those who were pro-suffrage and still found suffragists 
campaigning against them.87  To their credit, though, this anger may have had some 
positive outcomes.  Their small presence, if somewhat ineffective in swinging votes in 
1914, forced the Democrats to consider what angry suffragists might be able to do to the 
party in 1916, given two more years to organize.88
 Seven states voted on woman suffrage in 1914, but only the Montana and Nevada 
campaigns were successful.  At the same time and in the same places that NAWSA State 
Associations urged voters from all parties to support the suffrage referendum, CU 
members actively worked against all Democrats and labeled that party an enemy to 
suffrage.  NAWSA members openly blamed the CU for their defeat in North Dakota and 
Nebraska.
  Nonetheless, there were drawbacks to 
the CU strategy.  Their agitation may have contributed to the defeat of several key state 
suffrage campaigns in 1914. 
89
                                                 
87 For example, Democrat Representative Carl Hayden of Arizona delivered a tirade against the 
CU on the floor of Congress.  See Congressional Record, Vol. 51, Part 17, 1228-1229. 
  The president of the Ohio State Woman Suffrage Association, who 
generally supported the work of the CU, wrote to Paul three times during the first week 
 
88 This is the argument most frequently used by historians favorable to the militant suffragists.  
Their evidence for this comes from the pressure that the western wing of the Democratic Party placed on 
Wilson and the southern wing of the party to soften their position on woman suffrage in advance of the 
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Woman's Party, 1910-1928, 67. , Adams and Keene, Alice Paul and the American Suffrage Campaign, 
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of October to indicate the amount of damage being done in her state by CU activity in the 
West.  She provided Paul with direct quotes from the Mayor and Postmaster of Cleveland 
who had withdrawn their support for suffrage in Ohio because of the CU and warned, “I 
honestly and truly think that your campaign against the Democratic party in the 
enfranchised states is hurting the Ohio campaign.”90
 Furthermore, the CU campaigns infuriated NAWSA leaders and a significant 
portion of the rank and file.  One of the underlying premises of the CU was that that the 
NAWSA political approach was too passive.  This premise offended NAWSA leaders 
who continually argued that Paul and her followers failed to take into account the wider 
view that NAWSA took on the 1914 elections.  As explained above, the National’s state 
organizations were fighting to win referenda in seven different states in 1914.  NAWSA 
had engaged in careful planning for these campaigns for years in some cases.  
Additionally, NAWSA was not as politically passive on a national scale as CU leaders 
charged.  Just two months before the 1914 election, Shaw published NAWSA’s “Black 
List.”  It contained the names of nine senators and nine congressmen – Republicans and 
Democrats - picked by the organization for defeat as a result of their unwavering 
opposition to the federal amendment.  In a statement accompanying the release of the list, 
NAWSA appealed to all suffragists to “concentrate their influence to defeat for re-
election the men named.”
  Ohio was one of the five state 
referenda to fail during 1914. 
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Worried about the negative impact of the CU, Shaw sent a letter to pro-suffrage 
Senator Charles Thomas of Colorado disowning Paul and the CU.  Per Shaw’s request, 
Thomas read the letter on the floor of the Senate.  It stated, in part: 
As I wrote to you some time since, the National Congressional Union, 
under the direction of Miss Paul, does not in any way represent the 
National Suffrage Association.  There is no relation whatever between the 
two groups . . . While I fully recognize that individual women and local 
societies have an equal right with all others to be heard, I also feel it my 
duty to state that none of these represent the organized suffragists of the 
country.  So that whenever any individual or any representative of the 
Congressional Union in Washington makes any appeal to the Senate, or to 
yourself as chairman of the Senate committee, it is not to be understood as 
an appeal from the organized suffragists of the nation.  Nor when any 
threat is made of an attack upon the Democratic party is it to be considered 
as coming from the organized suffragists of the nation.”92
 
 
From her perch as NAWSA’s lead editorialist, Blackwell tried to remain open to the CU 
strategy in her coverage of the 1914 elections, although she was convinced that 
NAWSA’s continued focus on state campaigns was essential to eventually securing a 
federal amendment.  After the 1914 election, she completely rejected the policy of 
holding the party in power responsible.93
                                                 
 
  Likewise, the general NAWSA membership 
demonstrated its displeasure with the CU strategy by adopting the following resolution at 
NAWSA’s December 1914 convention: “Be it resolved that [NAWSA] be absolutely 
opposed to holding any political party responsible for the opinions and acts of its 
92 Shaw to Thomas (March 7, 1914), Reprinted as part of “Dr. Shaw Writes to Senator Thomas,” 
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individual members, or holding any individual responsible for the majority action of his 
party on suffrage.”94
 An impartial observer of the woman suffrage movement from 1914-1915 would 
find the situation greatly confusing.  Two different groups that seemed to be working in 
exact opposite directions represented the movement.  The larger of the two groups, 
NAWSA, was simultaneously supporting the traditional federal suffrage amendment and 
the cumbersome Shafroth-Palmer bill, while still trying to win victories in a number of 
state referenda campaigns.  Meanwhile, the CU was urging the abandonment of state 
campaigns, pouring all its energies into the traditional federal amendment, and 
campaigning against all western Democrats (even those who supported suffrage) in order 
to “hold the party in power responsible.”  Political leaders from both parties could, and 
did, play the groups off one another and used the confusion of the movement as an 
excuse to not take a definitive stand on the issue.  This was clearly the case with the 
President. 
 
 Wilson could safely hide behind the party position on a federal amendment for 
most of 1913 and 1914, but events of the following year made it clear that his position 
would have to be slightly amended if he hoped to win the support of progressives in the 
1916 election.  As the next chapter details, the fall and winter of 1915 were critical 
months for both Wilson and the suffrage movement.  The President found himself in need 
of progressive support heading into the 1916 election and the suffrage movement, still 
divided over the NAWSA/CU rift and the Shafroth-Palmer Amendment, faced referenda 
campaigns in four key states – New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts.  
Between October and December, the movement experienced a roller-coaster effect.  
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Suffragists lost all four of the state campaigns, but won more votes than many people 
expected in several of the states.  Furthermore, they secured crucial support when Wilson 
voted in favor of the amendment as a private citizen of the state of New Jersey.  Most 
importantly, NAWSA’s path took a decisive turn when it met in convention in December 
1915, dropped the Shafroth-Palmer Amendment, and elected Carrie Chapman Catt as the 
new president.   
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CHAPTER 3 
PRELUDE TO THE 1916 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
 
 In his 1913 inaugural address, President Wilson raised the hopes and expectations 
of progressive reformers across the nation.95  While heralding America’s industrial 
achievements, he also acknowledged the associated human costs of massive and rapid 
industrialization.  In words that resonated with proponents of reform, he advocated 
perfecting “the means by which government may be put at the service of humanity, in 
safeguarding the health of the nation.”96  Yet little in the first two and a half years of 
Wilson’s presidency lived up to this soaring rhetoric.  Despite legislative victories with 
tariff and banking reform, the president’s opposition to rural credits, refusal to grant the 
American Federation of Labor immunity from the Sherman Act, approval of racial 
segregation in federal service, and refusal to support the Palmer Child Labor bill had 
disappointed and alienated progressives of every stripe and from every section of the 
country.97
                                                 
95 Throughout this chapter and the next, I use the term “progressives” with a lowercase “p” to refer 
to the broad group of Americans who in the late 19th and early 20th century were either actively involved in 
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“Progressives” with an uppercase “P” to refer specifically to those Americans who belonged to the 
Progressive Party.  For a discussion of the historical problems associated with the concept of 
“progressivism,” see Peter G. Filene, "An Obituary for the "Progressive Movement"," American Quarterly 
22, no. 1 (Spring 1970): 20-34. 
   
 
96 An Inaugural Address (March 4, 1913), LWWP.  
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These next two chapters serve as an in-depth examination of Wilson’s 1916 re-
election strategy – a strategy based largely on winning back progressive voters and that, 
ultimately, led to his victory over the Republican challenger, Charles Evan Hughes. This 
first chapter charts Wilson’s actions with regard to woman suffrage in advance of his 
1916 re-election campaign.  Additionally, it analyzes the diverse strategies employed by 
NAWSA and the NWP as they followed differing paths toward attaining the federal 
suffrage amendment. In turn, chapter four places Wilson’s actions with regards to woman 
suffrage into the broader context of the 1916 campaign. 
One of the first actions that Wilson took to win back progressive voters was to 
vote in favor of the suffrage referendum in his home state of New Jersey in October 
1915.  The vote in New Jersey became a battleground for pro and anti-suffragists as each 
side hoped to use the president’s decision to its advantage in the public relations war.  
The White House was flooded with letters from both sides of the debate imploring him to 
support the cause in their favor.  A letter from Caroline Cruvey just a few weeks before 
the vote typifies the more than 100 letters Wilson received from anti-suffragists in New 
Jersey alone, not to mention the correspondence from interested parties throughout the 
country.  Cruvey wrote:  
As one of the majority, (as I believe), of women opposed to Female 
Suffrage, I beg you will not cast your vote with its great influence, on the 
affirmative side of “votes for women”.  I can see no adequate gain coming 
from the admission of women into the political arena compensating for the 
added expense which will follow, and for the loss of interest in home and 
family life which will surely result . . . There are no “rights” to be 
advanced by our votes, for the laws are in our favor as regards our persons 
and property.  The emotional nature of our sex sadly unfits us for 
participation in politics and its hot-bed of passions.  Won’t you, by your 
vote, leave us a little longer in the quiet of our homes where most of us 
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love to be, with time to rear our children well, and care for our husbands 
and grown sons with undivided interest?98
 
 
Despite this compelling appeal and hundreds like it, Wilson announced his decision to 
vote in favor of the amendment on October 6, 1915. 
 In a statement issued to the press, he explained the rationale behind his decision.  
The statement demonstrated the tentative nature of his support for women’s voting rights.  
He insisted that he was voting as a private citizen of New Jersey and not as the leader of 
the Democratic Party.  Furthermore, he reiterated his opposition to a federal suffrage 
amendment saying, “I believe that [suffrage] should be settled by the States and not by 
the National Government and that in no circumstances should it be made a party 
question, and my view has grown stronger at every turn of the agitation.”99
 The motivation behind Wilson’s affirmative vote in New Jersey has been an issue 
of debate among historians.  Link contends that events in Wilson’s personal life 
contributed to his decision.  When Wilson’s first wife died in August 1914, he was nearly 
overcome with grief.
 
100  Seven months later, however, he met Edith Bolling Galt who 
was to become his second wife.  Link asserts that women voters in the Western states 
were upset about Wilson’s quick courtship with Galt so soon after his wife’s death and 
that Wilson’s affirmative vote in New Jersey was an attempt to pacify those indignant 
women voters who would play a significant role in the 1916 election.101
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 Link’s analysis of the significance of Wilson’s impending marriage on his 
decision to vote for suffrage in New Jersey is overstated.102
Having been called [to the post of Secretary of the Navy] by President Wilson I did 
not feel inclined to exchange it for the difficult and, perhaps, dangerous high and 
exalted position of Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary to the Court of 
Cupid on a mission in which neither my heart nor my head was enlisted and in the 
performance of which my official head might suffer decapitation . . . Wilson was not 
warned.  They were married before Christmas and two things followed: (1) Wilson 
was reelected, proving that political prognosticators are not always right; and (2) 
they lived happily together and Mrs. Wilson’s charm and sound wisdom made her 
greatly beloved and admired.
  The memoirs of Wilson’s 
Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, reveal that many senior Democratic leaders 
were indeed worried about offending women voters in the West if the President married 
Galt before the 1916 election.  Available evidence, though, indicates that the President 
did not share their concerns.  Daniels was asked by a number of Democrats to approach 
the President and warn him of the political liabilities of a hasty remarriage.  His negative 
response to the request is worth quoting in full: 
103
 
 
While many may take issue with Daniels’ characterization of Galt as charming and wise, 
his account of this episode erodes support for Link’s theory that Wilson’s advisors were 
willing to broach the topic of the political ramifications of remarriage with their boss. 
Daniels’ contention that women voters were not put off by the president’s remarriage is 
                                                 
 
102  In rejecting Link’s explanation, I join with Victoria Bissell Brown who adroitly dismisses Link 
by saying, “To argue that Wilson would endorse suffrage as a legitimate activity for half the nation’s 
citizenry simply to gain goodwill for his marriage to his second antisuffrage wife is to trivialize the cause 
of woman suffrage and rather seriously underestimate the ideological significance of his conversion to the 
logic of that cause.  By late 1915, . . . Wilson had come to see that he could hold on to his sentiments about 
women’s distinct role in life without defending an outmoded suffrage boundary that was doomed to 
collapse anyway.”  See Brown, Did Woodrow Wilson's Gender Politics Matter?, 142.  
 
103 Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 1910-1917 (Chapel Hill: University of 
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well supported by both the election results (Wilson swept the West in 1916) and Galt’s 
memoirs of the same time period. 
 Galt recalled tremendous support from people all over the country after Wilson 
announced their marriage plans.  The couple immediately began to receive congratulatory 
telegrams from friends and strangers.  They received a standing ovation when they were 
announced to the crowd at a Red Sox-Phillies baseball game the day after their 
engagement announcement and another ovation the following month when they attended 
the annual Army-Navy football game.  Galt further recalled that she and the President 
received a large nugget of gold from the people of California – a state that had granted 
women full suffrage in 1911- as an engagement gift.104
 Additional contrary evidence from contemporary sources comes from Alice Stone 
Blackwell.  In the pages of the Woman’s Journal and Suffrage News, Blackwell asserted 
that “the President’s conversion was not due to the influence of [his engagement to] Mrs. 
Galt.”  Blackwell cited an interview between Wilson and Nevada suffragist Anne Martin 
in December 1914, during which the president congratulated Martin on the success of the 
Nevada suffrage referendum.  According to Martin, Wilson implied that he favored 
woman suffrage – so long as it was attained by the state method.  Blackwell pointed out 
that this conversation took place almost ten months before his engagement to Galt.
  Daniels’ and Galt’s testimony 
indicate that the president’s decision to vote for suffrage in New Jersey was not likely 
connected to fear of his remarriage offending women voters in the Western states. 
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 Wilson had been hinting to the suffragists that he would support their cause in 
New Jersey for nearly a year before the actual referendum.  In fact, he and his personal 
secretary, Joseph Tumulty, strung suffrage leaders along throughout 1915.  NAWSA 
President Anna Howard Shaw met with the President in January 1915 – shortly after the 
vote on the federal amendment in the House of Representatives.  Shaw reported that, 
“The President gave no expression of opinion to the women, but the delegation came 
away with the distinct belief that he would very shortly come out with a favorable 
statement.”106  Her prediction of an early commitment from Wilson was misplaced.  In 
May, Tumulty told two suffrage leaders from Pennsylvania that the President would 
announce his position on the New Jersey referendum in time for it to have its effect in the 
elections in the four states where suffrage was to be voted on in the fall.107  Suffragists 
were still patiently waiting in July when Tumulty released another statement regarding 
the President’s position.  This time, Wilson’s secretary told suffragists to expect a public 
announcement by the President “within the next few weeks.”108
 It is not entirely clear why Wilson chose to wait until the last minute to announce 
his support for suffrage in New Jersey.  However, the evidence suggests that he chose to 
use most of 1915 to test the waters of public opinion and reaction within his own party.   
The January 1915 House vote on the federal amendment demonstrated that Democrats 
  In fact, Wilson made no 
such announcement until October 6th – a mere 13 days before the New Jersey vote and 
only a month before the elections in Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts. 
                                                 
106 “Believe Wilson Will Come Out,” Woman’s Journal and Suffrage News, January 23, 1915.   
For another account of this, see “Expect to Win Wilson: Women Think He Will Support Suffrage in New 
Jersey,” The Washington Post, January 15, 1915, 4. 
 
107 “Wilson to Tell Stand in Time,” Woman’s Journal and Suffrage News, May 15, 1915.  The four 
states with pending suffrage referenda were New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New York. 
 
108 “President Will Take Stand Soon,” Woman’s Journal and Suffrage News, July 24, 1915.   
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opposed suffrage – at least in the form of a federal amendment – by a margin of two to 
one.109
Ultimately, Wilson’s affirmative vote on the New Jersey referendum reflected a 
mix of his shifting personal position and political expedience.
  Furthermore, polls from New Jersey indicated that – claims of the suffragists 
notwithstanding - the measure did not have widespread support in the state and would 
probably fail.  So there was some political risk involved for the president as he 
contemplated what action to take in his home state. 
110
  Despite their long wait, suffragists were elated upon hearing the announcement 
that the president would vote in favor of suffrage.  From her post as the Chair of the 
Empire State Suffrage Campaign in New York, Catt immediately sent a telegram to the 
White House on the day of his announcement saying, “On behalf of a million women in 
  The potentially negative 
impact of his engagement announcement was a minor concern, at best, compared to his 
need to attract progressive voters.  His vote was a move aimed to please suffragists in the 
East and women voters in the West, as well as progressive elements of the electorate 
from across the country that had been alienated by some of his actions in 1914 and 1915.  
It had the additional advantage of not alienating southern Democrats because it in no way 
committed Wilson to support the dreaded federal amendment.  In fact, as his statement to 
the press reveals, he went out of his way to make it clear that his vote in New Jersey only 
reaffirmed his support of a states’ rights approach to voter qualifications. 
                                                 
 
109 In the House, 171 Democrats voted against the federal amendment while only 86 voted in 
favor.  See “Suffrage Meets Defeat in House,” The Washington Post, January 13, 1915, 1.  
 
110 Documentary evidence of Wilson’s personal shift is scant.  His private correspondence from 
this time period reveals little about his shifting attitude on suffrage.  Publicly, though, he stated that he was 
voting in favor of the state suffrage referendum “because I believe that the time has come to extend that 
privilege and responsibility to the women of the State.”   For Wilson’s full press release, see “Wilson 
Indorses Woman Suffrage,” New York Times, October 7, 1915, 1. 
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New York State who have declared they want the ballot, please accept my gratitude for 
your announcement that you will vote for the woman suffrage amendment in New 
Jersey.”111
The New Jersey referendum was defeated by a count of 184,400 to 133,200  – a 
margin of almost 3 to 2.
  Catt hoped that the president’s actions in New Jersey would positively 
influence voters in New York – a hope that went unfulfilled in the 1915 suffrage 
campaign in the Empire State.   
112  Wilson’s vote did not push suffrage to victory in 
Pennsylvania or Massachusetts, either.  Still, it was symbolically important for the 
movement.  NAWSA never failed from that day forward to point out that the president 
supported suffrage, at least in principle, because of his affirmative vote in New Jersey.   
His endorsement aided them in their ongoing fight with anti-suffragists who – up to that 
point – had claimed Wilson as an ally to their cause.113
The Woman’s Journal and Suffrage News featured pictures and stories of 
Wilson’s actions for three weeks in October 1915.  In addition to trumpeting Wilson’s 
support, the journal also listed all of the members of Wilson’s cabinet who announced 
plans to support suffrage referenda in the upcoming elections.
 
114
                                                 
 
  Similarly, The Woman 
111 Catt to Wilson (October 7, 1915), PWW, Box 89, Reel 208. 
 
112 “The New Jersey Vote Against Suffrage,” New York Times, October 21, 1915, 10. 
 
113  The anti-suffragists had worked hard to convince the President to resist the New Jersey 
referendum.  The President of the New Jersey Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage wrote to Wilson in 
January 1915, pleading with him to oppose the measure.  See Letter from Mary Scudder Jamieson to 
President Wilson, quoted in “Suffrage in the President’s State,” The Woman’s Protest (Feb. 1915), 16.  For 
more on the anti-suffragists’ activities, see chapter six. 
 
114  For coverage of Wilson’s announcement and vote, see the October 9, October 16, and October 
23 editions of the Woman’s Journal and Suffrage News.  With the exception of Secretary of State Robert 
Lansing of New York, all of Wilson’s cabinet members who were from states facing suffrage referenda 
announced that they would vote in favor of suffrage.  The other cabinet members include Tumulty and 
Secretary of War Lindley Garrison of New Jersey, Secretary of the Treasury William McAdoo and 
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Voter, a journal published by the NAWSA-affiliated Woman Suffrage Party of New 
York, attempted to use the president’s vote in New Jersey as an endorsement for the 
upcoming referendum in New York.  Woman Suffrage Party Chairman Mary Garrett Hay 
wrote to the voters of her state, “If you do not judge our movement upon its merits, judge 
it by its friends.  The President of the United States and members of his Cabinet will vote 
for suffrage in their respective campaign states.”115
Not all suffrage journals celebrated the president’s actions, though.  The CU – 
totally focused on the federal amendment – saw little use for Wilson’s states’ rights 
support for suffrage.  By fall of the following year, it was using the president’s vote in 
New Jersey as a weapon against him in his 1916 re-election campaign.  The front page of 
the CU journal, The Suffragist, declared: 
 
Woodrow Wilson, a private citizen cast one vote for woman suffrage in 
New Jersey where its defeat was certain.  The Vote of Mr. Wilson of 
Princeton did not bring woman suffrage one step nearer.  New Jersey went 
against suffrage.  Mr. Wilson’s precinct went against suffrage.  [He] has 
used all his power to defeat national woman suffrage.  In Congress, where 
the chances for the success of woman suffrage were good he opposed it 
with the whole power of his party machine.  Mr. Wilson knows it is well 
nigh impossible to amend more than twenty state constitutions.  He knows 
that the state-by-state method of obtaining suffrage is a virtual denial of 
suffrage.  Women voters – Do not send to the White House a man who 
opposes political freedom for women.  Vote against President Wilson and 
the Democratic candidates for Congress.116
 
 
Despite the negative CU reaction and the loss of all four suffrage referenda in 1915, 
NAWSA leaders saw a number of silver linings. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Secreatry of Commerce William Redfield of New York, and Secretary of Labor William Wilson of 
Pennsylvania.  See “Wilson and Cabinet Members Declare for Equal Suffrage,” Woman’s Journal and 
Suffrage News, October 9, 1915. 
 
115 “Victory is Certain,” The Woman Voter VI, no. 11 (November 1915), 9.  
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Taking a longer view than their counterparts in the CU, Catt and company found the 
results in Pennsylvania encouraging.  With the exception of Philadelphia, suffrage had 
won a majority in all the large industrial areas.  The margin of defeat was only seven 
percent, with 80% of the opposition votes coming from Philadelphia.  However, both 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania had state constitutions that mandated a five-year waiting 
period for resubmission of defeated amendments, so near-term hopes in both states were 
diminished despite the close election returns.117
Massachusetts, home of the National Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage, 
only gained 35.5 percent of the total vote in favor of the amendment.  New York, though, 
showed the most promise for a future near-term victory.  Despite the suffrage amendment 
losing by nearly 200,000 votes, voters in many industrial areas had begun to support 
suffrage, and the state’s suffrage leaders were confident that they could win the next time 
around.  New York required a two-year wait between amendment votes, but suffrage 
leaders announced the start of their 1917 campaign on the night of their 1915 defeat.
   
118
 NAWSA’s fortunes took another positive turn when the organization met in 
convention in December 1915 and elected Catt as its new leader.  Catt’s election as 
President of NAWSA was actually the second time that she assumed that post.  It marked 
another milestone in her life, which had largely been devoted to increasing women’s 
rights since her initial engagement with the suffrage movement in Iowa in 1885.  Born in 
Ripon, Wisconsin in 1859, Catt moved with her family to Charles City, Iowa in 1866.  
She was one of seven women to enter Iowa State Agricultural College (now Iowa State 
 
                                                 
 
117 Flexner and Fitzpatrick, Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United 
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118 Ibid., 264. 
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University) in 1877.  Following her graduation in 1880, she taught high school in Mason 
City for three years before being promoted to the position of Superintendent of Schools in 
1883.119
 Following her marriage to Leo Chapman in 1885, Catt resigned her position as 
school superintendent and served as her husband’s co-editor of the Mason City 
newspaper.  Leo Chapman died from typhoid fever in 1886 just a few months after the 
couple had moved from Iowa to San Francisco.  At the age of 27, Catt was widowed, 
unemployed, and living alone in a new city.  She took up free-lance journalism for a few 
years before returning to Iowa in 1887 and beginning work as a public lecturer.  Shortly 
after her return to her home state, she rejoined the Iowa Woman Suffrage Association, 
becoming a paid lecturer in 1889.   
 
In a move that surprised many of her suffrage comrades, Carrie married George 
Catt in 1890.  The couple had first met at Iowa State during their undergraduate years and 
became reacquainted during Carrie’s time in San Francisco.  George Catt was an engineer 
who spent a great deal of his time at work sites in Washington state and California.  To 
the immense pleasure of the Iowa suffragists, Carrie’s marriage did not end her work for 
their movement.  She and her new husband made an agreement that he would work and 
earn money to support them and that she would continue with her reform work, even if 
that meant they would have to spend a great deal of time apart from one another.120
                                                 
 
 
119 Biographical information about Catt’s early years in Iowa and her initial involvement in the 
suffrage movement is detailed in Van Voris, Carrie Chapman Catt: A Public Life, 7-13. , Robert B. Fowler, 
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In the same year that she remarried, Catt first entered into the limelight of 
NAWSA by giving a speech at the National Convention.  She impressed the leaders of 
the National, including Susan B. Anthony, who later hand-picked her to lead the 
successful 1893 state suffrage campaign in Colorado, to serve as Chair of the 
Organization Committee from 1895-1899, and to succeed her as NAWSA’s president in 
1900.  Catt subsequently served four one-year terms.  Her tenure was marked positively 
by the formation of the International Woman Suffrage Alliance (IWSA), but negatively 
by repeated failure to secure any victories in state suffrage campaigns.  Frustrated by the 
lack of progress, increasingly interested in her work with the IWSA, and concerned about 
George Catt’s failing health, Carrie Catt resigned the NAWSA presidency in 1904.121
Following George’s death in 1905, Catt immersed herself in work with IWSA.  
Her longtime lieutenant from their early NAWSA days, Mary (Mollie) Garret Hay, came 
to live with her and join in international suffrage work.  For the remainder of Hay’s life, 
she and Catt lived and worked together.
 
122
                                                 
 
  From 1905-1913, the bulk of Catt’s energy 
was devoted to work with IWSA.  Following a major suffrage victory in Illinois in 1913, 
however, she agreed to serve as chair of the Empire State Campaign Committee in New 
York.  As explained above, NAWSA leaders hoped to capitalize on the momentum of the 
Illinois win by gaining victories in several Eastern states in 1915.  For the next two years, 
Catt worked tirelessly on the New York state suffrage campaign.  Although unsuccessful 
in winning the referendum, Catt’s popularity and prestige within NAWSA soared as a 
121 Van Voris, Carrie Chapman Catt: A Public Life, 55-59. 
 
122 Hay died 19 years before Catt. However, when Catt died in 1947 she left instructions that she 
was to be buried next to her long-time partner.  Shortly after Hay’s death, Catt had a monument erected 
over their burial plot in New Rochelle, New York.  The monument reads, “Here lie two, united in 
friendship for thirty-eight years through constant service to a great cause.”  Ibid., 219. 
66 
 
result of her leadership of the campaign.  It was in the wake of the New York defeat that 
she reluctantly agreed to serve again as NAWSA’s president.123
 Catt faced a daunting task as she accepted the reigns of NAWSA in December 
1915.  The organization was deeply divided over the decision to simultaneously pursue 
the Shafroth-Palmer Amendment and the traditional federal suffrage amendment.  
Despite the silver linings described above, suffragists’ spirits were dampened by their 
failure to win any of the four state referenda in 1915.  Furthermore, Catt’s predecessor, 
Anna Howard Shaw, was an amazing orator, but a poor administrator.  Dissent within the 
organization ran high.
 
124
Catt knew that the organization needed a clear focus and direction that included 
educating the public and key politicians alike about the differences between the National 
and the CU.  While still at her post as chair of the New York suffrage campaign she was 
sensitive to the need for distance from the CU.  She wrote to Jane Addams in January 
1915 expressing her desire to steer clear of any organization that involved the CU 
because she did not want her name or NAWSA linked with that group.  Addams had 
requested that she attend a conference in Washington, D.C. with several other women’s 
groups to discuss the formation of a peace organization.  Initially, Catt agreed to attend – 
  Finally, the CU insurgency presented a serious problem for 
NAWSA as it attempted to maintain its nonpartisan status and to continue to pursue 
action at both the state and federal level.   
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only later discovering that the CU was hosting the conference.  She immediately wrote to 
Addams, reneging on her agreement to attend the conference. 
 She explained in the letter that she held no personal animosity toward the CU, but 
its leaders continued to pursue an anti-Democratic campaign when the suffrage 
amendment was pending in eleven states and depended for success on Democratic votes.  
Catt told Addams, “As Chairman of the New York Campaign Committee, I must not 
allow myself to be placed where I seem to sanction that policy.”125
 The historical record indicates that her fears about public confusion were well 
founded. Not even the president, a fairly astute and informed political player, was able to 
match suffrage leaders’ names with the organizations they represented.  In July 1916, 
Catt and Mrs. Frank M. Roessing, chair of NAWSA’s Congressional Committee, 
requested to meet with Wilson.  The President’s personal secretary, Joseph Tumulty, 
communicated the request to him via a memorandum.  In a hand-written note at the 
bottom of the memo, Wilson asked, “Are these ladies of the ‘Congressional Union’ 
variety?”
  Even as a state level 
representative of NAWSA, Catt recognized the potential damage her association with the 
CU could have for the National.  She carried that level of recognition with her into the 
NAWSA front office. 
126
                                                 
 
  Tumulty replied with a note explaining the difference between the two 
groups, pointing out that Roessing and Catt represented the more “conservative” 
organization that did not approve of the anti-Democrat stance of the CU.  He also 
125 Catt to Addams (January 4, 1915), Carrie Chapman Catt Papers, Manuscript Division, Library 
of Congress, Washington, D.C., Box 4, Reel 3. (Hereafter referred to as CLOC).  Addams eventually 
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within the suffrage movement.  See O'Neill, Everyone was Brave: A History of Feminism in America, 174-
175. 
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informed the president that Catt was scheduled to address the Democratic State 
Convention in West Virginia the following week, which helped to distinguish her from 
the rival organization.127
 After reading Tumulty’s explanation, Wilson, satisfied that he was not meeting 
with the enemy, wrote on the memorandum, “Okay Tuesday at 2 pm – office.”
 
128
 Paul and her comrades in the CU took a markedly different approach to the 
President.  In the first few months of 1916, the CU solidified its strategy for making 
suffrage an issue in the fall election.  In February, Blatch expressed optimism to Paul that 
the threat of women voters abandoning the Democrats in the West was forcing the 
Democratic leadership to be more responsive to the issue.  She explained that she had 
written to the heads of both political parties in all the Western states requesting a hearing 
with them on behalf of the CU.  To Paul she confided, “I think it is interesting that the 
Democratic Committees are replying so much more readily.  Evidently, the 
  It is 
significant to note Wilson’s confusion in mid-1916.  Clearly he was aware of the CU’s 
agitation against his party and was reluctant to grant leaders of that organization an 
audience.  If his ability to distinguish between the two groups were not changed, he might 
have continued to associate the federal amendment only with the CU.  Over the next 
several months, Catt initiated a public relations campaign that left no doubt in the 
president’s mind that NAWSA, too, supported the federal amendment but would pursue it 
in a manner that did not threaten him or the Democratic Party. 
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Congressional Union has filled them with some fear.”129
 In a memo written at the meeting’s conclusion, the chair of the Advisory Council 
summarized the proceedings.  She explained that the council had decided to form a 
National Woman’s Party (NWP).  The basis of this new party would be to place suffrage 
above allegiance to any other political party.  Enfranchised women of the West would be 
urged to join the NWP and use their voting power to press for immediate passage of the 
federal amendment.  The council also decided to hold a formal founding convention for 
the new party in Chicago in June 1916 to coincide with both the Republican and 
Progressive Party National Conventions.
  Fueled by this sort of optimism, 
Paul called a meeting of the CU National Advisory Council in early April to focus efforts 
in the West and make the threat of women voters even more credible. 
130  Paul sent letters to CU leaders in each of the 
Western states reiterating the new strategy and urging them to attend the convention in 
Chicago.  She used the letters to amplify her strategy, reasoning, “We hope that if the 
political leaders see the women voters are forming an independent party they will regard 
the suffrage question as a more serious one than they have considered it in the past.”131
 One of Paul’s lieutenants, Mary Beard, attempted to explain the CU strategy to 
suffragists in New York by publishing an article in The Woman Voter.  Her article 
provides further insight into the political thinking of CU leaders.  Beard derided state 
suffrage campaigns and insisted that suffrage organizations (namely NAWSA) that tried 
to engage in both state and federal work would always be ineffective.  She wrote: 
 
                                                 
 
129 Blatch to Paul (February 23, 1916), NWPP, Reel 1. 
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Each successive failure to win in a campaign state increases the obstacles 
in the way of a Federal amendment.  State work does not, therefore, 
inevitably promote a Federal amendment.  Of course, in the future, 
victorious states would help the Federal amendment, but Federal work in 
that case always waits for state success to precede it and does not 
accompany state work.  An organization that believes that more states are 
essential to the securing of a National amendment can work but half-
heartedly for that amendment.132
 
   
Beard went on to contrast the NAWSA approach of asking for the vote with the NWP’s 
strategy of using the votes of women to demand full suffrage: “Disenfranchised women 
do not have to argue, plead or cajole if enfranchised women will but vote under the 
slogan: ‘SUFFRAGE FIRST!’”  This concluding phrase became the NWP’s mantra in the 
1916 campaign. 
 On June 7, Blatch gave the keynote speech at the Chicago convention.  She 
demanded that the enfranchised women of the nation take a stand against the Democrats 
unless they passed the federal amendment: 
I know that we have never had a greater instance of the control over 
legislation by the Party in power than at the present time.  I know that the 
Party in power today, the dominant Party - my Party – controls the White 
House, controls the Senate, and controls the House of Representatives; and 
you know what that means.  They control every committee in the House of 
Representatives and in the Senate.  They determine legislation.  Now you 
and I are voters in the Suffrage states, controlling ninety-one of the 
electoral votes, controlling one-fourth of the United States Senate and one-
sixth of the House of Representatives.  Are we going to sleep?  Are we 
going to sentimentalize?  Are we going to run after this Party or that 
Party?  Or are we going to stand for the biggest principle that any group of 
enfranchised people have ever been called upon to stand for?133
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Blatch went on to claim that the Woman’s Party would deliver 500,000 votes against the 
Democratic Party in the 1916 election unless it pledged its support to the federal 
amendment. 
 In the days that followed, the Progressives and Republicans held their national 
conventions.  Suffrage was an issue of debate for both parties.  In the end, the rapidly 
shrinking and increasingly politically insignificant Progressive Party endorsed the federal 
amendment.  The Republicans took a more moderate stance, urging the extension of 
suffrage but recognizing the right of each state to settle the question for itself.  In his 
acceptance of the Republican Presidential nomination in August, Charles Evan Hughes 
went a step further, offering his personal endorsement of the federal suffrage amendment.  
Nevertheless, in early June it appeared that the Progressives favored a federal amendment 
while Republicans only supported a states’ rights version of suffrage.  The attention of all 
suffragists then turned to the Democratic National Convention in St. Louis, which was 
held the following week (June 14-16). 
 When the Democrats adopted a plank similar to the Republicans, endorsing 
suffrage only as an issue to be decided by the states, the NWP earnestly began 
campaigning against all Democrats in the western states.134
                                                 
134 For the rationale of the NWP leaders in launching a second “boycott” of Democrats, see Adams 
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in Ibid., 152. 
  An overwhelming amount of 
evidence points to the conclusion that this strategy was based on three faulty assumptions 
and that it did little to further the cause of suffrage.  The first major assumption that failed 
the Woman’s Party was that women would behave as single-issue voters, willing to place 
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suffrage for women in other parts of the country above any other concerns.  Secondly, 
they falsely believed that women voters would view Wilson as anti-suffrage because he 
was the head of the Democratic Party and a federal amendment had not been passed 
during his first term.  Finally, they were overly confident that a majority of people would 
understand their strategy of campaigning against all Democrats even if individual 
Democratic candidates supported suffrage.   
In reality, women voters were concerned with a wide range of issues in the 1916 
election.  Wilson’s affirmative vote in New Jersey and willingness at the St. Louis 
Convention to support the suffrage plank, limited though it was, convinced many voters 
that he was actually an advocate for the cause.  A tiny minority abandoned their 
traditional party allegiance to join the Woman’s Party, while a vast majority, suffragists 
and anti-suffragists alike, were convinced that the campaign against all Democrats 
damaged the suffrage movement. 
 One of the best illustrations of women’s refusal to behave as single-issue voters 
comes from a set of correspondence between Alva Belmont and a number of western 
women voters.  Belmont served as the Chairman of the NWP’s Campaign Fund 
Committee during the 1916 election year.  In September, she sent a letter to 20,000 
women voters asking them to donate money in an attempt to raise $500,000 for the 
upcoming campaign.  Her letter explained that the NWP needed additional funds because, 
“Mr. Wilson and his party have steadfastly opposed the woman suffrage amendment in 
Congress. The Woman’s Party is campaigning, therefore, in the states where women 
vote, against Mr. Wilson and the Democratic Congressional candidates.”135
                                                 
 
  She received 
135 Belmont to Fellow-Member (September 13, 1916), NWPP, Reel 1. 
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hundreds of responses, overwhelmingly negative.  A snapshot of the letters back to 
Belmont illustrates the posture of women in the West. 
 A woman in Kansas responded that knowing that the Republican candidate 
supported a federal suffrage amendment was not enough to cause her to vote for him.  
She wrote, “The women of Kansas have the suffrage and it is valuable to them only as it 
is used to gain for themselves or humanity the things most desired.  We are anxious to 
know [Hughes’] attitude on a number of questions; vis: Child Labor law, Universal 
compulsory military service, taxes on income, inheritances and munitions.”136  She went 
on to express skepticism that Hughes’ interest in suffrage extended beyond his near-term 
desire to be elected.  She questioned Belmont, “Has all this enthusiasm for woman 
suffrage been awakened merely to get votes – women’s votes – to help make himself 
President . . . His election would in no way advance the suffrage cause and on the other 
hand defeat much very necessary legislation.137
 A woman who described herself as an “earnest advocate of women’s suffrage” 
sent a similar response to Belmont.  She was even more specific about Wilson’s appeal 
over Hughes.  In refusing to donate any funds to the NWP, she explained that Wilson 
“had done so much for our country.  A man who has stood by the wage earning people.  I 
think the woman’s suffrage party in campaigning against Mr. Wilson is all wrong.  And 
you will find in the end that you have gained nothing.”
   
138
                                                 
 
  She further added her belief 
that Wilson’s support of the states’ rights stance of the Democratic Party did not mean 
136 Mrs. J.E. Drennan to Belmont (September 27, 1916), NWPP, Reel 1. 
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that he personally did not support a federal amendment.  This letter indicates two 
important points.  First, it demonstrates that the writer believed Wilson’s support of 
workers was more significant than his party’s failure to secure a federal suffrage 
amendment – further proof that the belief in suffrage as an issue women would weigh 
more heavily than all others was false.  Secondly, it shows that Wilson had successfully 
used his party’s adherence to states’ rights as a protective barrier for his personal views.  
Despite the fact that he had never wavered from the party’s position that suffrage was an 
issue to be decided by the states, many women remained hopeful that because he was in 
favor of the principle of suffrage, he was not personally opposed to a federal amendment. 
 A respondent from Oregon blasted Belmont and the NWP for their strategy, 
echoing the belief that Hughes only supported the federal amendment in order to gain 
votes and that he knew the bill would first have to gain the support of two-thirds of 
Congress before he would ever have to deal with it.  She pointed out that the suffrage 
amendment had lingered in Congress for twenty years under Republican administrations 
and that the amendment had come further under Wilson than any of his Republican 
predecessors.  In a sharp rebuke of the entire NWP strategy, she wrote, 
In this state the majority of the women are standing for Wilson and the suffrage 
cause has lost many of its best workers because of the foolishness of the 
congressional union [sic] and the woman’s party in trying to throw the Oregon 
women’s vote to Hughes.  You are definitely injuring the cause of suffrage among 
Oregon women.  We will never again work together as we did before the split which 
you and your followers have forced upon us.  You are causing the same split in other 
states and therefore you have given suffrage the greatest setback that it could be 
given.  It will take at least ten years of hard work by the saner women to overcome 
the blow you have given suffrage in trying to force your candidate for president upon 
us.”139
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This woman represented the views of those who not only continued to support Wilson but 
also were distraught over the damage being caused by the NWP’s assault on the 
Democratic Party.   
In an almost identical letter, Mrs. W.F. LeSueur from Arizona contradicted all 
three of the assumptions on which the NWP’s strategy was based.  She wrote, “President 
Wilson can and will get suffrage for women quicker, than would his opponent.  In my 
opinion he has accomplished more in the last three and half years than has the 
Republicans in twenty years [sic].  I do not think that Mr. Hughes would be equal to the 
big questions now confronting, and that will confront our nation.”140
The fact that so many women in the West credited Wilson with progress on the 
federal amendment while deriding the efforts of the CU is ironic.  In reality, the CU was 
largely responsible for reinvigorating the movement for a federal amendment.  The work 
it performed while still affiliated with NAWSA’s Congressional Committee in 1913 and 
later as an independent organization in 1914-1915 brought attention and action on the 
amendment in Congress.  Still, perception proved more powerful than reality.  In 1916, it 
cannot be denied that many women voters perceived Wilson to be an advocate for the 
federal amendment.  Further, they failed to see the ways in which the CU’s work had 
helped the cause. 
  LeSueur’s letter 
demonstrates that the “big questions” facing the United States weighed more heavily on 
the minds of many voters than did suffrage.  Additionally, her response indicates the 
belief held by many that Wilson was actually an advocate for suffrage and to campaign 
against him and the other Democrats would only hurt the movement. 
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The replies to Belmont’s request for financial aid are not the only sources of 
evidence that an overwhelming majority of western women rejected the NWP’s strategy, 
although their actual words are perhaps the strongest testimony.  Subsequent 
correspondence suggests that Belmont’s September 1916 plea for donations to the cause 
went largely unanswered.  Less than four months after her call for funds, she was forced 
to send another letter to previous contributors asking for financial assistance.  She wrote, 
“Our treasury is empty and our work is seriously crippled for lack of funds.”141  The 
women she had solicited in September apparently spoke with both their pens and their 
checkbooks.  The NWP’s membership numbers are even more compelling.  In early 
1917, the number of women from suffrage states that had joined the Woman’s Party was 
only 14,277 – a far cry from the 500,000 voters that Blatch had promised in June 1916.142
Part of the problem for the NWP resided with the fact that Paul’s strategy, though 
defensible if given proper scrutiny and full hearing, seemed counterintuitive to most 
voters who quickly dismissed it without a full hearing.  Paul’s explanation of the strategy 
to one of the leaders of the Woman’s Party in Colorado, illustrates this point.  She wrote, 
“Our interest, of course, is in securing the passage of the amendment and not in securing 
the election of Hughes, but it is vital to the success of the amendment, I think, that we 
secure the defeat of Wilson and the election of Hughes.”
 
143
                                                 
 
  Paul had a hard time 
convincing people that she was not interested in electing Hughes – only defeating 
Wilson; with only a subtle difference in purpose, the propositions were one and the same. 
141 Belmont to Anderson (January 26, 1916), NWPP, Reel 2. 
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Additionally, Paul’s method of measuring the success of the movement differed 
from that of most people who believed supporters should be won over rather than 
coerced.  She went on in the same letter to the supporter in Colorado to justify her 
methods: 
It seems to us that we gain more publicity by our campaign of opposition than we 
could by one of support.  In Colorado two years ago . . . we succeeded in making 
such an impression upon the campaign and obtaining so much publicity for our fight 
against [U.S. Senator] Thomas that even now, two years later, he is still making 
speeches in the United States Senate denouncing our campaign against him.  Had 
[NWP members] simply gone in as speakers supporting Mr. Thomas’ opponent, they 
could not possibly, I believe, have created the furor in the state in which they did by 
their policy of attacking Thomas and pointing out the reasons for not having him 
returned to Washington.144
 
 
The problem with Paul’s assessment is that Thomas was a pro-suffrage Senator who had 
worked to secure suffrage for women in Colorado and voted in favor of the federal 
amendment repeatedly in the U.S. Senate.  Paul considered the NWP’s campaign against 
Thomas a success, despite the fact that they had been working against a long-time 
suffrage supporter and that he was re-elected despite their efforts to defeat him.  This type 
of “success” was not attractive to the vast majority of voters. 
 In some ways, the NWP’s 1916 campaign strategy only made the suffrage battle 
more difficult.  After Wilson was re-elected and the Democrats maintained control of the 
House and Senate, the Republicans owed the NWP nothing since the women’s vote had 
not carried them to victory.  Furthermore, many Democratic suffrage supporters backed 
away from the cause because they were made to feel as if it conflicted with their party 
loyalty.  Most importantly, much-needed Democratic support in Congress had been 
alienated by the NWP’s campaigns in the West.  NWP member Maud Younger reported 
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in January 1917 that Representative Hayden of Arizona, a long-time suffrage supporter in 
the House, had rejected her request to delay a vote on the federal amendment that would 
surely end in its defeat.  Hayden had told her that if the NWP was in favor of delaying the 
vote, then he was in favor of rushing it, even if it meant defeat for the amendment.  He 
explained that he was in favor of anything the NWP opposed because they had fought 
against him in his last campaign.145
NAWSA activities in 1916 reflected the beliefs of its leader, Catt, just as much as 
the CU/NWP activities reflected the leadership of Alice Paul.  The four major tenets of 
Catt’s strategy in 1916 were increased organization, a renewed focus on the federal 
amendment, remaining steadfast to the policy of nonpartisanship, and distinguishing 
NAWSA from the CU.  All of this was part of Catt’s long-term vision: win more states in 
order to increase the number of Congressmen from suffrage states, thereby enhancing the 
prospects for passing the federal amendment and for achieving a quick ratification.  She 
recognized that this strategy meant several more years of work for the suffrage 
movement, as opposed to the quick fix promised by the western strategy of the NWP.  
She explained to NAWSA members: 
  If this was the type of response the NWP generated 
from Congressmen who supported suffrage, they stood little chance of winning the votes 
of those who opposed the amendment. 
But let me implore you not to imagine a Federal Amendment an easy 
process of enfranchisement.  There is no quick, short cut to our liberty.  
The federal amendment means a simultaneous campaign in 48 states.  It 
demands organization in every precinct; activity, agitation, education in 
every corner . . . Nothing less than this nation-wide, vigilant, unceasing 
campaigning will win the ratification.146
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To Catt, the NWP promises were a mirage.  Throughout 1916, she hammered away at 
NAWSA’s state associations to improve their internal organization in preparation for 
state referenda and, later, the ratification fight. 
 During her opening comments as the newly elected President of NAWSA, Catt 
told the assembled representatives that the watchword for 1916 would be organization: 
“Whether for Congressional or State work, the only solid foundation is organization; and 
if you have in your State a thorough and far-reaching organization, you can switch it on 
short notice to any piece of work, State or Federal, that needs to be done.”147  Just a few 
months later, she announced the formation of NAWSA’s Department of Organization.  
The new Department’s mission was to “give lessons in organization” to state associations 
so that “every state which has not already done so shall transform its plan of organization 
into that which makes the political unit the basis of organization.”148
 To fully understand Catt’s emphasis on and use of the term “organization,” one 
must have a sense of Catt’s experience as a suffragist over the preceding two decades.  In 
the absence of a strong national headquarters and a coordinated national plan, each state 
association had followed its own path.  State leaders often ignored the advice of the 
NAWSA Executive Council, either squandering resources in campaigns that were 
doomed to fail or failing to capitalize on opportunities in states where concerted 
campaigns might have resulted in victory.  Further, some state leaders were reluctant to 
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move beyond voter education to voter mobilization.  Having spent time at both the 
national and state level, Catt was painfully aware of the need for a stronger central 
authority in NAWSA.  As a corollary, she demanded that all state associations bow to the 
dictates of that central authority, even if that meant seeing funds raised in their states used 
for a campaign in another state or agreeing to abandon their state campaigns if the 
national leaders determined their states did not have much chance of success.149
 Alongside this increased focus on organization, Catt placed additional emphasis 
on the plan for attaining the federal amendment.  Although her own political calculations 
may have eventually led her to independently make this transition, the activity of the CU 
/ NWP certainly hastened her journey.  Early in 1916, she confided to another NAWSA 
leader, “It seems to me that the National Association is losing its Federal Amendment 
zealots to the Congressional Union merely because we do not work on that job hard 
enough . . . If [NAWSA] should once do it, there is no knowing what might happen.”
   
150  
Propelled to greater action by its rival organization and the increased chance of success 
because of new suffrage states, NAWSA, under Catt’s leadership, worked harder for the 
federal amendment than it had since the late 19th century.151
                                                 
149 Van Voris, Carrie Chapman Catt: A Public Life, 132-135.  
  In the mind of most 
NAWSA leaders, a key to winning the federal amendment and ratification would be the 
maintenance of NAWSA’s nonpartisan status. 
 
150 Catt to Maud Wood Park (January 18, 1916) and Catt to Park (January 27, 1916), NAWSA 
Records, Reel 15. 
 
151 NAWSA’s renewed focus on the Federal Amendment was reflected in the pages of both the 
Headquarters News Letter and the Woman’s Journal and Suffrage News.  Beginning in Janaury 1916, both 
publications provided a status report on the federal amendment in every issue.  Furthermore, the articles 
and editorials included more even coverage of state and congressional activity. 
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 In the first years of her presidency, Catt found herself not only defending the 
policy of non-partisanship to the public, but also fending off partisan overtures from close 
friends and members of her own organization.  So what was it about NAWSA’s 
traditional policy that drove Catt to defend it with such vehemence?  She answered that 
question in numerous articles, letters, and interviews by claiming that holding the party in 
power responsible simply would not work to secure suffrage for all women.152
 Despite what seemed blatantly obvious to Catt as the correct path for NAWSA, 
women whom she respected and worked with occasionally challenged the National’s 
traditional policy.  In July 1916, Catt received a letter from the President of Bryn Mawr 
College, M. Cary Thomas.  Thomas, an active suffragist and a long-time national leader 
of the battle for greater educational opportunities for women, wrote only a few weeks 
after both the Republican and Democratic National Conventions had adopted a suffrage 
plank for their party platforms, but during which neither endorsed the federal amendment.  
Thomas suggested that Catt meet with the Republican presidential candidate, Charles 
Evan Hughes, and urge him to publicly support the federal amendment and promise to try 
and get Congress to pass it if he were elected.  NAWSA should offer their pledge of 
  It was not 
a personal issue for the always-pragmatic Catt.  Rather, she simply did not believe it was 
an approach that could succeed.  With constitutional rules requiring a vote of two-thirds 
of the national legislature in order to send an amendment to the states for ratification, the 
amendment necessarily required bipartisan support.  State ratification, as well, required 
bipartisan action.  Therefore, suffragists could not afford to draw the hostility of either 
party.  
                                                 
152 For example, see the following articles authored by Catt: “The Suffrage Platform,” Woman’s 
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support to Hughes in the upcoming election unless the Democrats passed a federal 
amendment in the final session of the 1916 Congress. 
 Thomas went on to suggest that Catt then meet with President Wilson and explain 
her plan to support Hughes in the upcoming election unless the Democrats pushed the 
federal amendment through in the next two months.  She felt that the fear of losing the 
election in the fall would force Wilson to rally his party and push the amendment through 
Congress.  Even if it did not, all the nation’s suffragists (CU, NAWSA, Progressives) 
would be united in their support of Hughes and the Republican ticket, and, following 
their election to office, “the federal amendment will at last be passed especially as the 
Republican congressmen who have been campaigned for by women will feel a sense of 
obligation to them such as they have never yet felt.”153
 Even after Hughes was convinced by the CU to come out in support of national 
suffrage in his July 15, 1916 nomination acceptance speech, Catt refused to give him 
NAWSA’s endorsement.  She continued to speak of suffrage as inevitable because of its 
bipartisan appeal.  In an article written after Hughes’ announcement in July but before the 
November elections, she reiterated her non-partisan approach, assuring voters that no 
national party opposed suffrage:  “The two dominant parties in their suffrage planks 
recommended that the question should be settled by the States, but neither declared 
 Thomas’ letter had genuine 
appeal.  She predicted a reunification of suffrage forces under one banner supporting 
Hughes and success for the federal amendment.  Catt was not swayed.   
                                                 
 
153 Thomas to Catt (July 4, 1916), CLOC, Box 29, Reel 19.  Interestingly, this letter contradicts the 
account of Thomas’ relationship to the suffrage movement offered in H. L. Horowitz, The Power and 
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against the Federal method.  Mr. Charles E. Hughes, the Republican candidate, has 
openly declared for the Federal Amendment.  Mr. Wilson, at this time, does not yet 
endorse it, but many democrats in Congress have not only spoken and voted for it, but are 
earnest advocates of it.”154
 Thomas was not the only one urging Catt to reconsider her non-partisan path.  At 
the NAWSA Atlantic City Convention in September 1916, one of the delegates made a 
motion that NAWSA support only those candidates who had spoken out in favor of the 
federal amendment – namely Hughes.  The motion attracted many of the women who 
were frustrated with the slow rate of progress and saw a partisan approach leading to 
quicker victory.  Catt spoke in opposition to the proposal and was supported by her 
predecessor, Dr. Anna Howard Shaw.  After two hours of debate, the motion was 
defeated, and the delegates passed a subsequent resolution to initiate a vigorous publicity 
campaign to make clear the association had indeed decided to maintain its non-partisan 
policy.
  Wilson’s later actions in his second term indicated that by 
refusing to endorse Hughes over Wilson, Catt endeared herself and NAWSA to the 
president. 
155
Despite challenges from within and outside the organization, Catt navigated 
NAWSA through the tempting waters of partisan politics.  President Wilson’s reaction to 
her dedication to this principle can be measured by his increasing responsiveness to her 
requests for support.  After his successful re-election in the fall of 1916 by a close margin 
of 276 electoral votes against 255 for Hughes, Catt was able to repeatedly call on the 
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President for support in state campaigns as well as the federal amendment campaign – a 
dynamic to be explored in-depth in the following chapters. 
Catt’s other main 1916 goal – distinguishing NAWSA from the CU – was a focal 
point of the emergency NAWSA National Convention she called in Atlantic City, New 
Jersey in September 1916.  At the convention, she revealed her “Winning Plan” for 
securing the federal amendment.  In her presidential address, she informed the audience 
that the suffrage movement was in a state of crisis.  Arguing the futility of securing 
suffrage for all women of the country by the state method and the necessity of the federal 
amendment, she exhorted NAWSA to continue to campaign for state suffrage in states 
likely to accept an amendment, but not to waste efforts in states with an obstinate 
electorate or constitutional constructions that made securing amendments almost 
impossible.  In all cases, the organization would work to influence legislators to vote in 
favor of the federal amendment.  Repeatedly, she stressed organizational efficiency and 
unity of effort.156
The beauty of Catt’s “Winning Plan” is two-fold.  First, it recognized the 
necessity of winning more state referenda in order to eventually secure a federal 
amendment.  Catt was well aware that congressmen were more apt to vote for a federal 
amendment if they came from suffrage states.  The results of the 1915 vote on the federal 
amendment in the House of Representatives proved this point.  The roll call showed that 
96% of congressmen from suffrage states voted in favor of the amendment, as compared 
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to 37% from non-suffrage states.157
Shortly after issuing her call to NAWSA members to attend the Atlantic City 
convention, Catt invited the president to address the assemblage at their closing session.  
The president replied in a personal letter to Catt that he would accept the invitation 
barring any schedule conflicts, adding a sentence at the end of the letter, “I sincerely wish 
to come.”
   To abandon the campaign in states with large 
congressional delegations such as New York would not only erase the years of work that 
had been poured into those campaigns, but also spell defeat for the federal amendment.  
Additionally, keeping state suffrage organizations alive would provide the framework 
necessary for the eventual ratification campaign that would have to be fought once the 
federal amendment passed Congress.   
158
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 The evidence suggests that Catt saw Wilson’s presence in Atlantic City as a 
way to accomplish two goals.  She hoped his appearance before the convention could be 
used in the public relations campaign.  Even if he did not come out in support of the 
federal amendment, his mere presence at the national convention of an organization with 
that end as its stated goal could be interpreted to show his decreasing resistance to such a 
measure.  Additionally, she hoped his exposure to a theater full of dedicated, orderly 
suffragists would help facilitate his complete conversion to the ranks of the believers – in 
other words, an advocate for the federal amendment.  
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 As expected, the president did not speak explicitly in favor of the federal 
amendment during his address.  Neither did he, though, insist that suffrage be attained 
through the state method.  In a marked departure from his past statements, he professed 
his support for the principle of suffrage without clearly stating his preference for the issue 
to be settled by the states. Wilson said, “We feel the tide [of the suffrage movement]; we 
rejoice in the strength of it, and we shall not quarrel in the long run as to the method of 
it.”159  Wilson’s shift in position was not an unconscious action or a slip of the tongue.   
Later correspondence indicates that he intended his remarks at Atlantic City to represent 
his openness to a federal amendment heading into the 1916 election.  Responding to a 
request in October from the Writers Equal Suffrage League for a statement of his 
position, Wilson directed his secretary to provide the league with a copy of his Atlantic 
City speech.160
Reminiscing several years later, Catt expressed her belief that it was that night in 
Atlantic City when Wilson “yielded to the momentum of the movement which was 
rapidly reaching its climax in his administration.  [The convention was] the very hour 
when conversion to the principle became with him conversion to an obligation to join the 
campaign.”
 
161
                                                 
 
  When Wilson looked out over the audience in Atlantic City, he saw 
exactly what Catt wanted him to see – orderly women that cheered him before and after 
his speech and who contrasted sharply with the image he held of CU agitators.  This 
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positive image, she believed, catalyzed Wilson’s conversion to the NAWSA cause of a 
federal suffrage amendment. 
Just two months later, Catt decided to increase the intensity of the public relations 
campaign aimed at distinguishing between NAWSA and the CU.  NAWSA press 
secretary Rose Young wrote to her in November 1916 requesting that she write some 
articles to be used in conjunction with personality stories, cartoons, and news items in 
order to “get the National American so dominantly featured in relation to the federal 
amendment that there won’t be any room on the map for the C.U. to get a grip on popular 
imagination again.”162
 Catt effectively used the letter to answer those questions.  She explained how the 
mixing of the Congressional Committee responsibilities with the Congressional Union 
and the violations of NAWSA principles had led to Paul’s decision to part ways with the 
National.  Furthermore, she provided a detailed explanation of the CU policies of holding 
the party in power responsible and abandoning state suffrage campaigns in favor of a 
singular focus on the federal amendment.  In contrast, she explained, “The National looks 
to both parties for support of the Federal Amendment and to intensive organization and 
vigorous activity within the states, to secure the ratification of the Federal Amendment; 
 Catt, concurring with Young’s proposal, composed a letter that 
Young released to the press.  Young indicated on the press release that Catt had written 
the letter in answer to three questions: 1) Why the Congressional Union came into 
existence 2) Why it advanced a policy contrary to that of the National American Woman 
Suffrage Association and 3) What the differences are between the two groups. 
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and the National would also secure the vote by suffrage referenda whenever possible.”163
 By the end of 1916, NAWSA had succeeded in getting both major parties to 
include suffrage planks in their national platforms.  Like their counterparts in the NWP, 
they would have much preferred a plank endorsing the federal amendment, but in that 
they were committed to work at both the state and national level, they chose to see the 
states’ rights planks as a positive step.  Through an aggressive publicity campaign, 
NAWSA leaders had educated a large number of Americans about the difference between 
NAWSA and the CU.  More importantly, they had educated the president.  Wilson was 
convinced enough of NAWSA’s goodwill to speak at its national convention.  He did not 
endorse a federal amendment, but his language indicated a new openness to national 
suffrage.  His mere presence at the convention was a public relations plume in NAWSA’s 
hat that they used repeatedly during the final three years of the campaign. 
 
Stressing NAWSA’s non-partisan approach, focus on the federal amendment, and 
continued work at the state level, Catt clearly explained the differences between the two 
organizations.  She concluded the letter with her personal assessment of the 
ineffectiveness of the CU policy of holding the party in power responsible. 
 Woman suffrage was but one of many issues facing Wilson during his 1916 re-
election bid.  His reaction to pressure from suffragists, as well as his attempt to win over 
progressive voters by supporting important pro-labor legislation, serves as the subject of 
the next chapter.  Additionally, this chapter details the post-election analysis conducted 
by NAWSA, the NWP, and Wilson’s Administration.  Different interpretations of the 
                                                 
 
163 Catt, “The Winning Policy,” p. 3. NAWSA Records, Box 82, Reel 59. 
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1916 results – accompanied by the increasing prospect of US intervention into the war in 
Europe - led to new strategies by all three groups in 1917.  
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CHAPTER 4 
WILSON’S PROGRESSIVE TURN AND THE 1916 ELECTION 
 
 One of the most important things to note when examining Wilson’s approach to 
the 1916 election is that the issue of woman suffrage was, at best, a minor concern.  The 
issues that dominated the campaign were America’s potential involvement in the war in 
Europe and where the two major political parties would fall on a broad range of 
progressive issues.  Wilson’s campaign strategy evolved immensely during the course of 
1916, but by the time the election arrived in November, his platform can best be 
summarized as peace, prosperity, and progressivism.  This chapter reveals Wilson 
treading carefully through the months leading up to the election, balancing his need to 
win back progressive voters with his need to placate the conservatives within his own 
party, particularly those from the South.  While the preceding chapter detailed the 
president’s successful maneuvers to appear pro-suffrage in advance of the 1916 election, 
this chapter examines his equally successful attempt to cast himself and his party as pro-
labor.  Specifically, it conducts a comparative analysis between Wilson’s evolving stance 
on woman suffrage and his changed position on two key labor issues: restricting child 
labor and supporting an eight-hour workday. This chapter concludes with an assessment 
of how various groups interpreted the results of the 1916 election.  Recognizing that 
NAWSA, the NWP, and the Wilson administration understood the election results in 
different ways helps to explain the new strategies employed by each group in 1917.  
 A close examination of Wilson’s decision to support both the Keating-Owen 
Child Labor Bill and the Adamson Act, which granted railroad workers an eight-hour 
day, is illuminating for understanding his conversion to the federal woman suffrage 
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amendment in a number of ways.  But at the outset of this analysis it is important to note 
key differences between Wilson’s approach to labor legislation as compared to the issue 
of woman suffrage.  Unlike his views on woman suffrage, Wilson had supported the 
principle of protective legislation for child workers and limited hours for workers for 
most of his public life.164  Additionally, Wilson tended to see the government’s role with 
regard to economic issues in a much different light than he did social issues.  As a 
number of his biographers have noted, he was reluctant to act as decisively on the latter 
as opposed to the former.165
 Specific similarities to the suffrage battle include the fact that his support for the 
Keating-Owen Child Labor Act and the Adamson Act marked a sharp reversal of his 
position on these specific pieces of legislation.  His shift indicated a new openness to 
national solutions for social justice issues.  Further, a look at his executive 
correspondence regarding labor reveals that Wilson’s advisors were adamant that he 
needed to bolster his political support among progressives if he had any hope of being 
  Despite these differences, though, Wilson’s increasingly 
supportive stance on labor legislation and willingness to move away from a strict states’ 
rights position does bear important similarities to his slide toward support for woman 
suffrage.   
                                                 
 164 Specific evidence of this fact will be presented in various points throughout this chapter.  For a 
general overview of Wilson’s position on restricting child labor, see Wood, Constitutional Politics in the 
Progressive Era: Child Labor and the Law, 66-68. For evidence of Wilson’s support for 8-hour day 
legislation, see Phillip S. Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the United States, Vol VI: On the Eve of 
America's Entrance into World War I, 1915-1916 (New York: International Publishers, 1982), 167. For 
Wilson’s general anti-statist stance and belief that protective labor legislation equaled class legislation 
during the 1912 election, see Chace, 1912: Wilson, Roosevelt, Taft and Debs - the Election that Changed 
the Country, 192-196. , Julie Greene, Pure and Simple Politics: The American Federation of Labor and 
Political Activism, 1881-1917 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 235-236. 
  
 165 Walworth, Woodrow Wilson, 327. Walworth argues that Wilson “realized that the issues of 
race equality and woman suffrage involved slow changes in the social mores of his people.  He knew that 
he could not act upon them with constructive decisiveness, as in the case of economic maladies that 
obviously demanded remedy.”  See also, Clements, The Presidency of Woodrow Wilson, 45. 
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reelected in 1916 – even if that meant disappointing more conservative members of his 
own party, especially from the South.  This fact bears strongly on his actions with regard 
to woman suffrage.  Portentously, the battle over the child labor bill reveals significant 
cracks within the supposedly monolithic South.  
 Additionally, evidence in this chapter shows that Wilson was willing to listen to 
and follow the counsel of his advisory team.166
 On the international stage, Wilson charted a bold course for the country.  
Recognizing that, like him, most Americans were opposed to U.S. military intervention in 
the war and deeply divided over the causes of the fighting in Europe, he developed a plan 
for a mediated peace.  First outlined in a speech on May 27, 1916, Wilson set forth his 
vision to end U.S. isolation by taking the lead in a negotiated peace agreement among the 
  He followed closely the entreaties of 
those close to him who urged his support of both the child labor and 8-hour day bills.  
Similarly, the president paid heed to those within his inner circle who urged him to take a 
moderately pro-suffrage stance by supporting a states’ rights suffrage plank in the 1916 
Democratic platform, but stopping short of endorsing the federal amendment.  Finally, 
both of these legislative battles culminated with Wilson’s personal intervention with 
members of Congress.  His willingness to exert executive influence with legislators 
foreshadows his actions with Congress on behalf of the federal woman suffrage 
amendment during his second term.  Looming over all of the domestic issues in 1916, 
though, was the raging war in Europe. Wilson’s desire to influence the outcome of that 
conflict colored all of his calculations. 
                                                 
166 As this chapter will show, the advisors who played a critical role in shaping Wilson’s attitude 
on labor questions included, among others, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, Supreme Court Justice 
Louis Brandeis, Oklahoma Senator Robert Owen, National Child Labor Committee leader Alexander 
McKelway, and Industrial Relations Committee Chairman Frank Walsh.  
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warring nations of Europe and then committing the nation to participation in a postwar 
association of nations that would maintain peace in the future.  His plan offended 
isolationists but pleased a majority of Americans who enthusiastically supported the 
campaign slogan: “He kept us out of war.”167  Although an emphasis on nonintervention 
would seem to be a shift from Wilson’s fierce defense of American rights on the seas and 
his preparedness campaign of 1915, Link argues convincingly that Wilson’s peace stance 
was based on much more than political expedience.  Over the course of 1916, Wilson had 
grown both increasingly frustrated with the Allies and distrustful of Great Britain.  He 
clearly recognized the political value of taking a stand for peace.  However, Link argues, 
his transition to “a leading champion of nonintervention was facilitated by developments 
both at home and abroad.”168
 Domestically, Wilson worked to regain ground with progressive voters. Several 
factors contributed to his belief that such action was necessary.  First off, he and his 
advisors had carefully studied the election returns from 1912.  They were keenly aware 
that Wilson’s victory owed more to the split between the Republican Party and 
Roosevelt’s Bull Moose insurgency than to any issue championed by the Democrats.
  
169
                                                 
 167 Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917 (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), 17-25. 
  
They were also cognizant of the fact that, although he did not score any points in the 
Electoral College, the Socialist candidate, Eugene Debs, had won nearly a million votes 
 
 168 Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 241. 
 
 169 In 1912, Wilson won 435 electoral votes compared to only 88 for Roosevelt and 8 for Taft.  
However, he received only 42% of the popular votes, the rest being divided between Roosevelt (27%), Taft 
(23%) and the Socialist candidate, Eugene V. Debs (6%). Carol Goldinger, ed. Presidential Elections since 
1789, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1987), 114.  
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representing 6% of the popular vote.170  In addition, many of the president’s actions 
during the first three years of his administration had further alienated progressives.  
Specifically, they opposed his military preparedness program and his approval of racial 
segregation in federal service. They were further discouraged by his failure to grant the 
American Federation of Labor immunity under the Sherman Act and to support woman 
suffrage, child labor legislation, and rural credits.171 As early as November 1914, leading 
progressive journalists such as Hebert Croly of the The New Republic expressed 
dissatisfaction with Wilson’s conservativism.172 As Link argues, “It was obvious that 
[Wilson and the Democrats] would have to reverse themselves and enact these and other 
measures if they were to persuade independents, Progressives, and midwestern farmers 
that they led a great national party that had struck the shackles of state rights and laissez-
faire dogma.”173
 Labor leaders joined with Croly in critiquing Wilson’s failure to live up to many 
of his promises from the 1912 campaign.  Late in the 1912 election cycle, Wilson had 
    
                                                 
 170 Interestingly, the Socialist Party began rapidly losing members after the 1912 election.  
According to Debs’ biographer Nick Salvatore, Socialist leaders were unable to sustain class consciousness 
among the rank and file in succeeding years.  Further, new tensions based on geography created challenges 
within the party.  The large increase in the Socialist vote in 1912 had primarily come from Western and 
southwestern states.  But national leadership remained very much in eastern Socialist control.  As a result 
of both of these factors, more than 22,000 members left the party over the course of 1913.  More than 6500 
more members were gone by the end of 1915.  The Socialist vote dropped off dramatically during the 1914 
mid-term elections.  Nick Salvatore, Eugene V. Debs: Citizen and Socialist, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 2007), 265-267.  There is nothing in Wilson’s correspondence to his campaign staff to 
indicate that any of them were aware of the internal Socialist Party tensions or that they took notice of the 
declining Socialist vote in the 1914 mid-terms.  This could be explained by the fact that Wilson and his 
team rarely wrote or spoke explicitly about courting Socialists.  It seems likely that when Wilson and/or 
Democratic strategists talked about courting “progressives” they were referring not only to former members 
of the Progressive Party, but also to independents who would be attracted to a social justice agenda, to 
include Socialists. 
 
 171 Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 223-224.   
  
 172 Herbert Croly, "Presidential Complacency," The New Republic, November 21, 1914 
 
 173 Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crises, 1915-1916, 322. 
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linked up with one of the nation’s rising legal scholars and political reformers, Louis 
Brandeis, and developed a plan to combat the Progressive Party’s goal of branding him as 
anti-labor.174  As noted labor historian Phillip Foner has documented, Brandeis 
encouraged Wilson and the Democrats to take a position that would, “couple the right to 
organize with the need for social legislation wherever it was required to protect labor 
from the overwhelming power of industry.”175  Wilson began emphasizing these 
principles in the final two months of the campaign, appearing pro-labor enough to win 
the public endorsement of the American Federation of Labor President Samuel Gompers 
just a week before voters went to the polls.176  But with that endorsement came 
expectations of specific gains for labor – expectations that the Wilson administration 
failed to meet during the first three years of his administration.177
                                                 
174 The 1912 campaign was not the first time that Wilson had worked to remake his image with 
progressive-minded voters.  During his 1910 gubernatorial race in New Jersey, he shed his conservatism in 
order to embrace the growing reformist sentiment across the state.  This was particularly true in the last 
month of the campaign when he came out unequivocally in favor of a strong corrupt practices law and for 
an empowered public utilities commission.  See Link, Wilson: The Road to the White House, 180-181. , 
Cooper, Woodrow Wilson: A Biography, 122-126.   
  
 
 175 Phillip S. Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the United States, Vol V: The AFL in the 
Progressive Era 1910-1915 (New York: International Publishers, 1980), 115. Wilson’s relationship with 
Brandeis continued to develop over the next several years, culminating in Wilson’s controversial 
appointment of Brandeis to the Supreme Court in January 1916.  For details on the nomination battle that 
largely took place within the Democratic Party see Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crises, 1915-1916, 356-
362. See also Chapter 18: Nomination in Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis: A Life (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 2009), 430-459.  
 
 176 Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the United States, Vol V: The AFL in the Progressive 
Era 1910-1915, 115-117. For additional background on the actions of the AFL in the 1912 campaign, see 
Greene, Pure and Simple Politics: The American Federation of Labor and Political Activism, 1881-1917, 
231-240.  Greene notes that the trade unionists’ vote in 1912 certainly helped Wilson, but he received less 
support from that bloc than the 1908 Democratic candidate, William Jennings Bryan.  More disturbing to 
Democrats and AFL leaders alike was the increase in labor votes for Debs.  More than half of the nearly 
one million votes Debs received came from people voting Socialist for the first time. 
 
 177 For a detailed discussion of organized labor leaders’ frustration with Wilson based on his first 
three years in office, see Phillip Taft, The A.F. of L. in the Time of Gompers (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, Publishers, 1957), 297-298. , Greene, Pure and Simple Politics: The American Federation of 
Labor and Political Activism, 1881-1917, 246-247. , Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the United 
States, Vol V: The AFL in the Progressive Era 1910-1915, 130-131.  Foner argues convincingly that 
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 As the 1916 election neared, the issue of restricting child labor emerged as an 
opportunity for Wilson to begin his amends to progressives and labor leaders alike. The 
leading reform organization for restricting child labor during the Progressive Era was the 
National Child Labor Committee (NCLC).  When originally formed in 1904, the NCLC 
specifically disavowed federal legislation, preferring to press for reform through the 
states.  Over the next decade, their methods met with great success in almost all parts of 
the country.178  Problems persisted, though.  Powerful mill owners in the southern 
manufacturing states of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama had 
successfully blocked the passage of meaningful child labor legislation.  Additionally, the 
tremendous variation in state laws and uneven enforcement gave industries incentive to 
move to states with more lenient regulation.  The combined difficulties of disunity in 
state legislation and southern recalcitrance led the NCLC to develop and support a federal 
child labor bill in 1913.179
 The NCLC-supported Palmer-Owen Bill, introduced in Congress in 1914, relied 
on the principle that the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution gave Congress the 
   
                                                                                                                                                 
Wilson’s failure to clearly exempt labor unions from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was the thing which most 
angered labor leaders.  Gompers had written to Wilson twice in 1913, pleading his case on this particular 
point, and was furious when Wilson in early 1914 assured business leaders that he would veto the Clayton 
Act (a revised anti-trust measure) if it included an exemption for unions.  See Gompers to Wilson (March 
14, 1913) and (April 30, 1913), LWWP.   
 
 178 By 1914, forty states had enacted at least some type of protective legislation for children 
working in mills and factories. 
  
 179 Julie Novkov, "Historicizing the Figure of the Child in Legal Discourse: The Battle Over the 
Regulation of Child Labor," The American Journal of Legal History 44, no. 4 (Oct. 2000): 372. See also 
Walter I. Trattner, Crusade for the Children: A History of the National Child Labor Committee and Child 
Labor Reform in America (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), 80 and 116. , Wood, Constitutional Politics 
in the Progressive Era: Child Labor and the Law, 10 and 32. 
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power to prohibit child labor.180  For most states, the bill’s provisions were less restrictive 
than the legislation already in place at the state level.  For the southern mill owners 
whose states had no such laws, though, it was anathema.181  Nonetheless, it passed in the 
house by a vote of 233-43 in February, 1915.  But passage in the senate was blocked by a 
conservative third-term Democrat representing the interests of the southern mill owners, 
Senator Lee Overman of North Carolina who employed obstructionist tactics such that 
the bill died without ever coming to a vote when Congress adjourned on March 4, 
1915.182
 The bill was reintroduced at the next session of congress as the Keating-Owen 
bill.
 
183  It quickly sped through the house and passed in January 1916 by a vote of 343-
46.  In the senate, Overman again managed to block the measure.  When the Democrats 
met in caucus in July, the southern opponents of the bill threatened to filibuster and 
obstruct key pieces of legislation if the child labor bill came up for a vote.184
                                                 
 180 Specifically, the Palmer-Owen bill banned the interstate commerce of any goods manufactured 
by a company that employed children under the age of 14 or employed children between the ages of 14 and 
16 for longer than eight-hour days.   
  It was at 
this point that Wilson made his important decision to intervene and pressure the members 
of his own party. On the morning of July 18, he traveled from the White House to the 
 
 181 Trattner, Crusade for the Children: A History of the National Child Labor Committee and 
Child Labor Reform in America, 124. , Novkov, Historicizing the Figure of the Child in Legal Discourse: 
The Battle Over the Regulation of Child Labor, 373.  This bill was first introduced by two Democrats, 
Representative A. Mitchell Palmer, a third-term Congressman from Pennsylvania, and Senator Robert 
Owen of Oklahoma.   
 
 182 Trattner, Crusade for the Children: A History of the National Child Labor Committee and 
Child Labor Reform in America, 127. 
  
  183 Representative Palmer had vacated his House seat in order to pursue an ultimately unsuccessful 
campaign for election to the U.S. Senate.  Therefore, Senator Owen now co-sponsored the bill with 
Representative Edward Keating, a progressive journalist turned Democratic politician from Colorado.     
 
 184 Ibid., 128-130. 
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capital for a meeting with Democratic senate leaders with the express purpose of 
convincing the members of his own party to pass the Keating-Owen Bill.  Following the 
president’s meeting with the senate Democrats in which he connected passage of this bill 
with the party’s overall image heading into the 1916 election, the obstructionists relented 
and the bill came up for debate the following day.  It passed by a vote of 52-12 on August 
8 and Wilson signed it into law on September 1, 1916.185  It was immediately challenged 
by a lawsuit and, despite nearly two years of effectively reducing the number of child 
laborers, the Supreme Court ruled it unconstitutional in Hammer v. Dagenhart in 1918.186
 Wilson’s support of the Keating-Owen Bill marked a reversal of his previous 
position regarding a federal child labor measure. Even before taking office in 1913, 
Wilson made it clear to reformers that, as much as he sympathized with the cause, he felt 
that federal legislation to limit child labor that was based on congressional power over 
interstate commerce exceeded constitutional boundaries.
 
187
                                                 
 185 The facts surrounding Wilson’s meeting with the Senate Democrats have been detailed in 
numerous sources to include Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 226-227. , 
Trattner, Crusade for the Children: A History of the National Child Labor Committee and Child Labor 
Reform in America, 130. , Wood, Constitutional Politics in the Progressive Era: Child Labor and the Law, 
66-68. 
  He reiterated this position to 
  
186 In a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court ruled that the commerce clause of the constitution which 
granted the federal government the right to regulate interstate commerce did not give the federal 
government the right to regulate the laws governing the hours or age of workers within individual states, 
even if the goods those workers produced (cotton, in this particular case) were traded across state lines.  
Such regulation, the majority argued, was purely an issue for the individual states, in accordance with the 
10th amendment.  This ruling was officially overturned in United States v. Darby Lumber Company in 1941 
when the Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 which relied on the commerce clause to for 
federal regulation of employment conditions.     
 
 187 As president-elect, Wilson held a conference with a wide range of social welfare advocates in 
January, 1913.  Two prominent members of the NCLC, Dr. Owen Lovejoy and Dr. Alexander McKelway, 
attended the conference and made the case for federal child labor legislation.  Wilson released a statement 
at the conference’s conclusion that questioned the constitutionality of any such proposal.  He stated, “Every 
subject treated here to-day engages my deep interest and enthusiasm.  My enthusiasm is in proportion 
generally to the practicability of a scheme.” For an account of this meeting, see News Report: “Wilson 
Captures Social Workers: Holds a Secret conference with Them at Mrs. Alexander’s Castle Point Home” 
(January 27, 1916), LWWP. 
99 
 
NCLC leaders when they asked him for support of the Palmer-Owen Bill in early 1914, 
telling them that “such legislation could not be upheld and, if passed, would open the 
door to unlimited federal regulation.”188
 Wilson’s journey to the capitol on that July morning in 1916 was a clear departure 
from his previous stance on federal regulation of child labor through the commerce 
clause of the Constitution.  His decision a month later in August to support a federal 
eight-hour day law for railroad workers (the Adamson Act) involved an equally dramatic 
reversal.  The railroad crisis in the summer of 1916 was not the first time that Wilson had 
become personally involved in disputes between the railroad brotherhoods and railroad 
owners.
  Nonetheless, he maintained a public silence on 
the topic as the bill moved through the House in 1915 and stalled in the Senate that 
spring.  When it was reintroduced as the Keating-Owen bill in 1916, he again refrained 
from public comment until it stalled in the Senate for a second time and then made his 
decision to intervene. 
189  Twice previously in his first term, he had intervened in labor negotiations in 
order to prevent a strike.190
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 But his actions concerning the Adamson Act are especially 
 188 Trattner, Crusade for the Children: A History of the National Child Labor Committee and 
Child Labor Reform in America, 121-122.  See also Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-
1917, 59. 
 
 189 The “Big Four” railroad brotherhoods included the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, and Order of 
Railway Conductors. 
 
 190 Wilson’s first intervention occurred in 1913 when he pressured Congress to pass the Newlands 
Act.  This legislation revised the Erdman Act of 1898 by improving the rules for arbitration and mediation 
in favor of the Brotherhoods.  The second intervention came in July and August of 1914 when the 
Brotherhoods demanded improvements to working conditions and wages from railroad owners.  When the 
two sides could not reach an agreement and the Brotherhoods threatened to strike, Wilson called leaders 
from both groups to the White House and got them to agree to a plan of arbitration as proposed by the 
Board of Mediation and Conciliation.  Both of these crises are covered in detail in Foner, History of the 
Labor Movement in the United States, Vol VI: On the Eve of America's Entrance into World War I, 1915-
1916, 143-163. 
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significant in that the crisis culminated with the president demanding federal legislation 
to protect a particular class – a position that he argued strongly against in his 1912 
campaign.  Further, Wilson’s support of the eight-hour day for railroad workers became a 
major issue in the 1916 campaign.  While earning him remarkable support from 
progressives, labor leaders, and workers, it also was a point on which his Republican 
opponent centered his attacks in the final months of the campaign. 
 The specific events that led up to Wilson’s intervention on behalf of the 
brotherhoods in August 1916 are well known.191  A quick summary is as follows: In June 
1916, the brotherhoods demanded an eight-hour day for their members, along with no 
reduction in wages and time and a half for overtime work.  The owners rejected this 
demand, prompting the brotherhoods to vote overwhelmingly in favor of a general strike 
to begin on Labor Day (September 4, 1916).  The Board of Mediation met with both 
groups in early August, but could not bring agreement.  When the board president 
informed Wilson that negotiations would probably fail, Wilson requested to meet with 
representatives from the brotherhoods and the owners at the White House.192
 As the conference at the White House began on August 14, three weeks before the 
strike deadline, the president proposed a compromise.  He urged the owners to grant the 
eight-hour day, but also asked the brotherhoods to delay a final decision on punitive 
overtime pay until a federal commission could be appointed to study the entire railroad 
 
                                                 
 191 Specifically, see Ibid., 164-188. , David R. Roediger and Phillip S. Foner, Our Own Time: A 
History of American Labor and the Working Day (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), 195-199. , Link, 
Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 235-237. , Elizabeth Sanders, Roots of Reform: 
Farmers, Workers, and the American State, 1877-1917 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 377-
382. 
 
 192 Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the United States, Vol VI: On the Eve of America's 
Entrance into World War I, 1915-1916, 156-158. 
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problem and then make a recommendation.  The brotherhoods accepted this compromise 
on August 18, but the owners’ representatives did not.  Wilson then summoned the actual 
presidents of the railroads to Washington.  Simultaneously, he directed congressional 
leaders to begin work on legislation that would codify his compromise proposal in case 
he was unable to persuade the railroad presidents to voluntarily accept it.  In a series of 
meetings from August 18-21, the president was unable to prevail over the railroad 
presidents.193
 In the waning days of August, Wilson decided that he had no recourse but to call 
for congress to act in order to prevent a strike.  He met with senate Democrats on August 
28 to lay out his position and then took the extraordinary step of addressing a joint 
session of congress on the following day.  He asked for legislation that represented the 
basic tenets of the compromise he had proposed to the brotherhoods and the owners, but 
that also included measures to facilitate arbitration in future conflicts.  Although he did 
not explicitly blame the railroad owners for the impasse, he implied that they – more so 
than the Brotherhoods – were the obstacle to a solution that did not involve government 
intervention.
   
194
 Following the president’s address, the Commerce Committee immediately 
resumed work on the specifics of the legislation.  The final form of the bill did not 
include the rate increase and antistrike provisions that Wilson had requested, but it did 
 
                                                 
 193 Ibid., 167-174. , Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 235-237. 
 
 194 Ibid.  Of the owners, Wilson said, “The representatives of the railway management have felt 
justified in declining a peaceful settlement which would engage all the forces of justice, public and private, 
on their side to take care of the event . . . They do not care to rely upon the friendly assurances of the 
Congress or the President.  They have thought it best that they should be forced to yield, if they must yield, 
not by counsel, but by the suffering of the country.” An Address to a Joint Session of Congress (August 29, 
1916), LWWP. 
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comply with the President’s request in almost every other way.  Named for the 
Commerce Committee Chairman, Senator W.C. Adamson of Georgia, the Adamson Act 
passed the House by a vote of 239-56 on September 1 and passed in the Senate on the 
following day by a vote of 43-28.  Voting in the Senate was highly partisan with all but 
two Democrats voting in favor of the measure and all but one Republican (Senator La 
Follette) in opposition.  In the House, all but three Democrats supported the bill and, 
while a slim majority of Republicans voted against it, 53 joined the Democrats by voting 
aye.195  Wilson signed the bill in a ceremony on his personal railcar at Union Station on 
September 3.  He gave each of the four signing pens to the chiefs of the Four 
Brotherhoods who promptly cancelled plans for the Labor Day strike.196
 So, in a span of just three days in early September and with only two months left 
before the 1916 election, President Wilson signed into law two pieces of legislation that 
increased the regulatory power of the federal government far beyond the boundaries of 
his 1912 “New Freedom” platform.  Both the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act and the 
Adamson Act seemed to signal a major reorientation in the President’s thinking about the 
power of government to legislate social justice through federal action. Understandably, a 
number of scholars have addressed the important question of this dramatic shift.   
 
 Wilson’s primary biographer, Arthur Link, argues that Wilson was a qualified 
liberal with doubts about intervention in the economy when he was elected to his first 
term in 1912.  Comparing Wilson’s “New Freedom” with Theodore Roosevelt’s “New 
                                                 
 195 Specifically, the vote among House Republicans was 69-53.  For a breakdown of voting and 
detailed analysis of the geographical distribution of those supporting the measure, see Sanders, Roots of 
Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State, 1877-1917, 381-382. 
 
 196 Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the United States, Vol VI: On the Eve of America's 
Entrance into World War I, 1915-1916, 180-181. 
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Nationalism,” Link contends that Wilson wanted the federal government to destroy 
special privileges and any barriers to individual potential.  Much of the rhetoric from both 
men was aimed at large corporations which they believed unfairly limited competition.  
But for Wilson, labor unions and progressive reformers also sought policies that, in his 
thinking, stifled individualism. He labeled the Progressive Party’s social welfare and 
reform program “paternalistic.”197  According to Link, the president explicitly extended 
the meaning of the New Freedom doctrine of “special privileges to none” to oppose 
protective labor legislation of all kinds, claiming that it favored a particular class of 
citizens at the expense of others.198
   So, who was the Woodrow Wilson of 1916 who suddenly supported protective 
labor legislation?  According to Link, he was a man facing re-election and desperately in 
need of progressive support.  Link explains: 
 
Those observers who predicted the President would adhere stubbornly to New 
Freedom concepts did not well understand Woodrow Wilson.  He had broad 
political principles, to be sure; but he was not an inflexible dogmatist on methods 
or details.  As he thought the  Democratic Party offered the only hope of 
constructive, progressive change, he believed his party’s most important task was 
to stay in power.  Nowhere did he come out and say that his desire to maintain the 
Democrats in power was responsible for the commitment he made to advanced 
progressivism in 1916.  Yet he became almost a new political creature, and under 
his leadership a Democratic Congress enacted the most sweeping and significant 
progressive legislation in the history of the country up to that time.199
 
 
The “advanced progressivism” to which Link refers included Wilson’s nomination of 
Louis D. Brandeis to the Supreme Court, his support of the rural credits, workmen’s 
                                                 
 197 Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 19-21. 
 
 198 Ibid., 56. 
 
 199 Ibid., 224. See also Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crises, 1915-1916, 321-323. 
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compensation, and child labor bills, his backing of the Lafollette Seaman’s Act, and 
support for the principle of woman suffrage.  As a result of these moves, nearly every 
social justice plank of the 1912 Progressive Party platform had been enacted by the 
Wilson Administration by the eve of the 1916 election.   
 In placing all of the key social reform legislation of late 1916 into the single 
category of “advanced progressivism,” Link glosses over key differences in the level of 
public support for the various measures and the degree to which Wilson’s support marked 
a shift in his personal principles.200  Link does acknowledge that the President’s shift 
toward nationalistic solutions began early in his first term, noting that Wilson “was, quite 
simply, at a point of metamorphosis in his thinking about legislative policy, and the 
political exigencies only hastened his change.”201
 On the specific issue of a federal child labor bill, Link’s account contains no hint 
of whether the president was concerned with alienating the southern Democrats who 
opposed the measure or whether he had any correspondence with them prior to his direct 
intervention in July.  It also omits any discussion of Wilson’s concern with whether or 
 For Link, then, Wilson’s progressive 
turn resulted from a convergence of his new thinking about national solutions combined 
with the dictates of electoral politics.  
                                                 
 200 In fact, Link’s tendency to over-generalize leads him to intentionally avoid addressing the 
question of Wilson’s motivations and to reduce them to presidential politics.  His account reeks with 
ambiguity in places.  For example, he writes, “Regardless of the motivation behind Wilson’s commitment 
to advanced doctrines . . . the Democratic Congressional majority . . . enacted almost every important plank 
in the Progressive Platform.”  And later, “Whether this acceptance of the New Nationalism signified a 
fundamental change in Democratic philosophy, or whether it was executed solely for expedience’s sake, no 
man could tell.”  This ambiguity weakens the explanatory power of Link’s version of Wilson’s mindset as 
he considered major policy shifts in 1916.  For direct quotes, see Link, Woodrow Wilson and the 
Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 229-230. 
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not the measure would pass the test of constitutionality that it was sure to face.  Similarly, 
Link’s re-telling of the President’s involvement with the Adamson Act is devoid of 
specific analysis outside of the political ground to be gained by Democratic support for 
the measure.202
 In a work focused specifically on child labor legislation, Stephen B. Wood 
directly challenges Link’s interpretation of Wilson’s conversion.
 
203  While 
acknowledging that political considerations were surely part of the equation, he sees the 
President as undergoing a transformation in thinking about the constitutionality of federal 
intervention into the economy throughout his first term in office.  Wood further points 
out that Link “largely ignores the rapid shift in public attitudes about the constitutional 
issues between 1907 and 1916 . . . and the fact that both radical agrarian and conservative 
states’ rights Democrats enthusiastically supported the Keating-Owen Bill.”204  Wood’s 
analysis of Wilson’s political thought conflicts with that offered by most historians of the 
Progressive Era who tend to see the president as, at best, a reluctant reformer.205
                                                 
 202 Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 235-238. 
  Wood, 
 
 203 The two most comprehensive histories of child labor legislation areWood, Constitutional 
Politics in the Progressive Era: Child Labor and the Law, Trattner, Crusade for the Children: A History of 
the National Child Labor Committee and Child Labor Reform in America.  Both of these accounts rely 
heavily on a much earlier work - Elizabeth H. Davidson, Child Labor Legislation in the Southern Textile 
States (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1939). On the specific issue of Wilson’s support 
for the Keating-Owen Bill, Trattner relies entirely on Link. See p. 130-131. 
 
 204 Wood, Constitutional Politics in the Progressive Era: Child Labor and the Law, 68. 
 
 205 Specifically, see Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1955); Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 
1900-1916; Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900-1918.  Hofstadter’s description of 
Wilson’s progressive impulses tends to align with Wood’s interpretation, but both Kolko and Weinstein 
portray the president as much more conservative.  See especially, Kolko, 205-211 and Weinstein, 162-166.  
While more recent scholarship has ended to more sympathetic to the actual progressive reformers, it has 
done little to change the conservative interpretation of Wilson offered by Kolko and Weinstein.  See Leon 
Fink, Progressive Intellectuals and the Dilemmas of Democratic Commitment (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1997), Barbara Fried, The Progressive Assault on Laissez Faire (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1998), and John Milton Cooper Jr., "Making a Case for Wilson," in Reconsidering 
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though, portrays the president as willing to use the power of the federal government to 
intervene in the economy from the beginning of his 1912 campaign.206  Rather than 
seeing Wilson’s success in pushing the Keating-Owen Bill through the Senate as a shift 
away from New Freedom principles, Wood argues that it was a fulfillment of the 
president’s consistent vision to humanize industrial life in America.207
 Wood’s interpretation is supported by historian Kendrick Clements’ more recent 
biography of Wilson.  Unlike Woods, Clements engages with historians who have 
trumpeted the conservative Wilson interpretation and, unlike Link, he considers the 
motivation behind Wilson’s support of each one of the pieces of “advanced 
progressivism” individually.  In the case of both the Keating-Owen Bill and the Adamson 
Act, he concedes that Wilson’s support for these measures was primarily driven by his 
desire to win reelection.
 
208
                                                                                                                                                 
Woodrow Wilson: Progressivism, Internationalism, War, and Peace (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson 
Center Press, 2008), 9-23. 
  However, he argues, the fact that the shift may have been 
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207 Ibid., 77.  Unfortunately, Wood’s work appears uninformed by the larger body of scholarship 
on Wilson and the Progressive Era.  He makes no reference to works by historians such as Hofstadter or 
Kolko, both of whom had published research relevant to Wood’s interpretation.  His failure to engage with 
the interpretations by previous historians is one of the few shortcomings of an otherwise excellent analysis 
of this particular chapter of Progressive Era history.  In a more recent biography, John Milton Cooper, Jr. 
supports this analysis of Wilson’s progressive turn.  Emphasizing the influence of English political theorist 
Edmund Burke on Wilson’s thinking, Cooper asserts that Wilson viewed expediency as a virtue, so long as 
one did not compromise fundamental principles. In this case, Wilson agreed with the growing reformist 
sentiment that the federal government had a role to play in regulating the economy and protecting workers.  
And he grew increasingly comfortable with supporting legislation that would enhance that role because, in 
his mind, such support did not force him to abandon the basic small government tenets of the New Freedom 
platform.  See Cooper, Woodrow Wilson: A Biography, 336. 
 
 
 208 Clements, The Presidency of Woodrow Wilson, 44.  
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motivated by political concerns does not necessarily make it unprincipled.209  Clements 
examines a wide array of Wilson’s writings on the role of government in promoting the 
general welfare and concludes, “As a responsible political leader [Wilson believed] it was 
therefore his duty to change his positions in response to changing public demands.  To 
change with the times was to be consistent with principle, not to abandon it.”210  While 
conceding the importance of electoral politics, Clements also believes Wilson’s shift was 
in keeping with his constantly evolving stand on the potential of government to legislate 
in order to meet the public’s needs.211
 Labor historians, too, have given considerable attention to the both the reason for 
and the impact of Wilson’s rather remarkable transformation in 1916.  In his sweeping 
history of the labor movement published in 1982, Phillip Foner disputes Link’s grouping 
of the Adamson Act with measures such as child labor and woman suffrage.  In the case 
of the Adamson Act, Foner says that political considerations of the upcoming presidential 
election certainly played a role, but they were “not the prime motive for Wilson’s action 
– the serious damage a railroad strike would inflict on the nation’s economy and the 
Wilson preparedness program was a significant factor influencing his thinking.”
 
212
                                                 
 209 Note that this line of argument is echoed by Victoria Bissell Brown in her excellent essay on 
Wilson’s conversion to the cause of woman suffrage.  See Brown, Did Woodrow Wilson's Gender Politics 
Matter?, 127-128. 
  But 
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 212 Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the United States, Vol VI: On the Eve of America's 
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in the case of a federal child labor bill and woman suffrage, he contends that Wilson’s 
reversal was driven by the political exigencies of the 1916 election.213
 A more cynical view of Wilson’s motives appears in a later Foner work that he 
co-authored with David Roediger.  Writing in 1989, Roediger and Foner note Wilson’s 
political finesse with both the Keating-Owen Bill and the Adamson Act.  In both cases, 
they argue, Wilson was able to make himself appear pro-labor without ever taking an 
unequivocal stand for federal action.  They note that, although Wilson spoke of the eight-
hour day as if it should be applied across all industries, the legislation he supported only 
made it applicable for children and certain railroad workers.  Unconvinced of Wilson’s 
complete conversion, they write, “Both the Adamson Act and the Keating-Owen Child 
Labor Law illustrate Wilson’s political skill and the ambiguity of federal commitment to 
shorter hours.”
 
214  Understood in this way, Wilson’s support for the Adamson Act, in 
particular, can be seen as having much the same effect as his vote in favor of the state 
suffrage measure in New Jersey in 1915.  Roediger and Foner join with most historians in 
noting that, actual limitations notwithstanding, “organized labor seized [the Adamson 
Act] as a presidential seal of approval for eight hours.”215
                                                 
 213 Ibid., 230. Foner mistakenly writes that Wilson supported the federal woman suffrage 
amendment prior to the 1916 election and that this won him support from NAWSA.  As the preceding 
chapter and following chapter show, Wilson showed an increasing openness to the federal amendment as 
early as his September 1916 speech to the NAWSA convention in Atlantic City, but he did not explicitly 
speak in favor of the federal amendment until January 1918. 
  Just as suffragists used the 
President’s vote in New Jersey to argue that he had been won over to the cause (and to 
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 215 Ibid., 195.  See also Robert Whaples, "Winning the Eight-Hour Day, 1909-1919," The Journal 
of Economic History 50, no. 2 (Jun. 1990): 403. 
 
109 
 
argue, by extension, that others should follow his lead), so too did labor advocates tout 
Wilson’s support for the principle of the eight-hour day in future battles. 
 Other labor historians concur with Roediger and Foner about the primacy of 
political considerations for Wilson.  Disagreements mostly center on who did the most to 
convince him of the political importance of supporting pro-labor measures.  In her history 
of the American Federation of Labor, Julie Greene argues that Frank Walsh, chairman of 
the Commission on Industrial Relations, played a decisive role. Called by Wilson to the 
White House in late August, Walsh convinced the president that the eight-hour day was 
just and that large number of workers’ votes would swing toward the Democrats were he 
to take the side of the brotherhoods in the railroad crisis.216  As part of her overall 
argument about the importance of Midwestern and Southern agrarian interests, Elizabeth 
Sanders argues that it was this peripheral agrarian coalition – more than the leaders of 
organized labor or progressive reformers – who provided the votes in Congress that 
Wilson needed in order to enact key labor legislation.217 Despite this difference in 
emphasis, both Sanders and Greene note the irony of the fact that winning the eight-hour 
day – seen by many as a major labor victory – was not a measure that the AFL had 
worked for nor actively supported since it involved intervention by the state.218
                                                 
 216 Greene, Pure and Simple Politics: The American Federation of Labor and Political Activism, 
1881-1917, 258.  While emphasizing the key role played by Walsh with the Adamson Act, Greene more 
generally argues that Wilson’s progressive turn was the result of “a combination of political ambition, a 
desire for reelection, and the arguments of progressives he trusted.” Ibid. 
 
 
 217 Sanders, Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State, 1877-1917, 380-382. 
 
 218 Greene, Pure and Simple Politics: The American Federation of Labor and Political Activism, 
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 Finally, there are those historians who choose not to dwell on the details of 
Wilson’s evolving principles on domestic legislation in favor of stressing his concern 
with foreign affairs.  With varying points of emphasis, these historians argue that Wilson 
was willing to act the political chameleon in 1916 because he firmly believed that 
America had to take the lead in reshaping the international political order  - and that only 
he and the Democratic Party understood how this ought to be done.  Further, he had no 
faith in Hughes or other Republican leaders to grasp the significance of this mission.219
 A historiographical void lies between those who claim that Wilson’s motives in 
supporting the Keating-Owen Bill and the Adamson Act were primarily political and the 
assertions of others that the President’s support was consistent with his changing 
understanding of the power and potential of the federal government to curb the harshness 
of life in an industrialized nation.
 
For these historians, Wilson was willing to make almost any compromise on the domestic 
front in order to ensure he remained in power to lead America on its mission to save the 
world.  
220
                                                 
 219 For examples of this argument, see Abrams, Woodrow Wilson and the Southern Congressmen, 
1913-1916, 437. , Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution, 
2-4 and 45. 
  This chapter attempts to fill part of that void with a 
more thorough examination of Wilson’s interaction with the reformers who lobbied for 
the bills, the interest groups that opposed them, and the members of his own party in the 
Senate who were clearly divided on the issues.  It also uses Wilson’s experience with 
 
 220 More recent historical work on child labor has failed to shed additional light on the complex 
issue of Wilson’s motivations in swinging the full power and authority of the executive behind the Keating-
Owen Bill.  The two most recent works on the topic are Hugh D. Hindman, Child Labor: An American 
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both the advocates and opponents of protective labor legislation as a way to help 
contextualize his decisions with regard to woman suffrage.  His increasing openness to 
national solutions in the form of federal legislation in 1916 had important implications 
for his attitude toward the federal woman suffrage amendment in the following year. 
  
The issue of restricting child labor was not new to Wilson when he assumed the 
presidency in 1913.  It was, rather, an issue he had confronted early and often in his 
public career.  As Governor-elect of New Jersey in December, 1910, he voiced his 
support for a state child labor law during a speech to the senior class of Princeton 
University.221  During his brief administration in New Jersey, he helped shepherd a 
“Messenger Boy Bill” through the state legislature in 1911 and later authored the 
platform of the New Jersey Democratic Party in 1912 which promised to continue to 
work for legislation that included the “careful regulation of the hours of labor for 
children.”222
 As president, he repeatedly voiced his support for the principle of restricting child 
labor.  In his 1913 inaugural address, he declared as just, “laws determining conditions of 
labor which individuals are powerless to determine for themselves.”
   
223
                                                 
 221 Wilson guest of Senior Class (Dec. 8, 1910), LWWP. 
 When the editor 
of the Medical Review of Reviews asked him for a statement of support to be used in an 
upcoming child labor awareness campaign in 1914, Wilson complied, responding, “This 
 
 222The “Messenger Boy Bill” restricted the employment of boys less than eighteen years of age 
between 10 p.m. and 5 a.m..  A News Report of Remarks in Trenton to the New Jersey Consumers’ League 
(February 25, 1911), LWWP.The Platform of the New Jersey Democratic Party (October 1, 1912), LWWP. 
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is a cause to which I have long been devoted.”224  Later, he approved of a plank in the 
1916 Democratic Party Platform promising that all federal agencies would adhere to the 
child labor standards proposed by the NCLC in its “Uniform Child Labor Law” and that 
the party encouraged similar legislation for each of the states.225
 As early as 1908 Wilson wrote in his political treatise, Constitutional Government 
in the United States, that a federal child labor bill which relied on the commerce clause 
was an abuse of Congressional power.
  In every case where he 
had the opportunity to voice his support for the principle of restricting child labor, Wilson 
expressed such support.  Simultaneously, though, he consistently stated his concern about 
the constitutionality of any federal regulation. 
226
 He reiterated this concern when speaking to reporters just after his gubernatorial 
victory in New Jersey in November, 1910. Wilson explained his belief that, “We will 
never get to the place toward which we all aspire by any such excited life in any one part 
of the Constitution.  If it is to grow as we grow, it must be throughout its structure.  The 
  Wilson’s primary concern – one which could 
continue to plague his thoughts even after he decided to support federal regulation – was 
opening the floodgates of the commerce clause.  If congress could regulate the labor of 
children within the borders of a state, he worried, where else might they see fit to use the 
commerce clause to intervene?   
                                                 
 224 Wilson to Mr. Frederic H. Robinson (May 5, 1914), The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Library 
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theory that child labor, for example, may be classed under interstate commerce logically 
leads to the inclusion of more and more of the phases of intercourse until there is no 
reason why divorce and marriage laws should not be put there.”227
 Wilson’s concern about the constitutionality of a federal child labor bill continued 
throughout his first presidential term.  Prior to taking office in January, 1913, Wilson told 
NCLC leaders, “My own party in some of its elements represents a very strong States’ 
rights feeling.  It is very plain that you would have to go much further than most 
interpretations of the Constitution would allow if you were to give to the government 
general control over child labor throughout the country.”
  This statement 
illustrates two important characteristics in Wilson’s thinking.  The first is his belief, in 
1910, that the commerce clause could not safely be extended to regulate child labor 
without becoming an open avenue for Congress to regulate matters far beyond the 
intended scope of the clause.  Secondly, though, the statement reveals Wilson’s 
recognition of the fact that the Constitution should “grow” and be adapted by the public 
to meet their changing needs.  Clearly, he believed that any such growth should be 
gradual, limited, and carefully applied so as to not upset the delicate constitutional system 
of checks and balances.  But he was not so conservative that he believed the American 
public should be prisoners of a document designed to serve their needs.   
228
                                                 
 227 “Gov.-Elect Wilson is to be Servant of All Classes,” New York World, November 10, 1910.  
Reprinted in LWWP. 
  His position changed little 
over the course of his first year in office.  When NCLC President Felix Adler and two of 
his lieutenants requested a meeting with the President in January, 1914 to discuss the 
Palmer-Owen Bill, he told his secretary, “Glad to see these gentlemen, but they ought to 
 
 228 “Wilson Captures Social Workers,” New York Times, January 27, 1913. 
 
114 
 
know, in all frankness, that no child labor law yet proposed has seemed to me 
constitutional.”229  Neither his public statements nor his private correspondence include 
any direct references to the constitutionality of federal regulation after this point.  That 
can be partially explained by Lovejoy, McKelway, and Adler’s success in getting the 
president to agree to maintain a public silence while Congress debated both the Palmer-
Owen and the Keating-Owen bills.  It may also be explained by the fact that the NCLC 
leaders had done extensive work to build their case that the proposed bill was, in fact, 
constitutional and would be upheld by the Supreme Court.230
  Like Wilson, NCLC leaders were apprehensive about the ability of the Palmer-
Owen Bill, if passed, to withstand judicial review.  Their concerns with constitutionality 
had driven Lovejoy to bring in a number of legal and labor experts to help draft the 
bill.
 
231  Additionally, they drafted an educational memorandum entitled “In Reply to 
Questions on the Constitutionality of the Palmer Federal Child Labor Bill.”232
                                                 
 229 Tumulty to Wilson (January 24, 1914) and Wilson to Tumulty (January 24, 1914), PWW. Adler 
was accompanied by Dr. Alexander McKelway and Dr. Owen Lovejoy, both leading members of the 
NCLC. 
  In 
 
 230 Prior to their February 1914 meeting with the President, the NCLC Board of Trustees had held 
a special meeting to consider the Palmer-Owen Bill.  At that  meeting, the board approved several 
important resolutions.  For the first time in the organization’s ten year history, board members agreed to 
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President Wilson and try to win his support for the proposed legislation.  Finally, they resolved to confer 
with the Legislative Drafting Bureau “with a view to retaining the services of the Bureau in supplying 
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Trustees, Thirty-ninth Meeting (January 22, 1914), National Child Labor Committee Papers, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C. (Hereafter referred to as NCLC Papers), Box 7. 
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anticipation of questions that NCLC leaders knew would be asked, the memorandum 
cited a series of recent Supreme Court rulings that the authors believed had increased the 
power of the federal government to intervene in the economic affairs of individual states 
if it was to safeguard or improve the welfare of the nation as a whole.233
 When the NCLC leaders met with Wilson in February, they presented him with a 
copy of the proposed bill and the educational memorandum.
    
234    According to Lovejoy, 
the President agreed to maintain a public silence and said “that he would give the matter 
very careful consideration.”235
 Although there is no transcript of Wilson’s meeting with Democratic Senators on 
July 18, 1916, the debate that followed in the Senate suggests that, in addition to making 
his point about the political value of passing the bill, he may have also urged the reluctant 
members of his own party to defer to the judicial branch.  The consensus opinion of the 
  It is significant to note that the next public action taken by 
the president with regards to child labor was to press for the passage of the Keating-
Owen Bill in July 1916.  This suggests that he was sincere when he said he would 
carefully consider the memorandum on constitutionality and that, perhaps, he was 
convinced by the compelling document that federal regulation of child labor was not 
beyond the scope of the commerce clause.  At a minimum, it seems, he became willing to 
let the courts decide the matter. 
                                                 
 233 Specifically, it cited Hoke v. United States (1913) and Muller v. Oregon (1908).  Hoke v. 
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bill’s proponents, repeated in one form or another in almost all of their speeches, was that 
the bill was desirable for humanitarian reasons and that it stood a solid chance of being 
upheld by the Supreme Court, particularly given the Court’s recent favorable rulings in 
Muller v. Oregon and Hoke v. United States.236  Senator Gallinger, a Republican from 
New Hampshire, made direct reference to Wilson’s changed outlook on the bill’s 
constitutionality.  Gallinger explained, “I have since had occasion to consult some of 
those same [Democratic] Senators and they have told me that they have changed their 
views, as the President of the United States has changed his views, and that they now 
believe the legislation to be constitutional . . . assuming that it will go to the Supreme 
Court of the United States for interpretation and decision.”237
Political necessity, however, was certainly part of the motivation.  Early on in the 
1916 campaigning season, Wilson began receiving advice from supporters about how to 
use the child labor issue to win over disgruntled progressives.  In June, Senator Owen, 
co-sponsor of the child labor bill, wrote to Wilson, “I enclose what I think would be of 
special value as a plank to attract the progressive elements in the country who ought to be 
  Gallinger’s statement 
implies that Wilson told members of his own party that he had changed his mind on the 
possibilities of the commerce clause to regulate child labor.  If that implication is correct, 
it also means that Wilson’s motivation in pressing for the bill was more principled than 
the interpretation which holds that he acted almost purely out of political necessity. 
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with us . . ..”238
As the Keating-Owen Bill languished in the Democratic Senate Caucus in July, 
Wilson’s Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, wrote to encourage the President to 
intervene.  Daniels, a native of North Carolina and former editor of one of the South’s 
leading newspapers, The Raleigh Observer, told Wilson that he knew there was 
opposition to the federal child labor bill among certain southern Congressmen - but went 
on to say, “I believe that the failure to pass that bill will lose us more votes in the close 
states than our Southern Senators appreciate.”
  The enclosure to which Owen referred was a statement of Democratic 
principles that included a plank to prohibit child labor.  Wilson’s willingness to include 
this plank in the 1916 Democratic Party platform indicates that he took Owen’s 
suggestion to heart. 
239  On the same day that Wilson heard 
from Daniels, he also received a letter from McKelway who cautioned, “In spite of the 
progressive record of the Democratic Party, I fear that the action on the child labor bill 
will be regarded as a test of genuine interest in humane measures opposed by commercial 
interests.  I wish that you could see your way clear to use your influence in furtherance of 
this important measure.”240
                                                 
 238Owen to Wilson (June 8, 1916), LWWP.  
  The combined effect of Daniels’ and McKelway’s warnings 
were enough to propel Wilson to action.  He responded back to the NCLC leader the 
following day, “I went up to the Senate yesterday to urge the immediate passage of the 
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Republican from New Hampshire, had made a speech on the Senate floor in which he emphasized that the 
Republicans were ready and willing to pass the child labor bill and that its failure to be brought to a vote 
rested squarely with the Democratic caucus.  Wilson responded to Daniels the following day, informing 
him, “I am going to try to see some of the Senators at once and see if we cannot assist to get them out of the 
hole that the old fox [Gallinger] has put them in.” Wilson to Daniels (July 18, 1916), LWWP. 
 
 240McKelway to Wilson (July 17, 1916), LWWP.  
118 
 
Child Labor Bill and am encouraged to believe that the situation has changed 
considerably.”241
In terms of winning over reform-minded voters, both the public coverage of 
Wilson’s actions and the private correspondence he received were overwhelmingly 
positive.  A July 19th headline in the New York Times read, “President Demands A Child 
Labor Law, Makes a Personal Visit to the Capitol to Impress his Views on Senate 
Leaders, Urges the Pending Bill, Bases His Request on the Measure’s Merits as Well as 
Political Expediency.”
 
242  Subsequent New York Times coverage highlighted the manner 
in which the bill’s proponents used Wilson’s activism as a mechanism for propelling the 
bill towards a successful vote.243  This was clearly an intended effect.  Banking on the 
political value of the bill, Wilson even postponed accepting the Democratic Party’s 
nomination until the bill had passed so that he could make reference to it in his 
acceptance speech.244
A flood of letters in the days following Wilson’s trip to the Capitol suggest that his 
activism did, in fact, garner him progressive support.  Progressive journalists from both 
sides of the country congratulated him on taking decisive action.
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  Similarly, Wilson 
 241Wilson to McKelway (July 19, 1916), LWWP.  
 
 242“President Demands a Child Labor Law,” New York Times, July 19, 1916, 6. 
 
 243 For subsequent New York Times coverage of the bill’s movement toward passage, see “Caucus 
on child Labor,” July 20, 1916, 12; “Against Child Labor Bill,” July 22, 1916, 10; “Child Labor bill’s 
Passage is Assured,” July 26, 1916, 3; and “Child Labor bill Urged in Senate,” August 4, 1916, 9. 
 
 244“Wilson to Appeal to Progressives, Believes Social and Industrial Justice in Legislation Will 
Win Votes, Notification Postponed so President May Point to Child Labor and Compensation Laws 
Signed,” New York Yimes, July 19, 1916, 5.  
 
 245 See John J. Fitzgerald (editor of the Boston weekly journal The Republic) to Wilson (July 19, 
1916), PWW. See also Charles Samuel Jackson (editor of The Oregon Journal) to Wilson (July 21, 1916), 
LWWP. 
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received a telegram from Benjamin Barr Lindsey, a district judge in Denver and a 
member of the National Executive Committee of the Progressive Party.  Lindsey’s 
telegram, which the Democratic National Committee subsequently released for 
publication in the New York Times, gushed, “Your splendid attitude on this question and 
willingness to change from your former position with the states rights Democrats to 
Federal or National control when it becomes clearly apparent that it is the best method to 
put an end to certain evils or advance certain rights should be sufficient proof to wavering 
Progressives that the Democratic Party is as willing as the Republican Party in proper 
cases to put the National welfare above state considerations.”246  Lindsey’s sentiments 
were echoed by other progressives in both their private correspondence with Wilson and 
their public writings.247
 Wilson’s support for child labor legislation was one of those rare political moves 
that managed to please a significant number of voters, while not having the simultaneous 
affect of alienating a large voting bloc.  Opponents of the federal bill were primarily 
limited to a few southern states that Wilson’s advisors often told him were not 
representative of the South as a whole.   This fact was made clear in a number of ways.  
When the House Labor Committee held public hearings on the bill in the spring of 1914, 
the testimony was dominated by the bill’s advocates.
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  The bill passed in the House by 
 246 Lindsey to Wilson (August 9, 1916), LWWP.  See also “Lindsey Supports Wilson, Child Labor 
Bill Wins Denver Judge to President’s Standard,” New York Times, August 10, 1916, p. 4.  
 
 247Letters to the Editor, “Wilson and Child Labor,” New York Times, August 9, 1916, 10; “Ten 
Reasons Why I Shall Vote for Wilson, Professor Irving Fisher of Yale Tells Why He Believes the 
Democratic President Should e Re-elected to Carry on His Work,” New York Times, August 27, 1916, 14; 
“Miss Tarbell for Wilson, Writer Says President is a Real Progressive Leader,” New York Times, 
September 11, 1916, 3.  
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an overwhelming majority of 233-43 in February 1915, indicating the broad support the 
measure enjoyed.  Of the 43 opposition votes, 35 came from six southern states, but there 
was not a “solid south” vote.  In fact, only in the Congressional delegations from North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Mississippi did a majority oppose the bill.249
 More serious opposition emerged before the final vote in the Senate.  David 
Clark, a native of North Carolina and the editor and sole owner of the Southern Textile 
Bulletin, seeing the ease with which the bill passed in the House, organized a conference 
of mill men from several southern states and founded the Executive Committee of 
Southern Cotton Manufacturers.  The organization’s sole purpose was to block federal 
child labor legislation.
   
250  Clark had tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade the NCLC to 
abandon its campaign for a federal law.  He accused the NCLC propagandists of grossly 
exaggerating both the number of children working in textile mills and the poor working 
conditions within those mills.  He conceded that there were a significant number of 
children employed in mill work - but argued that a federal law was unnecessary because, 
“The Southern States are essentially law abiding, and sooner or later every mill will be 
forced to comply with the legal requirements.”251
                                                                                                                                                 
 248 It was not until the final session of hearings in May that any opposition materialized.  Even 
then, the contrary view was presented by just three prominent cotton manufacturers from South Carolina 
who contended that the South was well on its way to ending child labor and argued against the 
constitutionality of any federal law. Ibid., 38-39. , Trattner, Crusade for the Children: A History of the 
National Child Labor Committee and Child Labor Reform in America, 125-126. 
  Clark’s plea fell on deaf ears, for the 
NCLC was moving confidently forward with federal legislation. 
 
 249Congressional Record, 63rd Congress, 3rd Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1915), 3836.  
 
 250David Clark, “Keating Child Labor Law Knocked Out,” Southern Textile Bulletin  (June 6, 
1918), 14.  
 
121 
 
Neither Clark nor the organization he represented ever tried to influence Wilson 
directly.  When the federal child labor bill was reintroduced in the 64th Congress, Clark’s 
organization had numerous manufacturers and doctors give testimony before the House 
Labor Committee and, later, before the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee.252  When 
the latter voted 7-6 to report the bill favorably, Clark successfully appealed to southern 
senators to block consideration of the bill.  They only relented, he later recalled, “when 
President Wilson under the influence of certain agitators went to the Senate and 
demanded the passage of the law.”253
Clark was convinced that Wilson’s motivations were purely political.  In an editorial, 
he wrote, “The passage by Congress and the approval by President Wilson of the Child 
Labor Law was a matter of politics; nothing more, nothing less.
   
254  Still, Clark made no 
attempt to correspond directly with the President or any members of his cabinet about his 
decision.  Instead, the Executive Committee of Southern Cotton Manufacturers chose to 
fight the federal law through the court system.  It was Clark who recruited a mill 
operative, Reuben H. Dagenhart, to file suit against the Keating-Owen law.  This case 
eventually became the Supreme Court Case Hammer v. Dagenhart in which the law was 
found to be unconstitutional.255
                                                                                                                                                 
 251 David Clark, “A Demand for a Square Deal,” Child Labor Bulletin, 4, no. 1 (May 1915), 41.  
Clark’s gave his “square deal” speech at the NCLC’s 11th Annual Conference in 1915 at which he 
personally appeared as a representative of the Executive Committee of Southern Cotton Manufacturers.   
 
 
 252David Clark, “Keating Child Labor Law Knocked Out,” Southern Textile Bulletin (June 6, 
1918), 14.  
 
 253 Ibid.  
 
 254David Clark, “The Unfair Child Labor Law,” Southern Textile Bulletin (September 27, 1917), 
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So opposition to the bill was limited.  Wilson heard from several men from the South 
that Clark and the mill owners he represented were a small minority.  For example, James 
H. Holloway of North Carolina told Wilson, “The opposition to the Child Labor Law 
does not represent One PerCent of the people of the South.  It is being festered and 
agitated by our cotton and Knitting Mill Barons who look with horror and dismay on any 
effort looking to the reduction or curtailment of their enormous profits.”256
 Despite his eventual support for the Keating-Owen bill, Wilson never fully 
relinquished his constitutional misgivings about the use of the commerce clause to 
regulate the labor of children.  Several months after signing the bill into law he received a 
letter from Secretary of War Newton Baker containing a series of resolutions adopted by 
the National Consumers League.  One of the resolutions was approval of a federal eight-
hour day law for women founded on the principles embodied in the federal child labor 
law.  Wilson responded to Baker, “I dare say these are the first of a series of suggestions 
of a similar kind which will grow out of the Child Labor bill.  I wonder what you yourself 
  The message 
from men like Holloway was clear – do not worry about alienating the South by 
supporting the Keating-Owen bill.  Armed with this advice and seeing the overwhelming 
support that the bill received in the House, Wilson recognized an opportunity to support a 
popular piece of legislation without alienating a significant bloc of voters.  The political 
benefits clearly outweighed the potential costs.   
                                                 
 
 256Holloway to Wilson (July 23, 1916), PWW. See also, Watkins to Wilson (July 21, 1916), PWW. 
Elton Watkins, a native of the South and later a U.S. Representative from Oregon wrote to the President, “I 
was born, reared and save last few years have lived in the south, consequently I know and understand 
temper and tone of southern people on child labor.  The Hardwicks and Smiths [two southern Senators who 
opposed the bill] constitute an infinite small minority . . . Child labor finds favor in that class represented 
by the Harvester Trust and the cotton mills.” 
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think as to the limits of this sort of legislation by Congress?”257
 The president was willing to set aside his constitutional misgivings as a result of 
conducting his own cost-benefit analysis.  On the benefit side of the ledger, he could list 
the fact that the principle behind the Keating-Owen bill, restricting the labor of children, 
was one he had consistently supported during his career in public life.  Additionally, the 
measure enjoyed tremendous support among progressive voters and trade unionists, two 
voting blocs he sought to add to his coalition for the 1916 election.  Finally, he was 
convinced by the two votes in the House (233-43 in 1915 and 343-46 in 1916) that 
passage of this bill was the will of the general public. And the costs were negligible. 
Pressing the Senate antagonized men like David Clark and the southern mill owners he 
represented, but it was clear from the House and Senate hearings and from the advice he 
received from other southerners that Clark and company were a small minority.   More 
importantly, though, for a man with a strong states’ rights and laissez-faire background, 
was the potential for opening up the commerce clause to continued intervention by the 
federal government into the economic affairs of the states.   
  If Wilson harbored such 
doubts about expanding the commerce clause after the fact, why had he consented to 
support the child labor bill in the first place?  
Wilson was able to rationalize away this final cost by taking to heart the arguments 
in favor of constitutionality offered up by the NCLC.  Never a strict constructionist, the 
President recognized the need for the Constitution to change in order to meet the needs of 
those it was designed to serve.  As he reviewed the NCLC memorandum that cited cases 
in which the Supreme Court had upheld the right and, in some cases, the responsibility of 
                                                 
 
 257Baker to Wilson (November 20, 1916), and Wilson to Baker (November 22, 1916), LWWP.  
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the federal government to intervene in the economy in order to promote social welfare, he 
became optimistic about the potential for the Keating-Owen bill to withstand judicial 
review.258
 The Adamson Act differed markedly from the Keating-Owen Act in that it did not 
involve such a direct matter of constitutionality and its opponents were a much larger and 
more unified group, namely the pro-business interests from across the country.
  At a minimum, the overwhelming public support, the lure of progressive and 
labor votes in the upcoming election, and the rightness of the principle involved made 
him willing to support the bill in the near term and defer to the judiciary in the long term.  
Ultimately, his decision to support a federal child labor bill reflected a combination of 
political need and principled decision-making. 
259
                                                 
258 It would be interesting to know Wilson’s reaction to the 1908 Supreme Court ruling in Muller 
v. Oregon.  In that case, the court upheld an Oregon state law restricting the working hours of women.  The 
justification for the law was the special state interest in protecting women’s health.  Unfortunately, I have 
been unable to find any reference to this ruling in Wilson’s private or public writings.  Since it was a case 
of a state law rather than a federal law, Wilson likely would have approved.  Muller v. Oregon was the case 
in which Louis Brandeis, serving as an additional counsel for the state, filed what came to be known as the 
“Brandeis Brief” – a document that included empirical data regarding the impact of long working hours on 
the physical health of women, with special regard to their capacity as child-bearers. 
  But 
Wilson’s involvement with this legislation did follow very much the same pattern as the 
child labor bill.  In the months leading up to the 1912 election, he explicitly rejected 
federal action to protect class interests.  Speaking to a group of unionists in Buffalo on 
Labor Day in September, 1912, Wilson championed traditional American individualism 
and denied the very concept of different interests between labor and capital: “Half of the 
difficulties, half of the injustices of our politics, have been due to the fact that men 
regarded themselves as having separate interests . . . I would like always to look at [the 
 
 259The Adamson Act was challenged by a lawsuit (Wilson v. New), but unlike the Keating-Owen 
Act which was held to be unconstitutional , it withstood  judicial review and was ruled constitutional by the 
Supreme Court in March 1917. 
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nation] as a whole, not divided up into sections and classes.”260 He went on to 
specifically criticize the Progressive Party’s proposals for federal protective labor 
legislation, saying, “Let me tell you that the old adage that God takes care of those who 
take care of themselves is not gone out of date.  No federal legislation can change that 
thing.”261  Speaking to a Working Men’s League in New York a few days later, Wilson 
began by saying, “I always like to feel that the company in which I am speaking 
represents no class and no class feeling, but represents the united interests of a people 
which can be divided, if divided at all, only artificially.”262
 Perhaps as a result of his narrow victory in 1912 and the election returns that 
indicated just how many Americans clearly disagreed with him on the reality of class 
interests, Wilson’s tone softened dramatically between September 1912 and his inaugural 
address in March 1913.  As he took office, he reached out to workers and reform 
advocates alike. The new president noted America’s industrial achievements, but also 
said, “We have not hitherto stopped thoughtfully enough to count the human cost, the 
cost of lives snuffed out, of energies overtaxed and broken, the fearful physical and 
spiritual cost to the men and women and children, upon who the dead weight and burden 
of it all has fallen pitilessly the years through.”
 
263
                                                 
  
  He even took the dramatic step of 
questioning whether industrialization had rendered the ideal of individualism obsolete: 
260 A Labor Day Address in Buffalo (September 2, 1912), LWWP.  
 
 261 Ibid.  Wilson echoed this point about the fallacy of class interests in a talk to Buffalo 
Democrats later that night.  He told the assemblage that the American people wanted, “to clear their 
government for action by making it free and then, when it is free, they wish to use it, not to serve any class 
or any party, but to serve civilization and the human race.” An Evening Address in Buffalo (September 2, 
1912), LWWP. 
 
 262An Address at a Workingmen’s Dinner in New York (September 4, 1912), LWWP.  
 
 263An Inaugural Address (March 4, 1913), LWWP.  
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“Our thought has been ‘Let every man look out for himself; let every generation look out 
for itself,’ while we reared giant machinery which made it impossible that any but those 
who stood at the levers of control should have a chance to look out for themselves.”264
 Most dramatically, his inaugural address seemed to indicate a new openness to 
protective labor legislation.  Wilson proclaimed, “Nor have we studied and perfected the 
means by which government may be put at the service of humanity . . . There can be no 
equality of opportunity, the first essential of justice in the body politic, if men and women 
and children be not shielded in their lives, their very vitality, from the consequences of 
great industrial and social processes which they cannot alter, control, or singly cope 
with.”
 
265
 As documented previously in this chapter, Wilson’s actions in his first term 
consistently failed to live up to the expectations created by his inaugural address.  Siding 
with the Brotherhoods in the railroad crisis of 1916 was, then, another opportunity for 
him to make amends.   The potential votes to be gained by siding with labor on this issue 
are largely the same as those associated with the child labor bill and need not be 
recounted here.
  He did not clarify whether the federal government or state governments or 
corporations themselves should “shield” workers, but his words were enough to raise the 
hopes and, more importantly, the expectations of progressives and labor leaders.   
266
                                                 
 264Ibid.  
  But how to move from general support for the principle of the eight-
hour day to federal regulation of workers’ hours when he had previously stood so firmly 
against just such measures – and how to do so without appearing to be pandering for 
 
 265Ibid.  
 
 266Of note, the proposed platform that Senator Owen sent to Wilson on June 8, 1916 also included 
support for “A working day not to exceed eight hours, with one day of rest in seven.”  As with the child 
labor provision, Wilson consented to the inclusion of this line in the 1916 Democratic Party Platform. See 
Owen to Wilson (June 8, 1916), LWWP.  
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votes - remained an obstacle.  Ultimately, Wilson justified his position on three basic 
principles:  the justice of the eight-hour day, its endorsement by the general public, and 
the very real calamitous effects that would result from a general strike by the railroad 
Brotherhoods.  He further shielded himself against charges of political expediency by 
repeatedly emphasizing that legislative action was a last resort to which he had turned 
only when all other options had been exhausted. 
 As the crisis reached a breaking point in late August, Wilson expressed in both his 
private correspondence and public declarations that he believed the eight-hour day was 
just and that it represented the consensus opinion of the majority of Americans.  In a 
private letter to Democratic Senator Francis Newlands, Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Interstate Commerce, Wilson explained, “I made this recommendation [for 
the owners to concede the eight-hour day] because I believe the concession right.  The 
eight-hour day undoubtedly has the sanction of the judgment of society in its favor and 
should be adopted.”267 On that same day, he issued a public statement that word-for-word 
repeated what he had told Newlands.  The president’s statement was subsequently 
reprinted in every major newspaper in the country.268
 As the battle over the eight-hour day increasingly moved into the public arena and 
was fought out in the nation’s newspapers, Wilson stood by his argument from justice.  
On August 18, the President of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), 
George Pope, sent Wilson a telegram (which he simultaneously released to the press) 
   
                                                 
 267Wilson to Newlands (August 19, 1916), quoted in Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the 
United States, Vol VI: On the Eve of America's Entrance into World War I, 1915-1916, 168.  
 
 268For example, see “President Makes Public His Argument that Failed to Move Railway Heads,” 
New York Times, August 20, 1916, 1; “’Responsibility on You if Strike is Declared’; Wilson in Advance 
Fixes the Blame on the Railway Managers and Presidents, but the Best Opinion Seems to be that Men will 
Stay at Work – Details of the Conferences in the White House,” Los Angeles Times, August 20, 1916, 1.   
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calling for the President to side with the owners and to force the Brotherhoods to agree to 
arbitration. In his response (also released to the press), Wilson again cited the public’s 
support for the eight-hour day, calling it a measure “to which the whole economic 
movement of the time seems to point.” 269 Predictably, editors of the nation’s leading 
newspapers weighed in on the Pope-Wilson exchange, with Democratic-leaning papers 
generally supporting Wilson and the Brotherhoods and Republican-leaning papers 
supporting Pope and the owners in their call for arbitration.270
 There is little reason to doubt Wilson’s sincerity about the disastrous effects of the 
strike.  The fact that he devoted more than a week in the middle of August to personally 
leading the negotiations between the Brotherhoods and the owners is evidence of both his 
desire to avoid a strike and his hope to achieve a non-statist agreement.  The New York 
Times reported on August 19 that the president was “still optimistic” about bringing the 
two sides together on a compromise.
  In the face of criticism, 
the president never wavered.  He continued to emphasize justice, public will, and the 
debilitating impact of a general strike. 
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  But when hopes of a compromise vanished and 
 269Specifically, Pope’s telegram read: “On behalf of 3700 manufacturing organizations, employing 
3,000,000 persons, and utterly dependent upon uninterrupted railroad service for their operation . . . [I] 
respectfully urge that you will, with all the power of your great office and responsibility, assert and 
maintain the principle of arbitration for industrial disputes affecting National intercourse.”  For both Pope’s 
telegram and Wilson’s response, see “Manufacturers’ Appeal to Wilson to Save Arbitration,” and 
“President Declares Belief in Principle of Arbitration,” Boston Daily Globe, August 21, 1916,  9;  “Railway 
Heads Confer: Union Men Mark Time; Wilson Deluged with Telegrams to Insist on Arbitration Principle,” 
Los Angeles Times, August 21, 1916, 1; “Wilson Defends His Railway Stand; Both Sides Firm,” New York 
Times, August 21, 1916, 1. 
 
 270See “Up to the Railroad Presidents,” The Washington Post, August 21, 1916, 4; and “A Grave 
Responsibility,” The Atlanta Constitution, August 21, 1916, 4; for editorials in support of Wilson.  See 
“Shadow for Substance,” Wall Street Journal, August 21, 1916, 1; and “No Longer the Public’s Advocate,” 
New York Tribune, August 21, 1916, 6; for editorials criticizing the President.  
 
 271“Railway Heads Balk Wilson’s Peace Plan,” New York Times, August 19, 1916, 1.  
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the strike appeared imminent, Wilson’s fear of the consequences overpowered all other 
considerations and, reluctantly, he made the dramatic decision to turn to Congress.272
 In his address to the joint session of Congress on August 29, Wilson reiterated the 
same arguments he had made in the press during the preceding weeks.  He explained that 
he remained committed to the principle of arbitration for industrial disputes but went on 
to say that current law did not grant him the power to compel the two sides to submit the 
issue to arbitration.  Emphasizing that a strike by 400,000 rail workers was now 
imminent, he forecasted the potential effects in cataclysmic terms: “Cities will be cut off 
from their food supplies, the whole commerce of the nation would be paralyzed, men of 
every sort and occupation will be thrown out of employment, countless thousands will in 
all likelihood be brought, it may be, to the very point of starvation, and a tragical national 
calamity brought on . . .”
   
273  Wilson also cited the potential for the railroad strike to 
threaten the nation’s security, both in terms of hampering the military’s ability to 
logistically support the 15,000 troops stationed on the Mexican border and its ability to 
respond to changing events in the war in Europe.  Finally, he spoke again of justice, 
proclaiming, “that the whole spirit of the time and the preponderant evidence of recent 
economic experience spoke for the eight-hour day.  It has been adjudged by the thought 
and experience of recent years a thing upon which society is justified in insisting.”274
                                                 
 
   
 272A committee of railroad presidents submitted their final refusal to compromise to Wilson on 
August 28, 1916.  See “Enclosure” to Austin Bruce Garretson and Others, With Enclosure to Wilson 
(August 29, 1916), LWWP. 
 273 “An Address to a Joint Session of Congress,” (August 29, 1916), LWWP. 
 
 274Ibid. Even after giving this address, Wilson was not certain that the crisis has been averted.  He 
wrote to an advisor the next day, “I do not know whether it will be possible to get from Congress any 
action which will control, or even moderate, the situation.” Wilson to Norman Hapgood (August 30, 1916), 
LWWP. Wilson’s concern was shared by Henry Ford who wrote to the President on September 1, 1916 to 
warn him that, if the strike was not averted, “The Ford Motor Company will of absolute necessity shut 
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 Congress heeded the president’s call and the Adamson Act became the law of the 
land on September 3, 1916.  Labor leaders and progressives alike hailed the attainment of 
what many considered to be labor’s most significant goal. IRC Chairman Frank Walsh 
heaped praise on Wilson, calling his action “unparalleled in the annals of statesmanship” 
and claiming that the Adamson Act marked, “the beginning of the end of an industrial 
despotism.”275 Again, the newspapers lined up along partisan lines, but it is interesting to 
note the much more significant outcry from the Republican-leaning press over the 
Adamson Act as compared to the child labor bill.276  In the weeks that followed, Wilson’s 
Republican presidential opponent, Charles Evan Hughes, increasingly centered his 
campaign around attacking the incumbent on this specific issue.  He accused Wilson of 
selling out to labor in order to win votes, a charge that Wilson hotly disputed.277  Rather 
than becoming defensive, Wilson embraced his action with regard to the eight-hour day 
and, much to Hughes’ dismay, also made it a centerpiece of his campaign.278
 Whereas Wilson needed reassurance from his southern advisors that his support 
for the Keating-Owen Bill would not alienate the majority of southern Democrats, he 
neither sought nor received any such advice with regards to the Adamson Act and the 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
down its factory and all its assembling plants throughout the country and every man of its more than forty 
nine thousand workers will have to go off the pay roll.” Ford to Wilson (September, 1, 1916), LWWP.   
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 276 For positive coverage of the eight-hour day’s passage, see “Wonderful Thing, Say Union 
Chiefs,” The Atlanta Constitution, 3 September 1916, 2; and “’Happy Day’ For Wilson,” The Boston 
Globe, 3 September 1916, 2.  For the opposite reaction, see “Another Scrap of Paper,” Wall Street Journal, 
September 4, 1916, 1; “Union Openly Dictates Course of Legislation,” New York Tribune, September 3, 
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 278 Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 238-239.  
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alienation of the “commercial interests.”  This simplest explanation for this difference is 
that Wilson never harbored hope of swinging pro-business voters away from the 
Republican Party.  As with the Keating-Owen Bill, he conducted a cost-benefit analysis 
and saw that he stood to make substantial gains with progressives and labor by his 
support of the eight-hour day.  The potential electoral losses were relatively insignificant.  
The only real loss was his abandonment of the principles of both states’ rights and anti-
statism.  As he looked to build a national party, one that could face both domestic and 
international challenges, he was willing to accept that loss.  And it was, in fact, Wilson’s 
ability to portray himself and his party as more attuned to the nation’s temper on issues of 
progressivism and peace that carried him to victory in 1916. 
 So how did Wilson’s moderate stance on woman suffrage, outlined in the 
preceding chapter, factor in with his broader platform of progressivism and peace during 
the 1916 election, particularly with regard to women voters in the West?  In short, it 
worked brilliantly.  With the exception of Oregon, Wilson won the electoral votes of 
every state in the West.  The headline in the New York Times read, “Votes of Women and 
Bull Moose Elected Wilson; Western Progressives Turned to Him Almost En Masse, but 
Not Those of the East; Peace a Powerful Issue.”279
The Woman’s Party terrorized the two conventions and frightened them with the 
prospect of ‘four million votes,’ which it held over them as a club.  Mr. Hughes was 
led to believe that it had the votes and made his celebrated declaration for the 
Anthony Federal amendment.  The Woman’s Party tried to make its threats good and 
marshal the Western women for Hughes, but the dispatches received by The Times 
showed that it failed utterly.  It did have an influence, but the wrong kind.  These 
dispatches are unanimous in recording the antagonism excited by the activities of the 
Woman’s Party, and also by the special train of Hughes women which went 
  The article specifically derided the 
efforts of the NWP.  Under the banner, “Woman’s Party Failed Utterly,” it read, 
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campaigning from New York into the West.  From many states come reports that 
both these things added greatly to Wilson’s vote; from no State comes a report that it 
subtracted from that vote.  The women, where they broke away from party lines or 
where they voted contrary to their men folks, voted for Wilson.  They did so 
generally on the argument that ‘He kept us out of war.”  In some States, such as 
Washington, the influential argument with them was not this one, but the legislative 
record which appealed to them as progressives.280
 
 
Correspondence between Wilson and his closest advisors in the months before the 
election indicate that they should not have been at all surprised by women’s behavior at 
the polls in November.  With a much firmer grasp of the relative importance of suffrage 
as an election issue than that held by the NWP, they had counted on such behavior all 
along. 
 Wilson was instrumental in the development of the Democratic platform that was 
eventually adopted at the St. Louis convention in June.  The plank endorsing the principle 
of suffrage but only recommending that the individual states extend the franchise to 
women had his full support.  During the debate over that particular plank, the anti-
suffrage Governor Ferguson of Texas made a last-minute attempt to have it removed 
completely.  His motion gained the support of a number of Southerners, which propelled 
Catt to telegraph the President and ask him to clarify his position.  He promptly replied 
that the plank received his approval and that he wished to recommend to the states that 
they extend suffrage to women upon the same terms as to men.281
                                                 
 
 After the newspapers 
ran reports of Catt’s call to Wilson for clarification of his position, a woman in California 
wrote the president, “Who is Carrie Chapman Catt that she can call the President of the 
United States to order.  Don’t fear those four million woman votes in the Suffrage states.  
 280 Ibid. 
 
 281 For Catt’s telegram to Wilson, see Catt to Wilson (June 16, 1916), PWW, Box 89, Reel 209.  
For Wilson’s reply, see Wilson to Catt (June 19, 1916), NAWSA Records, Box 9, Reel 7. 
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They will vote the democratic ticket.”282
 In early August, Daniels relayed a message to Wilson from Representative 
Keating from Colorado.  Reacting to Hughes’ declaration in support of the federal 
amendment just a few days earlier, Keating opined that Wilson should not change his 
states’ rights position.  Voters would recognize that he was only changing his position to 
try and win votes, and, in fact, a shift at this juncture would only have the opposite effect.  
Despite the fact that Keating was an advocate for the federal amendment and desired 
Wilson’s support, he recommended that the president adhere to the party platform in 
order to win the election.
  The message to not worry about Western 
women abandoning the Democrats over the issue of suffrage was one that Wilson heard 
repeatedly over the next four and a half months. 
283  Similarly, both Vice-President Marshall and Colonel 
Edward House complimented the president on standing by his states’ right stance, even as 
Hughes voiced support for the federal amendment.284
 Wilson articulated his position on suffrage during a speech to the Jane Jefferson 
Club of Colorado on August 7.  He proclaimed his faith that women voters would study 
the broad questions facing America and select the candidate that could best handle all of 
 Interestingly, all of this counsel 
came from members of Wilson’s advisory circle who were self-professed suffragists.  
They recognized, though, that suffrage would not be the deciding issue of the election 
and that a Democratic victory was more important for accomplishing a wide range of 
Wilsonian initiatives. 
                                                 
 
 282 Annie Dock to Wilson, (June 19, 1916), PWW, Box 89, Reel 209. 
 
 283 Daniels to Wilson (August 2, 1916), LWWP. 
 
 284 See Wilson to Marshall (August 3, 1916), and House to Wilson (August 6, 1916), LWWP. 
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those questions.  Additionally, he criticized Hughes for supporting a federal amendment 
when the Republican Party had been unwilling to go that far at their Chicago convention.  
Adamant that he would not disregard the official declaration of his party, he would do 
everything within his power to press for suffrage in state referenda.  Finally, in a sign of 
things to come, he complimented the sacrifices and war service of women in Europe as 
proof that women contribute service to their nations just as men do and therefore deserve 
equal citizenship.285
 Political insiders from the West continued to reassure Wilson that his suffrage 
position would not harm him throughout the late summer and early fall of 1916.  One of 
Wilson’s advisors passed along a letter in late August from Mary Field, “a highly 
intelligent woman who knows more about California than anyone I know.”  Field refuted 
the Woman’s Party claim that they would be able to sway the woman’s vote in the West.  
She was confident that women would not vote on a sex basis.  Rather, most people in the 
West were grateful that Wilson had kept the nation out of war.  She continued, “I feel that 
Wilson’s policy has done for women far more than the endorsement of the franchise 
amendment.  Far reaching and less obvious are the results of his federal reserve banking 
system, his rural credits, his tariff regulations, his industrial relations commission – all of 
which have direct, though subtile [sic], effect on the lives of women, especially the 
workers.
 
286
                                                 
 
  Field’s letter, much like the majority of responses to Belmont’s request for 
financial support of NWP activities, indicates that women were much more complex 
political creatures than the NWP made them out to be.  
 285 Wilson to the Jane Jefferson Club of Colorado (June 7, 1916), LWWP. 
 
 286 Field to Howe (August 21, 1916), LWWP. 
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 Wilson even received reassurances from NAWSA leaders that he need not worry 
about the Woman’s Party activity in the West.  Anna Howard Shaw, now retired but still 
an honorary member of the NAWSA executive council, told Wilson’s campaign manager 
to disregard the NWP.  She stressed that NAWSA was the largest suffrage group and the 
one to whom the President should pay attention.287
 Wilson’s strategy of supporting the principle of woman suffrage, federal child 
labor legislation, and the eight-hour day as part of a broad program of reforms aimed at 
securing the votes of progressives and trade unionists was successful.  He narrowly 
defeated Hughes in the electoral college 277-254.  The popular vote went 9,126,300 for 
Wilson (49%) as compared to 8,546,789 for Hughes (46%).  Importantly, the Socialist 
vote was reduced to just 589,924 (3%).
  Less than two weeks later, Wilson 
found himself being wildly applauded by the assembled members of NAWSA at the 
Atlantic City Convention.  His closest advisors, political activists from the West, and the 
nation’s largest group of suffragists all expressed their support for his stance on suffrage.  
With good reason, he ignored the NWP and ran a successful campaign based on his 
accomplishments in the arenas of foreign policy and progressivism.   
288 Most contemporary election analysts attributed 
the shift in votes from the Socialist candidate to Wilson to the Democratic Party’s record 
on labor issues.289  Historians have reached the same conclusions.290
                                                 
 
  And, of course, 
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 289For election analysis, see “Votes of Women and Bull Moose Elected Wilson,” New York Times, 
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there was the issue of peace.  Perhaps even more important than any of the debates on 
domestic policy, Wilson’s firm stance against American intervention in the war in Europe 
secured the necessary votes for his 1916 victory.  As the next chapter will show, the 
significance of this fact weighed heavily on the president in early 1917 when he was 
forced to make the difficult decision to lead the nation into war.   
 NAWSA viewed the election results as a vindication of their strategy to remain 
non-partisan and to continue to work for suffrage amendments at both the state and 
federal level.  For months after the election, NAWSA leaders used their newsletter and 
journal to editorialize about the superiority of their approach over that of the NWP.  
Oftentimes, they reprinted articles and editorials from the nation’s mainstream 
newspapers, most of which contained the same analysis:  that the women’s vote in the 
West had played a large role in Wilson’s victory and that women proved to be 
independent thinkers who were concerned with a broad range of domestic and foreign 
policy issues.291
 Predictably, the NWP had a much different interpretation of the election results.  
In contrast to every major newspaper in the country, the first post-election publication of 
The Suffragist declared, “In analyzing the election returns, we find that the women 
responded loyally to our appeal not to give their support to Mr. Wilson because of his 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 290Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 240-250. , Foner, History of the 
Labor Movement in the United States, Vol VI: On the Eve of America's Entrance into World War I, 1915-
1916, 229-231. In Pure and Simple Politics, Greene writes, “The keys to Wilson’s successful coalition had 
included a progressive program that spoke more broadly to the needs of working people . . . an inclusive 
strategy that reached out to Socialists as much as to moderate and conservative workers and that relied also 
on ties between labor activists and social justice progressives.”  Greene, Pure and Simple Politics: The 
American Federation of Labor and Political Activism, 1881-1917, 273. 
 
 291See “Women’s Vote Features Great National Election,” Woman’s Journal and Suffrage News 
47, no. 46 (November 11, 1916), 361.  For additional election analysis by NAWSA see the Nov. 25, 1916, 
Dec. 30, 1916, and January 1917 editions of the NAWSA Headquarters News Letter. 
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opposition to national woman suffrage.”292
 NWP leaders struggled to explain away this apparent failure: “We were not 
concerned with the result of the election.  Ours was a campaign in which it made no 
difference who was elected … What we did try to do was to organize a protest vote 
against Mr. Wilson’s attitude toward suffrage.  This we did.”
  To support this dubious claim, the editors 
cited the results in Illinois – the only state in which votes of women were counted 
separately – pointing to the fact that Hughes received 70,000 more votes from women 
than did Wilson.  That the results in Illinois did not reflect the larger trend in Western 
states did little to deter NWP leaders from claiming victory for their strategy.  Neither did 
the fact that, despite their call to “hold the party in power responsible” for inactivity on 
the federal amendment, Wilson was re-elected and the Democrats retained control of 
Congress.   
293  Again, this claim ran 
contrary to the consensus opinion of election analysts across the country that women in 
the West voted overwhelmingly in favor of Wilson. In subsequent editions of The 
Suffragist, the editors slightly modified their victory assertion.  They backed away from 
the claim of swinging a large number of women voters away from the Democrats and, 
instead, focused on their achievement of having made suffrage a central issue in the 
campaign.  In future elections, they warned, politicians of both parties will be more 
acutely aware “that many women are anxious to use their votes to win political liberty for 
the women of the whole country.”294
                                                 
 
  Whether this statement was accurate or not, in 
 292“The Results of the Election,” The Suffragist, November 11, 1916.  
 
 293Ibid.  
 
 294“The Lesson of the Last Election,” The Suffragist, Nov. 25, 1916.  
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taking this position, Paul and her followers stood squarely in line with the prevailing 
theories about the role of third parties.  But they also faced the challenge that confronts 
all third parties in the wake of an election; that is, how to sustain and even build 
momentum in the years before the next election.  The next chapter will show that Paul 
answered that challenge with the NWP picketing strategy.  
As 1916 drew to a close, Wilson found himself still in control of the White House 
and his party still in control of Congress.  He had been narrowly reelected, largely on the 
basis of his ability to keep the nation out of war.  And he had shown an openness to 
change his policy stances if certain conditions were met.  Based on the evidence in this 
chapter, those conditions included the following: proof that the change was just and that 
it represented the will of the general public, that it enjoyed the support of his closest 
advisors, and that, while political benefits would certainly be welcome, Wilson could 
justify to himself that it was in keeping with the contours of the Constitution.  Despite 
having run as the “peace” candidate, events on the world stage would force him to 
radically alter America’s position on the war in 1917.  The crisis in Wilson’s 
Administration would force Catt to also make a fundamental change in NAWSA’s policy 
by convincing the organization to simultaneously work in support of the war and 
suffrage.  Paul, too, would drastically alter the strategy of the NWP in 1917.  Rather than 
taking a stand on the war in Europe, Paul initiated a war at the White House gates. 
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CHAPTER 5 
1917 – YEAR OF DECISIONS 
 
 On New Year’s Day in 1917, the biggest and boldest headline on the front page of 
the New York Times read, “London Applauds the Allies’ Reply; Washington Sees Chance 
for Peace; Stir About Second Note From Spain.”295
 As the last chapter revealed, Wilson was narrowly reelected in November 1916, 
largely on the basis of keeping the nation out of war.  But by early February 1917, events 
on the international stage would result in his dramatic decision to reverse course and lead 
the nation into war.  This chapter places Wilson’s actions with regard to suffrage in the 
year after his re-election into context with the other issues he faced – issues that had the 
  News of the war in Europe 
dominated the headlines on the first day of the new year. In many ways, this was a sign of 
things to come.   Long before the United States formally entered the war in the spring of 
1917, events on the battlefields of Europe captured a great deal of the attention of 
American politicians and the general public alike.  By February 1917, though, with US 
entry into the war looking increasingly likely, national attention became almost entirely 
focused on the war.  This would remain the case for the remainder of 1917 and for most 
of 1918 as well.  It is critical to establish this fact at the start of this section in order to 
keep the events that will be described in this chapter in their proper perspective.  In very 
different ways, the nation’s suffragists sought to keep some attention on their movement 
in 1917.  But for the general public and certainly for the President, the war remained the 
central focus throughout the year.   
                                                 
 295 New York Times, January 1, 1917, 1.  
 
140 
 
potential to affect the entire world.  It reveals an increasingly close political and personal 
relationship between Wilson and NAWSA President Carrie Chapman Catt, two leaders 
who needed one another’s support.  Wilson desired all the political allies he could find as 
he reversed his position on US involvement in the war.  As president of NAWSA, Catt 
needed support from the President as she executed “The Winning Plan,” which entailed 
winning referenda in a number of states and overcoming legislative hurdles so as to 
increase the chances of securing a federal amendment.296  Evidence presented in this 
chapter shows Wilson and Catt’s vision for the proper suffrage strategy evolving in 
concert in 1917 through constant and careful correspondence.297
 From January through November, the NWP sent groups of women dubbed “silent 
sentinels” to picket the White House.  Wilson’s opposition to the federal amendment was 
the focus of their protest.  Starting in June, angry mobs attacked the pickets.  
Subsequently, the pickets, rather than their attackers, were arrested and jailed.  The 
bravery of the NWP pickets in the face of hostile crowds and certain imprisonment is an 
inspiring story.  Further, the violation of their civil rights by a government claiming that 
the world needed “to be made safe for democracy” is a dark stain on the Wilson 
Administration.  Shamefully, NAWSA chose to look the other way as their sister 
  At Catt’s behest, 
Wilson played a vital role in several successful state suffrage campaigns and facilitated 
the creation of a separate congressional committee on woman suffrage.   A factor pushing 
Catt and Wilson even closer together was the strategy employed by Alice Paul and the 
NWP. 
                                                 
 296For a detailed explanation of “The Winning Plan” see Chapter 3.  
 
297 Catt and Wilson or their secretaries (Helen Gardener for NAWSA and Joseph Tumulty for 
Wilson) exchanged more than 30 letters in 1917.  In other words, they communicated with one another at 
least once every two weeks.  Much of this correspondence in considered later in this chapter. 
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suffragists were sent to jail for exercising the right of free speech.  But contrary to NWP 
claims at the end of the year, the picketing campaign was not critical in Wilson’s shift 
toward support of the federal amendment.  That shift had been underway since his speech 
at Atlantic City in September 1916.  Rather, it was NAWSA’s work in 1917 that speeded 
his conversion to advocacy of the federal amendment by early 1918.  At best, the 
antagonistic actions of the NWP improved NAWSA’s standing with Wilson.  At worst, 
their actions armed anti-suffragists with yet another reason to deny women the vote and 
made the work of pro-suffrage forces across the nation that much harder.   
This chapter begins with an overview of the ideology behind the picketing 
campaign followed by a summary of how historians have interpreted its impact.  A 
careful examination of the evidence regarding Wilson and the public’s reaction to the 
pickets results in a challenge to the pro-militant revisionist interpretation.  Switching 
focus to the issue that actually dominated the year – namely, US entry into the war – this 
chapter analyzes key decisions made by Wilson, Catt, and Paul.  It chronicles Wilson’s 
assistance to Catt as she and NAWSA orchestrated victories in a number of state suffrage 
referenda and as they pushed for the creation of a separate suffrage committee in the 
House of Representatives.  With the President’s backing, the federal amendment received 
its first successful vote in Congress in January 1918.  An analysis of the competing 
NAWSA and NWP strategies and an assessment of the suffrage situation on the eve of 
that vote serve as this chapter’s conclusion. 
 Beginning on January 10, 1917, the NWP sent daily delegations of “silent 
pickets” to stand outside the White House gates holding banners which read “Mr. 
President, What Will You Do For Woman Suffrage?” and “How Long Must Women 
142 
 
Wait for Liberty?” The women came in groups of two or three and stood at their posts for 
hours at a time, day after day.  For nearly six months, the police and the President 
generally ignored the activists.  However, as the United States entered the war in April 
and patriotic fever swept across the nation, many citizens began to view the picketers as 
disloyal.   
 In June, the NWP banners became increasingly provocative, accusing Wilson of 
hypocrisy by fighting a war for democracy abroad but denying true democracy at home.  
Angry onlookers attacked the pickets and shredded their banners.  As scenes like this 
played out repeatedly in late June and early July, several picketers were arrested and 
imprisoned on charges of obstructing sidewalk traffic.  Their attackers were almost never 
arrested.  During their imprisonment, the jailed suffragists resorted to hunger strikes in 
protest against the illegality of their arrests and the bad conditions in the prison.  Prison 
officials responded by conducting brutal forced feedings.  The picketing, arrests, hunger 
strikes, and forced feedings that went on from June through November provided the 
NWP with intense press coverage.  Although much of it was critical of their actions, 
NWP leaders believed it helped the cause by keeping the issue of suffrage on the front 
pages of the nation’s newspapers.  Further, in pointing out Wilson’s hypocrisy and 
waging an unrelenting war at his doorstep, they believed they forced him to capitulate to 
the federal amendment in order to escape the negative publicity brought about by their 
campaign.298
                                                 
 298 Flexner and Fitzpatrick, Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United 
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 Much historiographical debate has centered on the role of the pickets in Wilson’s 
eventual decision to advocate for the federal amendment.  Indeed, the President began the 
year as a staunch states’ rights suffrage supporter but ended the year with tacit 
endorsement of the federal amendment.299  Did this transition occur mostly or partly as a 
result of the picketing campaign, or did it occur in spite of the NWP actions? The 
traditional interpretation, first articulated by Eleanor Flexner in Century of Struggle, 
argues that NWP-generated histories in the years immediately following ratification of 
the nineteenth amendment greatly exaggerated the impact of the pickets.  Flexner 
concedes that suffrage received increased publicity as a result of the NWP activity but 
believes that more of the general public and members of Congress were alienated rather 
than won over to the cause.  Wilson, she argues, was much more influenced by other 
events in 1917, particularly his close association with NAWSA and the increasing role 
women played in the public after the U.S. entered the war.300
 In their close analysis of Wilson’s relationship to suffrage in a 1981 article, 
Christine Lunardini and Thomas Knock argue that the NWP’s action pushed Wilson 
towards NAWSA, but they take no further stand than that.  Responding to that argument, 
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Sara Hunter Graham launched a revisionist interpretation by maintaining that Wilson 
came out in support of the federal amendment in December 1917 as a direct result of the 
NWP picketing campaigns.  The pickets, she claims, succeeded in pointing out the 
inconsistency of his war aims about spreading democracy and his administration’s 
indifference to democracy at home.  Graham contends that the pickets posed such a threat 
to Wilson that he entered into a conspiracy with NAWSA, major newspaper editors, and 
the director of his Committee of Public Information in order to suppress coverage of 
NWP activities.301
  Perhaps inspired by Graham’s rebuttal, Lunardini more boldly argues in a later 
work that the NWP campaign did succeed in making the point to the President that there 
would be consequences to pay if he did not accede to their demands.  Those 
consequences included losses for Democrats in future elections and loss of positive 
public opinion as a result of his administration’s harsh treatment of the pickets.
  
302  With 
few exceptions, more recent scholarship has tended to accept the revisionist 
interpretation, emphasizing the heroism and bravery of the NWP pickets over the 
traditional lobbying efforts and state-level work conducted by NAWSA.303
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 Evidence in this chapter challenges the revisionist interpretation. A thorough 
examination of the relevant correspondence and newspaper coverage for the most intense 
period of picketing (January-November 1917) reveals that the pickets were a constant but 
relatively mild annoyance to the President.  Most of the publicity so coveted by Paul and 
her followers was negative.  As ugly as the crowds and the police were towards the 
suffragists standing by the White House gates, there was no public outcry when they 
were arrested and imprisoned.  Rather than being pushed to take more decisive action on 
the federal amendment, Wilson found his ability to work for the suffrage cause hampered 
by the activities of the NWP.  The President acknowledged that the actions of the pickets 
brought some bad publicity to his administration, but he was more concerned with the 
bad publicity their actions brought to the greater suffrage campaign.  From the beginning, 
but increasingly so after the war began, Wilson, NAWSA leaders, members of Congress, 
most of the general public, and even a significant number of NWP loyalists thought the 
picketing campaign was ineffective and, in fact, harmful to the cause.   
 So, what exactly was the picketing strategy, why did it appear, and how did 
Wilson respond to it as it evolved over the course of the year?  The NWP Executive 
Council released a statement to the press on January 9, 1917 that they had met with the 
President and that he had declined to support the federal amendment, citing his allegiance 
to the Democratic Party’s platform.  At an “indignation meeting” held that afternoon, the 
Council had resolved to initiate a new campaign against the President.  Their press 
release explained that they intended to post women pickets at the White House grounds in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Brown, Did Woodrow Wilson's Gender Politics Matter?, 125-162.  Echoing Morgan in many ways, Brown 
concludes that the NWP campaign alone would never have been successful, but that the NWP did provide 
NAWSA leaders and pro-suffrage senators and congressmen with “the leverage they needed to approach 
the president as problem solvers and mediators.”  Quote from  p. 151. 
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order to make it impossible for the President to enter or leave the White House without 
encountering a picket pleading for the cause of suffrage.304
 In fact, Paul had begun developing the picketing strategy at least a month before 
the “indignation meeting” in January.  Letters from the NWP headquarters were sent to 
potential picket line volunteers in late December 1916.
 
305  Paul had campaigned hard 
against Wilson and the Democrats in 1916, but the President had been reelected and his 
party retained control of Congress.  Claims of victory in The Suffragist notwithstanding, 
Paul was keenly aware that “holding the party in power responsible” had failed in 1916 
and that the next opportunity to test this strategy again – the 1918 mid-terms – was a long 
way away.  In the months following the disappointing 1916 election, Paul “felt she 
needed to instigate a new nonviolent technique to rally her troops and keep them from 
exhaustion and depression.”306  She specifically settled on picketing the President for 
many of the same reasons that she pursued the “holding the party in power responsible” 
strategy in 1914 and 1916.  As the leader of the party that controlled both houses of 
Congress, Wilson had the power to force the issue of the federal amendment.  According 
to Paul, the pickets would serve as a form of visual rhetoric aimed at convincing the 
President to use that power.307
 Wilson’s initial reaction was to view the pickets as a sort of amusing distraction.  
He would tip his hat to them as he came and went from the White House.  On the first 
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extremely cold day that the pickets stood at their posts, he instructed his chief usher to 
invite the women into the lower corridor of the White House in order to escape the wind.  
When they declined, he ordered the usher to deliver hot bricks to the gate for the women 
to use for warmth.308  He joked with members of his Cabinet that he actually liked the 
pickets because they brought him prominence.309
 An article in the New York Times reveals that Wilson was not the only one 
amused by the pickets.  The Gridiron Club of Washington held a dinner for the President 
and several members of his Cabinet in February.  A group of actors performed a series of 
comedy acts in which they parodied recent political events.  The article reported that the 
actors introduced a character named “Hazel Jones” as one of the silent suffrage sentinels 
at the White House.  “Hazel” was then made the target of several gibes in a minstrel skit, 
demonstrating that most members of the audience viewed the pickets as a group of crazy 
women.  The newspaper related one specific joke: “‘Do you know Hazel had an awful 
accident? . . . One of those big fat squirrels in the White House grounds bit off her ear.  
The President said it wasn’t the squirrel’s fault, and the President was right . . . Suppose 
you were a hungry squirrel with an appetite for nuts, and for eight hours in the rain and 
snow and sleet somebody stood in front of your house.’”
 
310
                                                 
 
  The pickets were mocked 
again when actors portraying Ellis Island officials quizzed an immigrant about his 
knowledge of America.  When they asked the immigrant what President Woodrow 
 308 Diary entry of Thomas W. Brahany, White House Chief of Staff (March 4, 1917), LWWP.  
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Wilson spent most of his time doing, the man responded, “Dodging women with 
[suffrage banners].”311
 The President was forced to give the pickets more careful consideration beginning 
in late June.  On June 20, a group of delegates from the new Russian Republic that had 
just enfranchised its women arrived at the White House to meet with Wilson.  They were 
greeted by an NWP banner that read, “President Wilson and Envoy Root are deceiving 
Russia.  They say ‘We are a democracy.  Help us win the war so that democracies may 
survive.’  We women of America tell you that America is not a democracy.  Twenty 
million women are denied the right to vote.”
 
312  The banner went on to say that Wilson 
was the chief opponent of suffrage in America.  It urged the Russian delegation to tell 
Wilson he must enfranchise women before claiming Russia as an ally.  The inflammatory 
banner drew a crowd of opponents who ripped the banner to shreds.  A similar scene 
occurred on the following day when NWP members arrived at their posts with an 
identical banner.  On that day, the crowd not only tore apart the banner, but some also 
physically attacked the pickets and had to be restrained by the police.313
 The incident surrounding the “Russian banner” received considerable press 
coverage.  Almost every major newspaper in the country carried the story.
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 Several 
leading papers responded by publishing editorials condemning the pickets for attacking a 
 311 Ibid. 
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Tribune, June 22, 1917, 3; “Crowd Destroys Suffrage Banners,” The Hartford Courant, June 22, 1917, 20.  
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sitting president during wartime.  The Boston Daily Globe, a pro-suffrage paper, 
chastised the pickets because they had “harmed the cause” of suffrage.  The editorialist 
argued, “The women of America should be enfranchised, but if they are to be, they must 
pass the test of service . . . A Red Cross nurse, a housewife saving food, a woman worker 
setting free a man for the Army, any of them is a more telling argument for suffrage than 
a whole line of silent sentinels picketing the man on whose shoulders rest the burdens of 
America.”315 Editorials in the Chicago Daily Tribune and The Atlanta Constitution 
echoed the Globe:  The NWP pickets were disloyal citizens who would serve their cause 
more faithfully by supporting the nation through war service.316
 Members of Congress also voiced their displeasure over the “Russian banner” to 
reporters.  Congress was deeply divided over the issue of woman suffrage, but senators 
and representatives were nearly unanimous in their condemnation of the NWP’s 
actions.
  
317  The Washington Post reported, “Meanwhile the affairs of the last two days 
have operated to give Congress a veritable chill.  Even the friends of suffrage among 
senators and representatives now have ‘cold feet’ and feel that the cause of suffrage has 
received a setback from which it cannot recover during the present session.”318
                                                 
 
 Of note, 
news accounts, editorials, and statements from members of Congress all highlighted the 
fact that the NWP represented a minority of suffragists and noted that NAWSA did not 
 315 “Wrong Method of Pleading Their Cause,” Boston Daily Globe, June 21, 1917, 12.  
 
 316 “Bad Tactics by Suffragists,” Chicago Daily Tribune, June 22, 1917, 2; “Aiding the Kaiser,” 
The Atlanta Constitution, June 23, 1917, 6.   
 
 317 A New York Times article quoted seven members of Congress (five pro-suffrage and two anti-
suffrage), all of whom denounced picketing in general and, specifically, the NWP decision to display the 
“Russian banner.”  “Crowd Destroys Suffrage Banner at White House,” New York Times, June 21, 1917, 1-
2. 
  
 318 “Brave Third Day Out; White House Pickets Will Fly More Banners This Morning,” The 
Washington Post, June 22, 1917, 1.  
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condone the pickets.  In almost every case, reporters made a clear distinction between the 
NWP and NAWSA, evidence of the success of the former in distancing itself from the 
latter over the course of the preceding year.    
 Over the next two weeks after the first “Russian banner” appeared, a pattern 
developed in which the pickets would arrive at their posts, be attacked by unruly crowds, 
and then be arrested.  Initially, the police claimed that the arrests were for their own 
protection, although later the pickets were charged with obstructing sidewalk traffic.  
Wilson did not make any public statements during this time, but privately he confided his 
disappointment in the type of publicity being drawn to suffrage.  He wrote to his daughter 
on the day of the second crowd attack, “I dare say you heard of the fracas raised by the 
representatives of the Woman’s Party here at the gates of the White House.  They 
certainly seem bent upon making their cause as obnoxious as possible.”319
 On July 14, sixteen women were arrested on the charges of causing unlawful 
assembly before the White House.  In court three days later, the women received fines, 
but refused to pay, so were sentenced to varying periods of confinement at Occoquan 
Workhouse in Virginia.  According to the Commissioner of the District of Columbia, 
Louis Brownlow, the President was not told beforehand that the arrests were going to be 
made, and he was indignant when he found out afterwards.  He immediately pardoned the 
women and ordered Brownlow to his office.  Brownlow recalled that Wilson clearly 
disapproved of the arrests because it only indulged the women in their desire to be 
   
                                                 
 
 319 Wilson to Mrs. Francis B. Sayre (June 22, 1917), Life and Letters, Vol. 7.  
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considered martyrs.  The President ordered Brownlow to refrain from further arrests 
without his approval.320
 When fighting between the pickets and the crowds continued over the next few 
days, Brownlow reported to the President that he needed to make more arrests.  Wilson 
agreed that Brownlow should take minimum measures necessary to maintain peace on the 
streets.  Brownlow recalled, “Thereafter we pursued a policy of attempting to keep the 
peace, not arresting the pickets until they, or at least some of them, had taken positive 
action.”
 
321
 I will not make the argument that Wilson was unconcerned with publicity, but I 
will dispute the contention of Graham that he engaged in a conspiracy to suppress the 
facts involved in the picketing arrests and imprisonment.  Wilson’s secretary, Joseph 
Tumulty, informed him on the day after he had pardoned the sixteen pickets that several 
editors of prominent newspapers had inquired how the White House would like them to 
cover the events.  T.W. Noyes, editor of the Washington Evening Star, told Tumulty that 
he favored having a bare statement of fact, but no publicity in any paper.  Arthur 
Brisbane, editor of the Washington Times suggested that the Administration avoid the 
appearance of any “conspiracy of silence.”  Wilson instructed Tumulty, “My own opinion 
is that a compromise course ought to be adopted . . .My own suggestion would be that 
nothing that [the pickets] do should be featured with headlines or put on the front page 
  Brownlow’s memory of the events, written more than 40 years later, was 
undoubtedly affected by his desire to appear concerned for the safety of the pickets rather 
than guilty of committing serious breaches of their First Amendment rights.   
                                                 
 320Diary Entry (July 14, 1917), Life and Letters, Vol. 7.  See also Louis Brownlow, A Passion for 
Anonymity: The Autobiography of Louis Brownlow (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), 77-
79.  
 
 321 Ibid., 79.  
152 
 
but that a bare colorless chronicle of what they do should be all that was printed.  That 
constitutes part of the news, but it need not be made interesting reading.”322
 Graham contends, “At NAWSA’s instigation, President Wilson and the wartime 
censorship agency abridged the freedom of the press” in order to suppress news about 
NWP activities.
 
323  She finds evidence for this conspiracy in Wilson’s instructions to 
Tumulty (as noted above) and in a report from NAWSA lobbyists that the Committee on 
Public Information (CPI) Director, George Creel, arranged appointments for them with 
major news services.  The purpose of the appointments was for the NAWSA lobbyists to 
emphasize their desire for newspaper coverage to make a clear distinction between 
NAWSA and the NWP and to emphasize the former’s abhorrence of the picketing.  
Creel’s office also issued an official bulletin to all newspapers, post offices, government 
officials, and public agencies on July 3, 1917, in which similar points were made.324
 The President clearly preferred that the pickets not receive the type of publicity 
that they were seeking, but Graham’s own review of prominent newspapers reveals that 
the next major set of arrests in August received front page coverage.
 
325
                                                 
 322 Wilson to Tumulty (July 20, 1917), Life and Letters, Vol. 7.  
  If Wilson 
attempted to suppress news coverage, and there really is no evidence beyond the 
correspondence outlined above that he did any such thing, the attempt failed.  
Furthermore, his alleged suppression was clearly not much of a priority since there is no 
 
 323 Graham, Woman Suffrage and the New Democracy, 109.  
 
 324 Ibid., 109. Adams and Keene also cite the correspondence among the editors and the Wilson 
Administration, although they stop short of suggesting a conspiracy that involved NAWSA leaders.  See 
Adams and Keene, Alice Paul and the American Suffrage Campaign, 167. 
 
 325 Graham reviewed coverage of the arrests and riots of August 14-18, 1917, and found front page 
stories in the Evening Star (Washington), Washington Times, Washington Post, New York Times, New York 
World, New York Tribune, New York Herald, Baltimore Sun, Chicago Tribune, Philadelphia Inquirer, and 
Cleveland Plain Dealer.  See Graham, Woodrow Wilson, Alice Paul, and the Woman Suffrage Movement, 
672.  
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evidence that Wilson or Creel took punitive action against any of the major newspapers 
that continued to give front-page coverage to the pickets.   
 When viewed in comparison to the administration’s suppression campaign against 
anarchists, I.W.W.’s, and Socialists, the plan to ask newspapers to provide “colorless” 
coverage of the pickets appears relatively benign.326  Beginning in the spring of 1917, 
“federal marshals corralled radicals of every nationality, faction, and ideological 
persuasion, and U.S. district attorneys freely interpreted a vague Espionage Act, passed in 
1917, to win indictments and convictions on charges of treason and antiwar activity.”327  
Additionally, the Postmaster General denied second-class mailing privileges to leftist 
publications such as the Milwaukee Leader, the Appeal to Reason, and the Masses, 
resulting in the virtual shut-down of those publications.  In June 1918, Socialist leader 
Eugene Debs was arrested and later sentenced to ten years in prison for speaking out 
against American participation in the war.328
                                                 
  
  The fact that the Wilson Administration 
was generally more lenient toward the pickets than other dissenters does not make the 
arrests and imprisonments more palatable.  Nor is this evidence presented as an excuse 
for the clear violation of the NWP’s civil rights.  Rather, it serves to demonstrate that the 
administration simply did not consider these activists to pose a significant threat to 
Wilson’s standing with the American public or with his international audience. 
 326 For a detailed discussion of the Wilson Administration’s campaign against political extremists, 
see H. C. Peterson and G. C. Fite, Opponents of War, 1917-1918 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1957), William Preston Jr., Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903-1933, 2d ed. 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994) . 
 
 327Salvatore, Eugene V. Debs: Citizen and Socialist, 288.  
 
 328 Ibid., 294-296. See also, Thomas J. Knock, "Wilson's Battle for the League: Progressive 
Internationalists Confront the Forces of Reaction," in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992), 69. , Dawley, Changing the World: American Progressives in 
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 Given that most of the articles about suffragist arrests were critical of the NWP 
anyway, Wilson had even less motivation to actively work to limit the exposure.  There is 
no doubt that NAWSA leaders worked closely with the administration, including the CPI, 
to distance themselves and the cause of suffrage from the militants.  But they did so in 
full view of the public eye. The fact that NAWSA and Wilson were in agreement on the 
damage to the cause being inflicted by the NWP does not equate to a conspiracy to 
“abridge the freedom of the press.”     
 The argument that Wilson resorted to arrests to try and silence the pickets who 
were arousing public opinion against him is even less convincing when one sees the 
number of letters that Wilson received criticizing him for being overly lenient with the 
pickets.  A woman in Missouri wrote to him in late July demanding that he put a stop to 
the “un-American” picketing of the White House.  In August, a man who had witnessed 
the fighting between pickets and crowd members and the subsequent arrests, defended 
the actions of the crowd, saying, “An indignant public should be allowed to deal with 
such banners according to the dictates of their patriotism without police interference.”329  
The actions of the crowd, of course, also led Wilson to believe that the opinion of the 
pickets was a tiny minority.  Editorialists further reinforced this view.  Wilson was 
actually criticized for his leniency by a number of leading newspapers.330
 He did occasionally receive advice and petitions from those who supported the 
pickets, some of whom were prominent citizens, but there is no evidence that any of these 
 
                                                 
 329 See Dee Richardson to Wilson (July 24, 1917) and Henry Noble Hall to Wilson (August, 15, 
1917), LWWP.  
 
 330 See “Militants Pardoned,” The Washington Post, July 20, 1917, 6; and “Editorial,” The 
Hartford Courant, July 28, 1917, 8.  The Post opined, “Violations of law and order by misguided women 
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appeals caused Wilson to alter his suffrage stance.331  When he received letters from 
people concerned about the conditions in which the jailed suffragists were kept at the 
Occoquan Workhouse, he directed his staff to immediately investigate the charges and 
take any such action as needed to ensure there was no basis for future charges.332
 The last day of picketing in 1917 occurred on November 10.  According to a press 
release, NWP leaders decided to suspend the picketing campaign because “there are few 
candidates for the role remaining outside of jail, and the other [reason] is that the women 
hope that the next Congress will pass the Federal amendment and so make further 
picketing unnecessary.
   
333  In late November, the 31 suffragists remaining in jail (to 
include Paul) appeared before a District Judge who ruled that they had been illegally 
committed to Occoquan Workhouse and were entitled to liberation on bail pending an 
appeal.  After their release, they did not picket again until the summer of 1918.334
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 334 Graham also repeats the story first told in Irwin’s NWP history that a reporter from the New 
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 To the greatest extent possible, Wilson ignored the pickets during 1917.  When 
the publicity surrounding their arrests made it impossible for him to ignore them, he did 
his utmost to minimize the publicity they received.  Undoubtedly, this was partially an 
attempt to keep bad light from falling on his Administration.  More importantly, though, 
he sincerely believed the pickets were harming the cause of suffrage at the state and 
national level.335  His growing interest in the federal amendment was not a result of the 
coercive actions of the NWP.  Rather, it was the result of its increasing political value as 
NAWSA successfully won more and more state suffrage campaigns, as the U.S. engaged 
in a war to spread democracy, and as Democrats began to prepare for the 1918 mid-term 
elections.336
                                                                                                                                                 
meeting on November 8 in New York, volunteers were invited to participate in the final picket of the White 
House on that following Saturday.  According to the article, “Miss Doris Stevens said after the meeting that 
this would undoubtedly be the last time that the White House would be picketed.”  “Talk of Dropping 
Capital Pickets,” New York Times, November 9, 1917.  See also “N.Y. Suffragists Head for Prison Via 
Picket Line,” New York Times, November 10, 1917. 
   
 
335 For example, when Wilson wrote a message of support for the suffrage campaign in New York 
state, he added, “May I not say that I hope that no voter will be influenced in his decision with regard to 
this great matter by anything the so-called pickets may have done . . . Their action represents, I am sure, so 
small a fraction of the women . . . that it would be unfair and argue a narrow view to allow their actions to 
prejudice the cause itself.” Wilson to Catt (October 13, 1917), CLOC, Box 9, Reel 7. 
 
336 The actions of the NWP raise the question of the utility of a radical alternative.  Did Wilson 
move closer to Catt out of fear that, through inaction, Catt’s followers would eventually migrate toward 
Paul, leaving Paul and the NWP as the majority suffrage organization in the nation?  Did Catt work more 
aggressively on the federal amendment out of the same fear?  Perhaps. But the theory of the radical 
alternative includes an assumption that the radical alternative can, in fact, deliver on its promise to attract 
more adherents and undermine the mainstream organization.  For example, in the case of the labor 
movement, Phillip Foner writes, “When [AFL President Samuel] Gompers warned the Democratic Party 
that unless it ‘produced’ for labor, a labor party would be organized, his words carried meaning only 
because of the existence of the pro-labor party forces within the AFL.  In short, these forces prodded both 
the AFL to adopt more aggressive political methods and the major political parties, particularly the 
Democratic Party, to enact some of the legislation labor sought.” Foner, History of the Labor Movement in 
the United States, Vol V: The AFL in the Progressive Era 1910-1915, 142.  As discussed in Chapter 4, the 
credible threat posed by the Socialist Party winning 6% of the popular vote in 1912 resulted in strong 
motivation by Wilson and the Democrats to enact Socialist-supported legislation before the next 
presidential election.  But Paul and the Woman’s Party had failed to deliver on their promise to “hold the 
party in power responsible” in either the 1914 or 1916 elections.  Rather than resulting in membership 
growth, their picketing campaign in 1917 resulted in a loss of more than 10,000 members representing 
more than 10% of their overall strength.  Many of the departing members joined NAWSA.  So, in some 
ways, Paul made Catt and NAWSA an easy ally for Wilson in the same way that Malcolm X made Martin 
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 NAWSA, unlike the President, could not ignore the pickets.  From the start, 
NAWSA leaders denounced the silent sentinels of the NWP – continuing the campaign 
Catt had started in 1916 to distinguish NAWSA from the CU.  Shaw wrote to a close 
friend of Wilson’s in March 1917 expressing her deep regret at the actions of the 
Woman’s Party and reiterating her continued support for Wilson.  After condemning the 
pickets, she added, “I fully agree with you that Mr. Wilson intended just what he said at 
our National Convention at Atlantic City and what is more he has lived up to his promise.  
He has done more for suffrage during the month of February than all of the Presidents 
who have even been in the White House.”337
 In response to the wave of publicity after the July arrests, Catt issued an “Open 
Letter to the Public” in which she stressed the complete separation of NAWSA from the 
NWP.  Pointing out that the NWP was a minority organization, she claimed that the 
National represented 98% of the organized suffragists in the United States and was 
officially on record as absolutely opposed to the picketing tactics.  Catt urged the press 
and public alike to disregard the tactics of the NWP and to grant women suffrage in spite 
of the distasteful actions of a small minority.
  Shaw’s friend passed along the letter to 
Wilson, emphasizing her belief that the majority of suffragists opposed the pickets. 
338
                                                                                                                                                 
Luther King, Jr. more palatable to many Americans, including President Lyndon Johnson.  But the NWP 
never came close to posing a legitimate threat to Wilson or the Democratic Party. Their effectiveness as a 
radical alternative pales in comparison to the other factors pushing Wilson toward Catt, NAWSA, and 
support of the federal amendment. 
  In describing NAWSA, she boasted, 
“With its membership of two millions [sic] of women representative of all the states, it is 
the essential agent to be reckoned with; that its work has always been constructive, law-
 
 337 Shaw to Warren (March 13, 1917), LWWP.  
 
 338 Catt, “An Open Letter to the Public” (July 13, 1917), NAWSA Records, Box 82, Reel 60.  As 
noted earlier in this chapter, the press responded positively to Catt’s request to make a clear distinction 
between NAWSA as the nation’s majority suffrage organization and the NWP as a militant minority group. 
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abiding and non-partisan.”339
 Interestingly, Catt had not always been so intolerant of militant tactics.  Just seven 
years earlier, when interviewed about an upcoming trip to America by Mrs. Emmeline 
Pankhurst, leader of the militant suffragists in England, Catt said: 
  Catt thus established the NWP as a dramatic foil for the 
National, urging the public to make a clear distinction between the two groups.   
I am not a militant, and believe in evolutionary rather than revolutionary 
methods for obtaining reforms.  Consequently, I do not indorse the policy 
of the militants, but, on the contrary, I have much admiration for Mrs. 
Pankhurst, whose sincerity of purpose and willingness to sacrifice herself 
no one who know her can question.  Further I freely acknowledge that the 
situation created by a vacillating, short-sighted government on the one 
hand and sharp, clever, militant women on the other has resulted in much 
useful agitation the world over . . . It is well known that I am non-militant.  
Nevertheless, I wish to go on record with the statement that I shall never 
publicly nor privately repudiate the militants.  I do not like nor approve of 
their form of campaign, nor do I share a common opinion that they have 
set the woman suffrage movement ahead tremendously, but when a wrong 
is to be righted and millions of people are aroused to action in behalf of 
the movement, it is pusillanimous and contemptible for those who work in 
one way to condemn those who work in another.”340
 
 
Apparently, tolerance and respectful disagreement was easier when it involved British 
militants rather than militant tactics on American soil.  In the heat of the suffrage battle in 
the United States in 1917, Catt did exactly what she said she said she would “never” do; 
at every opportunity, she publicly and privately repudiated the NWP pickets. 
 Catt especially made sure the President understood that she did not support the 
NWP campaign against him.  Prior to his decision to pardon the pickets after the July 
arrests, she had scheduled a conference with the President to discuss the negative impact 
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the pickets might have on upcoming legislative action.  After he granted the pardon, the 
NAWSA Executive Secretary wrote to Wilson’s chief of staff that Catt thought the 
meeting would be unnecessary and that it could wait “to a later date when the war 
measure and the Congress will bear less heavily upon him . . . His serene and tactful 
handling of the recent ‘picket crisis’ cleared the air for a time, at least, and makes the 
conference unnecessary, we hope until the close of this Congress.”341
 As the crucial New York state suffrage campaign neared its climax in the fall of 
1917, pro-suffrage forces across the state worked tirelessly to overcome the damage to 
their campaign caused by the NWP pickets.  The NAWSA affiliate in New York passed a 
resolution protesting against men who said they planned to vote against the amendment 
because of the picketing in Washington, D.C.  NAWSA representatives denounced the 
tactics of the NWP.  They asked the men of New York not to punish them for the acts of 
a few who were misled into militancy.
  While emphasizing 
that her organization disapproved of the pickets, Catt made sure to recognize the other 
issues facing the President.  This diplomatic and considerate approach, while abhorred by 
Paul and other NWP leaders, was effective in winning the support of the President and 
his staff. 
342  Governor Charles Whitman and Congressman 
Charles Smith, both pro-suffrage, also attacked the pickets for their questionable tactics 
and asked New Yorkers to vote in favor of suffrage despite the actions of the NWP.343
                                                 
 
  
New York suffragists had only to look north to Maine to see they had good reason to fear 
 341 Gardener to Brahany (July 26, 1917), LWWP.  
 
 342 “Suffragists Rebuke Washington Pickets,” New York Times, October 2, 1917.   
 
 343 “Suffragists Hear Mayor Denounce Picketing,” New York Tribune, August 30, 1917, 14.  
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that the NWP campaign had damaged their chances of winning the referendum. Maine 
voters defeated that state’s suffrage measure by a vote of almost two to one on September 
10, 1917.  Analysis in The Portland Press indicated that the “natural conservatism of 
Maine people” was the primary reason for the referendum’s failure.  The article went on 
to say, “Intensifying this natural conservatism of the people of Maine . . . was the action 
of the suffragists in Washington, which came into prominence almost simultaneously 
with the submission of the question to the voters of this state.  Maine people, as a whole, 
entirely disapproved of the action of the women agitators for suffrage in Washington.”344
 After the suffrage victory in New York, Catt and other members of the NAWSA 
Executive Council requested a meeting with Wilson to thank him for his assistance in 
New York and solicit his support for the federal amendment.  In the memo requesting the 
meeting, NAWSA executive secretary Helen Gardener informed the President that the 
NWP was planning a large demonstration against him on November 10 and that it would 
help squelch NWP publicity if Wilson met with NAWSA members prior to that.
 
345  This 
exchange is probably the most convincing piece of evidence to support the contention of 
traditionalist historians who have argued that the NWP’s antagonism of the President 
pushed him closer to NAWSA.  Gardener’s note perfectly illustrates Bissell Brown’s 
assessment: “The pressure of the pickets gave NAWSA . . . the leverage they needed to 
approach the president as problem solvers and mediators.”346
                                                 
 
  Wilson not only met with 
the group, but also came closer than ever to fully and publicly endorsing the federal 
 344 Excerpt from The Portland Press, quoted in “Maine Election – and Suffrage,” New York 
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amendment.  After the meeting, Catt explained to reporters that the President had 
promised to do everything within his power to help the cause.  While this somewhat 
ambiguous statement stopped short of endorsing the federal amendment, Catt chose to 
interpret it as evidence that Wilson would, in fact, lend his aid to that fight when the new 
session of Congress opened in January.347
 After Catt’s meeting with Wilson, his director of the Committee for Public 
Information, George Creel, sent him a memo stating that the NWP wanted to have an 
audience with him in order to urge the federal amendment.  Creel recommended that 
Wilson decline to meet with them, saying, “May I advise against such an audience and if 
you agree with me will you suggest form of refusal.  Mrs. Catt and Dr. Shaw speak for 
equal suffrage in the nation and the Congressional Union is without standing and 
deserves no recognition.”
   
348
 NWP leaders, though, also believed they had led a victorious campaign in 1917.  
Paul spent a period of time in a sanatorium in Baltimore during the summer of 1917 
recuperating from exhaustion.  Burns filled in as the acting chair of the NWP.  
Expressing her confidence in the NWP strategy to a supporter in Rhode Island in late 
July, Burns declared, “We have been passing through a very trying time, but I believe 
great good has been accomplished . . . We expect to go on picketing during the coming 
  Creel’s letter indicates that Catt’s campaign to distinguish 
NAWSA as the “organization to be reckoned with” fully succeeded with leading 
members of the administration. 
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week.  There is great indignation that so many arrests have been made which now 
apparently can be proved false.”349  Despite the public outcry against the pickets, Burns 
was convinced that a significant number of people were actually more indignant of the 
pickets’ arrests.  This false belief was shared by most NWP leaders.350
The big world is watching---and learning---and admiring, and pretty soon 
the job you’re helping at will be done.  Can you imagine how it will be 
when that amendment actually passes?  Sometimes, when I am too tired to 
think, I just take a long breath and try to dream of a whole nation 
politically free---and then there is nothing too hard to do to make the 
dream come true.  We had wonderful stories in the NY, Washington, 
Phila., and Boston papers this morning, and every batch of clippings that 
comes in is bigger and friendlier.
 Writing to her 
comrades who were in jail, NWP member Beulah Amidon encouraged: 
351
 
 
Amidon’s words were surely encouraging to her comrades in jail.  Undoubtedly, she 
believed every word she wrote.  But her perception that people were “admiring” the 
pickets and that the press coverage was friendly was simply wishful thinking.   
 Upon her return to the NWP ranks in late September, Paul, too, voiced her belief 
that the picket strategy was effective.  In an argument foreshadowing Graham’s article 
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strongly disagreed over who, exactly, should picket.  Paul was willing to use women from all over the 
country, regardless of whether or not they came from states that had already granted them the right to vote.  
Blatch vehemently argued that only disenfranchised women should picket.  Women from western states 
who had the vote should continue to pursue direct political action by pressuring their elected 
representatives to support the federal amendment.  Unable to resolve this difference, Blatch sent Paul her 
resignation from the Executive Board on February 15, 1917.  See Blatch to Paul (January 24, 1917) and 
Blatch to Paul (February 15, 1917), NWPP, Reel 2.  Once the United States entered the war, Blatch not 
only moved away from Paul and the NWP, but also moved away from suffrage in general and concentrated 
her efforts on broader reform issues.  According to Blatch biographer Ellen DuBois, “By the time the 
Nineteenth Amendment was passed by Congress and ratified by the thirty-sixth state, Harriot Stanton 
Blatch was already living and working in a postsuffrage world. DuBois, Harriot Stanton Blatch and the 
Winning of Woman Suffrage, 183. 
 
 351 Amidon to Picket Prisoners (August 23, 1917), NWPP, Reel 2.  
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more than sixty years later, Paul wrote, “The vigor with which the administration is 
seeking to crush the picketing indicates, it seems to me, the effectiveness of this form of 
agitation.”352
 Enough of the leaders, though.  What did the rank and file of the Woman’s Party 
(small though they were) across the country think of their organization’s new direction in 
1917?  Some were supportive when the picketing first started and before the war began.  
A woman in Philadelphia wrote in February, “Don’t let people persuade you to withdraw 
the ‘pickets’ from the White House.  They are something far more than a spectacle.  If 
war should be declared and our country should need our energies . . . it will be time 
enough then to call in the pickets.”
  Again, Paul’s method of measuring success seems skewed.  As with her 
campaign against the pro-suffrage Senator Thomas of Colorado in 1914, she was 
convinced that garnering the hatred of those whose assistance she sought was good for 
the cause.  The responsiveness of the White House and Congress to NAWSA, who 
employed the exact opposite approach, demonstrates just how wrong Paul’s philosophy 
was. 
353
                                                 
 
  Two sisters in New York who pledged $500 to the 
NWP in July because they were so inspired by the brave pickets expressed a similar 
sentiment.  When they actually sent their check in August, they qualified their support,  
“We do not feel that the banners which display protest such as Kaiser Wilson are at all 
worthy of the cause and we fear may discredit it even among those most sympathetic.  
 352 Paul to Miss Mary B. Dixon (September 26, 1917), NWPP, Reel 2.  
  
 353 Mary V. to Paul (February 8, 1917), NWPP, Reel 2. 
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We hope that our contribution will not be used for this part of the work but rather for the 
educational propaganda.”354
 Perhaps the oddest letter of support came from Mary E. McCumber, the head of 
the North Dakota NAWSA affiliate.  McCumber, apparently a closet militant, wrote to 
Paul to tell her how much she admired her willingness to “fight right on the firing line.”  
She added that there were “thousands of women scattered over the country who are 
watching your achievements with pride and gratitude.
 
355
 The bulk of the mail from NWP members, though, was strongly opposed to the 
picketing campaign.
  We can probably assume with 
relative confidence that Paul derived more than a little satisfaction in receiving a letter of 
support written on NAWSA stationary. 
356  Two letters in January came from members canceling their 
pledges because they thought the picketing was both unwise and ridiculous.357
                                                 
 
  Many of 
those who had not been opposed in January and February became so when the U.S. 
entered the war in April.  Many more were later driven completely away from the NWP 
 354 Irene and Alice Lewishon to NWP (July 20, 1917) and Irene Lewishon to Paul (August18, 
1917), NWPP, Reel 2.   
  
 355 McCumber to Paul (June 25, 1917), NWPP, Reel 2.   
 
 356 This statement is based on the existing letters in the NWP papers.  Letters of opposition to the 
picket strategy outnumber letters of support by a margin of nearly three to one.  The question remains as to 
whether those who supported the strategy were as motivated to write to the NWP leadership and voice their 
opinions as those who opposed the strategy.  The majority of all correspondence from rank and file 
members of the NWP back to the headquarters dealt with donations.  Respondents were usually answering 
a call to send in money that they had previously pledged or that members of the NWP Executive Council 
had solicited.  Given that as the basis of the correspondence, it seems that supporters and opponents of the 
picketing strategy would have had the same motivation to write to the NWP headquarters.  If the 
motivation to write was, indeed, equal, than the raw ratio of 3:1 accurately portrays strong opposition to the 
picketing strategy within the NWP. 
 
 357 Mary P. Smith to CU (January 11, 1917) and Perle Shale Kingsbury to Maud Younger (January 
25, 1917), NWPP, Reel 2.  
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by its actions with regard to the Russian delegation in June.358
 In a note that struck right at the heart of Paul’s belief that there was no such thing 
as bad publicity, a woman in New Jersey reflected: 
  The tenor of the letters 
Paul received grew much graver after the incident with the Russian delegation. 
Because I believe in the federal amendment and because I believe the war 
should not stop the fight for suffrage, I belong to the Woman’s Party; and 
because I have had confidence in the women in Washington I have said 
many times to myself that they know best and the rest of us must stand 
behind them.  But today’s paper shakes my confidence, so untrue and 
misleading does that [Russian] banner seem to be.  Publicity is certainly 
gained, but at a great cost.359
 
 
This letter conveys the torn feelings of many NWP members who wanted to continue to 
work for the federal amendment but were uncomfortable with the militant course Paul 
charted for their organization.   
 When Paul sent out a mass mailing requesting funds in late June, many of the 
recipients took the opportunity in their replies to voice their displeasure with the 
picketing (and to decline to send any money).  The Chair of NAWSA’s Massachusetts 
state association wrote that she was convinced that the work of the NWP was delaying 
                                                 
  
 358 Based on their analysis of internal NWP membership records, Adams and Keene estimate that 
the unpopularity of the picketing strategy resulted in the loss of as many as 10,000 members from the total 
of 60,000 or 70,000 that existed at the start of 1917.Adams and Keene, Alice Paul and the American 
Suffrage Campaign, 172.  Some historians have argued that the militance of the NWP galvanized young 
recruits to the cause.  Adams and Keene, for example, note that, “By 1917, 87 percent of the organizers 
sent out to work in the states and encourage women to come into Washington for the picketing were 
between nineteen and twenty-nine, a significant decrease in age from earlier years.” Quote from p. 173.  
For similar data, see Ford, Iron-Jawed Angels: The Suffrage Militancy of the National Woman's Party, 
1912-1920, 102. Nancy Cott acknowledges this demographic shift, but argues that age was a less important 
aspect of NWP membership than was adherence to the “broader agenda of Feminism.”  Cott defines 
Feminism as opposition to sex hierarchy, the belief that women’s condition is socially constructed, and 
self-perception of women not only as a biological sex but also as a social grouping. Cott, The Grounding of 
Modern Feminism, 4-5.  Cott thus concludes that “The temperamental radicalism of the CU was probably 
as important as chronological age in the way it was seen by both outsiders and insiders as the party of 
youth.”  Quote from p. 57. 
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rather than helping the federal amendment.  In her state, she reported, the tactics of 
picketing and heckling the President repelled both men and women.360  Similarly, a 
woman in Illinois who confessed that she subscribed to the NWP newspaper, The 
Suffragist, refused to send money saying, “I do not believe that Mr. Wilson is our greatest 
enemy, though I have been impatient at his attitude, nor do I think that we gain by 
holding a party as a party responsible.”361
 From the far side of the country came a major blow to the NWP leadership in 
early July.  Elizabeth Kent, a member of the NWP Executive Committee, and an 
extremely active campaigner in California, tendered her resignation from the Executive 
Committee on July 9.  She telegrammed Paul, “Have greatest respect for your judgment 
but feel that present methods are not my methods and therefore I cannot honestly remain 
on board.”
 
362  Kent had been supportive of the initial picketing strategy, but the Russian 
banner had been too much for her to handle.  Many less prominent members of the 
organization echoed her sentiments.363
 During the fall of 1917, a number of letters from women not located in the urban-
industrial center of New York or the political hub in Washington, D.C. warned that the 
NWP was losing the publicity war in most other parts of the country.  An NWP member 
in Mississippi reported, “I do ‘my bit’ in your defense whenever I can get in a word.  
Through much garbled and prejudiced news reports the sentiment, and emphatically 
   
                                                 
  
 360 Grace Johnson to Paul (July 2, 1917), NWPP, Reel 2.  
 
 361 Colby to Paul (July 8, 1917), NWPP, Reel 2.  
 
 362 Kent to Paul (July 9, 1917), NWPP, Reel 2. Kent did not resign from the NWP altogether.  She 
remained an active and important member throughout the campaign. 
 
 363 For example, see Celia Raymond to Burns (August 16, 1917), NWPP, Reel 2.  
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among suffrage enthusiasts, is violently against you.”364  A Tennessee woman 
complained that the papers in her area refused to print the NWP publicity bulletins and 
instead published articles critical of the pickets.  The Woman’s Party, she lamented, was 
losing almost all of its members in Tennessee.  From Georgia came a report that the 
Atlanta Constitution refused to publish anything about the pickets as an interview or as an 
article of news.365
 Publicity was stymied in other ways, too.  A representative of the American Bar 
Association, upon receiving circulars and tickets concerning a mass meeting by the NWP 
to describe their prison experiences, wrote back to the NWP Headquarters that he had 
received the materials too late to announce it at the meeting of the Bar Association, but 
would not have announced it even if he had received them earlier.  He explained, “I am 
thoroughly in favor of Woman’s Suffrage but have no toleration whatever for the conduct 
of the Pickets which has disgraced this city for some months past.”
 
366
 Beulah Amidon’s inspiring letter to her comrades in jail failed to take these types 
of sentiments into account.  The women who braved freezing cold weather in the winter 
and steaming temperatures in the summer, angry crowds and indifferent police, dirty 
prison cells and forced feedings, exhibited tremendous courage and dedication to their 
cause.  The violations of their civil liberties is a black mark on the history of the United 
States, and especially on all those who supported the cause of suffrage but stood by as the 
pickets were arrested for exercising their right to free speech.  Regrettably, Catt and other 
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 365 Memo to Paul from the Tennessee Branch of the CU (September 3, 1917) and Memo to 
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NAWSA officials actually facilitated the attack on the pickets’ civil liberties by their 
constant denunciations of NWP tactics.367
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the primary reason for Wilson’s reelection 
was the support he received from people who believed he had kept the nation out of the 
war in Europe.  His bold plan for a mediated peace had appealed to Americans deeply 
divided over the cause of the war and fearful of ending America’s neutrality.  In the 
month after his narrow election victory, he constructed a plan for a peace conference.  As 
a first step toward the realization of that vision, he sent a memo to both the Allies and the 
Central Powers asking for a clear statement of their war aims.  Their responses in early 
January demonstrated just how difficult a mediated peace would be, for their visions of a 
just post-war settlement were vastly different.  Nonetheless, Wilson felt comfortable in 
giving his “peace without victory” speech to Congress on January 22, 1917.
  Neither the bravery of the pickets nor the 
injustices they suffered, though, changes the fact that their actions were harmful to the 
greater suffrage cause.  Specifically aimed at the President, their actions only made the 
positive work he did for the suffrage cause in 1917 even more difficult at a time when his 
difficulties were legion. 
368
                                                 
 
  
Unbeknownst to him at that time, the German leadership had already decided to resume 
their unrestricted submarine warfare in an attempt to speed the end of the war.  This 
action was a direct violation of the Sussex Pledge the Germans had given Wilson in May 
 367 NAWSA leaders almost never protested the attacks against or the arrests and imprisonment of 
NWP members.   Alice Stone Blackwell, president of the NAWSA-affiliated Massachusetts state suffrage 
organization, serves as an exception to this rule.  Following the incident surrounding the “Russian banner,” 
Blackwell told reporters, “I think it was foolish to display the banner appealing to the Russian mission, but 
at the same time the action of the women was lawful and those who attacked their banner and tore it to 
pieces were acting in an illegal and disgraceful manner.  The way the women were treated was shameful.” 
“Crowd Tears Down Banners,” Christian Science Monitor, June 21, 1917, 6.   
 
 368 Cooper, Woodrow Wilson: A Biography, 362-370.  
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1916.  In that accord, the German government had agreed to refrain from attacking 
merchant vessels and liners without warning.  The German ambassador informed the 
President of the submarine warfare plan on January 31, and Wilson – true to the promise 
he had made at the time of the Sussex Pledge – broke off diplomatic relations with 
Germany on February 3.369
 Wilson’s cabinet urged him to request an armed shipping bill from Congress so 
that U.S. merchant ships could defend themselves against attack.  Wilson was reluctant to 
do so until he learned of the German plan to bring Mexico into a war against the U.S.  
After the famous “Zimmerman Telegram” containing the German message to the 
Mexican leadership came to light for Wilson on February 24, he asked Congress to arm 
merchantmen on the following day.  Illustrating the limits to executive influence, the bill 
passed the House but failed in the Senate where staunch neutralists debated it so long that 
the Congress expired on March 4 without a vote.
 
370
 On March 12, a German submarine sank an unarmed American merchant ship – 
the first time Germany violated the Sussex Pledge in deed, rather than word.  That same 
day saw the start of the Russian Revolution, widely welcomed in America which had 
been troubled by the presence of the authoritarian Tsarist regime’s presence among the 
Allied Powers.  Wilson recognized the new Russian government on March 22.
 
371
The President called an emergency session of the new Congress in early April.  
He gave his war message to a joint session and uttered the famous phrase, “The world 
  
                                                 
 
 369 Ibid., 373-376.  
 
 370 Clements, The Presidency of Woodrow Wilson, 138.  
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must be made safe for democracy.”  Angered by the Zimmerman Telegram and the 
sinking of U.S. merchant ships, the Senate adopted a statement of war against Germany 
on April 4 by a vote of 82-6 and the House adopted it two days later by a vote of 373-50.  
Congress also adopted a joint resolution to restrict their debate during that session of 
Congress to “war measures” - issues that directly affected America’s ability to prosecute 
the war.372
 American troops began arriving in Paris in June.  Much of Wilson’s time over the 
summer was spent negotiating the terms of American Army units’ participation in the 
war with the Allies.  Wilson and his commander, General John J. Pershing, felt strongly 
that American troops should fight as a united unit and not be used as individual fillers for 
gaps in the Allied armies.  Wilson and Pershing’s views prevailed, but the negotiations 
with the allies were tense and time-consuming.
 
373
 The second Russian Revolution in November ended Russia’s involvement in the 
war and made its eventual outcome very unpredictable.  In January 1918, Wilson 
delivered his famous “Fourteen Points” speech to Congress.  The exuberance with which 
it was initially received was quickly overshadowed when the Germans initiated a major 
offensive in the spring of 1918 that was marginally successful.  They were on the move 
again in the Marne offensive of July only to be badly defeated, mostly by the fresh U.S. 
troops.
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  The Allies began a counterattack in July that succeeded in pushing Germany 
back toward her borders over the course of the next few months.  The Central Powers 
 372 Cooper, Woodrow Wilson: A Biography, 388-389.  
 
 373 Clements, The Presidency of Woodrow Wilson, 150. , John Keegan, The First World War (New 
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began to crumble in October and, finally, the Germans capitulated and signed the 
armistice on November 11, 1918. 
 It was against this backdrop of world-changing events that Catt developed and 
executed the “Winning Plan” she had outlined in Atlantic City in September 1916.  
Recognizing early on that Congress would be distracted by the war, she made state 
campaigns the main arena for NAWSA activity in 1917.  As Morgan argues, Catt was 
content to fight a holding action in Congress while increasing the eventual number of 
supportive Congressmen by creating more suffrage states.  She also recognized that 
participation in the war effort could be used to demonstrate the full capacity of women 
and further justify their demands for equal suffrage.375
 For the majority of her public life, Catt worked simultaneously towards 
broadening women’s rights and achieving world peace.  Before the First World War, she 
was active in the Woman’s Peace Party.  After the war and the passage of the federal 
suffrage amendment, she founded the Committee on the Cause and Cure of War, an 
organization to which she devoted herself until the end of her life in 1947.  Her decision, 
then, to support American involvement in World War I may at first seem contradictory.  
Certainly many of her comrades from the peace movement believed it was and harshly 
criticized her decision.
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 375 Morgan, Suffragists and Democrats: The Politics of Woman Suffrage in America, 118.  
 
 376  Catt’s successful campaign to convince NAWSA to support the war was extremely 
controversial and led to the defection of several prominent members.  NAWSA’s National Publicity 
Director, Elinor Byrns, resigned in the middle of a speaking tour when she heard that the National’s 
officers had voted to support the war. She continued to work for suffrage by joining the NWP which had 
voted to take no stand on the war.   See Cott, The Grounding of Modern Feminism, 61.  Similarly, 
NAWSA’s state leader in Wisconsin, Meta Berger, defected to the NWP over the issue of war support.  See 
S. Rowbotham, A Century of Women: The History of Women in Britain and the United States (New York: 
Viking, 1997), 99. After the United States entered the war, the Woman’s Peace Party split into three 
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 What those comrades-turned-critics failed to grasp was Catt’s political 
pragmatism.  She articulated time and again in letters, articles, and speeches her 
conscientious objection to war of any sort but also her realization that American 
intervention in the war in Europe was inevitable after February 1917.  Given that 
inevitability, Catt calculated that NAWSA stood a much greater chance of achieving its 
objectives if they threw themselves solidly into home front war service while 
simultaneously working to secure the federal suffrage amendment.  NAWSA’s war 
service would aid in the public relations campaign to convince voters that women as 
citizens fulfilled their obligations just like men and deserved the vote.  It would also 
deflect the potential criticism of anti-suffragists who would surely criticize NAWSA as 
“unpatriotic” for working towards suffrage while the war was being fought overseas.377 
When war became inevitable, Catt the pragmatist felt that her decision to support the war 
was also inevitable.378
 February was indeed the crucial month in terms of decisions about the war.  On 
February 3, 1917, Secretary of State Robert Lansing informed Congress that the United 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
factions: one that decided to support the war and devote themselves to war service, one, led by Crystal 
Eastman, which resolved to continue agitating for an early peace, and one, led by Jane Addams, which 
sought to promote a durable peace settlement while working for civilian relief at home during the war.  See 
O'Neill, Everyone was Brave: A History of Feminism in America, 183-184. 
 
 377 Van Voris, Carrie Chapman Catt: A Public Life, 137-138.  The manner in which the anti-
suffragists influenced the strategic decisions of the suffragists is considered in-depth in the next chapter. 
 
 378 The historical record contains several clues to Catt’s decision early on to privilege suffrage 
over her involvement with the peace movement.  For example, when Jane Addams was working to call 
nationwide mass peace demonstrations in December 1914, Catt offered her services only so far as her 
participation did not reflect poorly on the suffrage campaign. She amplified, “I think it most advisable that 
the suffragists should not be the prime mover in this step.  When I say that I will undertake [organizing the 
demonstration] in New York, I do not mean that I will head the movement, but that I will get the right 
people to do it and will give my assistance to it.” Catt to Addams (December 4, 1914), CLOC, Box 4, Reel 
3. Always conscious of the public’s perception of suffragists, Catt maintained her distance from potentially 
damaging relationships with other movements.  She continued to be casually involved in the Woman’s 
Peace Party until March 1917 when the organization officially rebuked her for NAWSA’s statement of 
support for the war. See “Peace Party Ousts Mrs. Carrie Catt,” New York Times, March 7, 1917.  
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States had broken off diplomatic relations with Germany.  On that same day, one of 
Catt’s closest co-workers at NAWSA, Clara Hyde, wrote to Mary Peck about Catt’s latest 
activities.  She informed Peck, “The second item you should know about is that C.C.C. 
dines with President and Mrs. Wilson on Monday night as the guest of Secy. Of War 
Daniels and his wife!!  The old goat is warming up.  I’d give a king’s ransom to watch 
Carrie turn her lamps on him.”379 Wilson’s appointment book confirms that he and his 
wife dined with Daniels and Catt on February 5, 1917.380  No record exists of what was 
discussed during their dinner.  However, the events of the preceding and following days 
strongly suggest that the impending war was a topic of conversation, along with whether 
or not NAWSA intended to support the President should he officially decide to send 
troops to Europe.  Wilson had held a meeting just four days earlier with the executive 
officers of the Woman’s Peace League who voiced their continued disapproval of 
increasing U.S. militancy.381
 It seems more than likely that the President inquired if Catt and NAWSA held the 
same views as the Woman’s Peace League.  Whether or not he asked that question 
remains a mystery, but the following day Catt issued a call to the Executive Council of 
NAWSA to meet later that month and adopt their official position on the war.  It would 
seem that Catt felt the question of NAWSA’s position had been raised – if not explicitly 
by the President then at least by the circumstances of the day. 
 
                                                 
 379 Hyde to Peck (February 3, 1917), NAWSA Records, Box 24, Reel 16.  Hyde incorrectly 
identified Daniels as the Secretary of War.  He was actually the Secretary of the Navy.  
  
 380 Appointment Books (February 5, 1917), PWW, Box 3, Reel 3.  
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 In her call to the Executive Council, Catt began by stating, “Our nation is on the 
brink of war.”  She went on to explain that the decision the organization needed to make 
was whether “suffragists [should] do the ‘war work’ which they will undoubtedly want to 
do with other groups newly formed, thus running the risk of disintegrating our 
organizations or shall we use our headquarters and our machinery for really helpful 
constructive aid to our nation.  The answer to these questions must be given now.”382
 At the meeting of the Executive Council on February 23-25, the members passed 
a resolution by a vote of 63-13 pledging their support and service in the event of war.  
Although invited, Wilson was unable to attend the final session in which the resolution 
was presented to Secretary of War Newton Baker.  He did send a letter to the NAWSA 
headquarters expressing his “very great and sincere admiration of the action taken.”
 
Even before war had been declared, Catt seemed to see the political benefits of making 
NAWSA’s stand apparent to the public and key politicians alike. 
383
 A statement of support in the case of war from the nation’s largest suffrage 
organization provided an embattled Wilson with a much-needed ally.  Antiwar sentiment 
  
Wilson expressed his appreciation and admiration in more concrete terms over the next 
two years as he became not only a supporter but also an advocate for the federal suffrage 
amendment.  In her urgent call for NAWSA to define its position on the war, Catt 
rigorously answered any question the President might have had about looking for support 
to its two million members.  In return, he seems to have answered Catt’s question about 
his support for national woman’s suffrage. 
                                                 
 
 382 Catt to Executive Council (February 6, 1917), NAWSA Records, Box 82, Reel 60.  
 
 383 Wilson to NAWSA (February 28, 1917), NAWSA Records, Box 32, Reel 21.  
175 
 
ran high in the early months of 1917.  Between February and April, peace federations 
from across the country flooded Congress with petitions opposing the war.  Wilson 
received thousands of telegrams reminding him that he had been elected on the basis of 
keeping America out of war.384 Membership in the antiwar Socialist Party actually started 
to rise in early 1917 as many Americans viewed the war as a conflict backed by 
American corporate interests.  Opposition was especially widespread in farm 
communities and urban working-class neighborhoods.385
 The NWP, too, realized that it must take some position on the war.  Paul sent a 
letter out to all her state chairmen on February 8th in which she called for a national 
convention in March to consider the organization’s war policy.  In the letter, she stressed 
that the organization was dedicated only to the enfranchisement of women and that, until 
changed by an action of the convention, that would continue to be the NWP policy.
  Although public opinion would 
shift dramatically once US troops headed into the fight in Europe, that transition was far 
from being a foregone conclusion in February.  Facing strong opposition for reversing his 
peace stance, Wilson was sincere when he thanked Catt for NAWSA’s early vote of 
confidence in him. 
386
                                                 
 
  
The March convention voted to sustain the current policy of focusing only on suffrage 
and remaining neutral on the issue of the war.  What Paul did not anticipate, or ever 
realize, was that a majority of Americans saw “taking no stand on the war” as a very 
active stand.  They viewed the NWP as unpatriotic and harmful to the nation.  This, much 
 384 Peterson and Fite, Opponents of War, 1917-1918, 3.  
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more so than opposition to suffrage, was the source of the anger that propelled crowds to 
attack the White House pickets.387
 Paul maintained her belief that NAWSA had forgone suffrage work to participate 
in war service throughout the remainder of her life.  In an interview given just a few years 
before she died in 1977, Paul related the same thing to her interviewer that she expressed 
to members of the NWP in 1917: it was up to the NWP to singularly focus on suffrage 
because the National was “working only for war.”
 
388
 Paul’s charge that NAWSA abandoned suffrage work is totally unfounded.  An 
April 1917 article in the New York Times, running under the headline, “Suffragists’ 
Machine Perfected in All States under Mrs. Catt’s Rule,” gave testimony to NAWSA’s 
two-pronged strategy.  The article referenced NAWSA’s recent commitment to war 
service, but went on to describe the organization’s vast political lobbying, publicity 
activity, and state campaigning.  Specifically, it pointed out that the National’s news 
service sent press releases to 6,000 newspapers throughout the country and that members 
in all the states collected stories of local work and fed them back to the National which 
then redistributed them to Washington and New York papers.
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  Of greater significance, 
NAWSA successfully orchestrated suffrage referendum victories in nine states while the 
387 Evidence for this comes from the fact that the NWP pickets were generally ignored by the 
public until after US entry into the war.  Even then, it was  not until the pickets raised the “Kaiser Wilson” 
banner in June 1917 that sidewalk observers violently attacked the pickets.  As a further link to the war, 
newspaper coverage of the attacks on the pickets indicates that the mob leaders were often soldiers or 
sailors. According to an Associated Press story that ran in several major newspapers, the crowd shouted, 
“traitors,” “treason” and “they are the enemies of their country,” when the pickets displayed the “Kaiser 
Wilson” banner.  See “Peaceful Pickets Cause Big Row,” Los Angeles Times, June 21, 1917, 11. 
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war raged in 1917-1918, further testimony to the organization’s ability to simultaneously 
perform war service and conduct suffrage work.  
 Catt was quick to exploit the political capital earned by suffragists’ war service.  
An excerpt from one of the NAWSA press releases to the New York Times demonstrates 
the manner in which she wedded the issues of suffrage and war service: 
In the United States, suffrage associations have illustrated this alertness of 
women.  Suffragists were already stimulating the production and 
conservation of food before any definite governmental action was worked 
out.  And through their suffrage associations they were passing on the 
word to other women.  What Connecticut found out was told in Alabama.  
Nebraska’s thrift aroused emulation in New York.  Women in Plattsburgh, 
New York, and San Antonio, Texas, were of one mind about being “camp 
mothers” to soldiers . . . There has been no sectionalism, there can be none 
among women, alike disfranchised, and alike, seeking for the ballot for the 
common end of protecting that which is dearest to their hearts.  No other 
group of people came so readily into line for national service, for no other 
group seeking enfranchisement has ever sifted through every class and 
station of life.  Ready-to-serve suffragists have put the handles of the tools 
of their colossal organization into the government’s hands.390
 
  
This article underscores several important points that Catt thought critical in the public 
relations campaign.  It mentions the nationwide spread of NAWSA’s efforts, the unity of 
their effort that transcended sectional boundaries, and their willingness to heed the 
nation’s call for aid while still fighting for equal suffrage. 
 Wilson did not fail to hold up his end of the bargain, either.  Although he did not 
advocate for the federal amendment until the year was complete (neither did NAWSA 
push him to do so), he made significant contributions to the cause, as will be shown, 
through his support of state referenda and the creation of a separate suffrage committee in 
the House of Representatives.  Partially as a result of the President’s aid, eight more 
                                                 
 
 390 Catt, “Ready for Citizenship” (August 24, 1917), NAWSA Records, Box 82, Reel 59. 
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states granted women full or partial suffrage in 1917.391
 Catt repeatedly called on the President for support in state suffrage battles in early 
1917.  In January, she wrote to the President’s secretary, Tumulty, alerting him that 
Oklahoma’s legislature was about to vote in favor of a suffrage bill.  She requested that 
Wilson write her a letter that included a statement that he hoped the voters in the state 
would approve the amendment.
  With the support of 
Representatives from these states, suffragists secured the necessary two-thirds vote in 
favor of the federal amendment in the House on January 10, 1918.  Wilson’s actions in 
1917 contributed no small amount to that victory. 
392  On the same day, she sent another letter to Tumulty 
explaining that a somewhat different bill was pending in North Dakota.  Implying that 
she and the President were in accord on the issue, she requested, “A letter of 
congratulations from the President and an expression of approval of this form of 
legislation, together with an expression of his continued interest in the suffrage 
movement and hope for its ultimate establishment would be of great assistance to the 
cause in general and serve the purpose of which we spoke.”393
                                                 
 391 The eight new suffrage states included North Dakota, Ohio, Indiana, Rhode Island, Nebraska, 
Michigan, Arkansas, and New York.  The legislatures in North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Indiana, and 
Michigan granted presidential suffrage.  Arkansas granted women the right to vote in primary elections.  
Only New York granted full suffrage.  Still, in 1917 alone, the number of presidential electors for whom 
women were entitled to vote increased from 91 to 232. Van Voris, Carrie Chapman Catt: A Public Life, 
147. , Flexner and Fitzpatrick, Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United States, 
282.  For detailed accounts of the suffrage campaigns in each of these states, see Ida A. Husted Harper, ed. 
History of Woman Suffrage, Vol. 6: 1900-1920, (New York: Arno and the New York Times, 1969).  Ohio, 
Michigan, and Indiana all experienced setbacks in late 1917.  Antisuffragists challenged the state 
legislation in the court system and succeeded in forcing additional referendums.  Despite legal challenges, 
the suffragists continued to count these states in the suffrage column, as did most of the nation’s 
newspapers who used NAWSA’s “suffrage map” in depicting the status of woman suffrage around the 
country. 
  
 
 392 Catt to Tumulty (January 17, 1917), PWW, Box 89, Reel 209.  
 
 393 Ibid.  
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 Wilson responded quickly, conforming to Catt’s specific wording requests in both 
cases.  In his letter of congratulations regarding the successful North Dakota vote, he 
wrote, “As you know, I have a very real interest in the extension of the suffrage to 
women and I feel that every step in this direction should be applauded.”394
 Wilson also lent his support to the ultimately unsuccessful campaigns in 
Maryland and Maine, but in the most important state battle, New York, Wilson was 
particularly active. Like Catt, he weaved the issues of democracy, war service, and 
suffrage into his statements and letters.  To a letter from the head of the New York 
Woman Suffrage Party, Vira Whitehouse, asking for a declaration of his support, he 
responded, “I hope that the voters of the State of New York will rally to the support of 
woman suffrage by a handsome majority.  It would be a splendid vindication of the 
principle of the cause in which we all believe.”
  Catt’s use of 
the phrase “of which we spoke” and Wilson’s phrasing “as you know” testifies to the 
level of high agreement and cooperation between the two. 
395  When Whitehouse wrote back to thank 
Wilson for his supportive words, she informed him that New York suffragists were 
suffering, “from the very general disapproval of the course of the pickets, over whom, of 
course, we have no control and whose methods we deeply deplore.  Your message should 
help as much as anything to show the voters of New York State the fair attitude to 
take.”396
                                                 
 
 
 394 Wilson to Catt (January 25, 1917), CLOC, Reel 7.  
 
 395 Wilson to Vira Boarman Whitehouse (August 27, 1917), LWWP.  For Wilson’s letters to 
Maryland and Maine, see Wilson to Tumulty (April 24, 1917), Life and Letters, Vol. 7 and Wilson to 
Deborah Knox Livingston (September 4, 1917), LWWP. 
 
 396 Whitehouse to Wilson (August, 28, 1917), LWWP. 
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 Taking into account the obstacle of the pickets, Wilson wrote to Catt in October 
again expressing his support for the campaign in New York.  He included a statement, 
“May I not say that I hope that no voter will be influenced in his decision with regard to 
this great matter by anything the so-called pickets may have done . . . Their action 
represents, I am sure, so small a fraction of the women . . . that it would be most unfair 
and argue a narrow view to allow their actions to prejudice the cause itself.”397
 Just a few weeks before the vote in New York, Wilson met with Whitehouse and 
a delegation of 110 members of the New York State Woman Suffrage Party.  His 
statement to them represents the climax of his connecting the war, women’s service to the 
country, and the right to full citizenship.  So sweeping were his words that some even 
saw it as his first public endorsement of the federal amendment.
  Catt was 
quick to give the President’s letter a wide circulation in the New York newspapers. 
398  His statement, printed 
in the New York Times on October 26, read, in part, “I am free to say that I think the 
question of woman suffrage is one of those questions which lie at the foundation [of the 
struggle for democracy].”  He added, “I believe that, just because we are quickened by 
the questions of this war, we ought to be quickened to give this question of woman 
suffrage our immediate consideration . . . I think the whole country has appreciated the 
way in which the women have risen to this great occasion [of the war].”399
                                                 
 397 Wilson to Catt (October 13, 1917), CLOC, Box 9, Reel 7. 
  The suffrage 
amendment passed in New York two weeks later by a margin of 94,000 votes.  The New 
York victory alone added 43 more representatives in Congress from suffrage states. 
   
 398 Blatch and Lutz, Challenging Years: The Memoirs of Harriot Stanton Blatch, 282. 
 
 399 Wilson’s Statement to New York State Woman Suffrage Party delegation (October 25, 1917), 
LWWP. 
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 Wilson was also instrumental in breaking up a major administrative obstacle for 
the suffragists.  For years, suffragists had been forced to plead their case for a federal 
amendment with the House Judiciary Committee because the House leadership had 
refused to establish a separate committee on woman suffrage.  The Senate had established 
a separate committee in 1878, and suffragists were convinced that their interests had been 
treated more fairly and with greater attention in the Senate than in the House.400  In May, 
NAWSA executive secretary Helen Gardener wrote to Wilson and asked him to intervene 
on NAWSA’s behalf with Representative Edward Pou, a Democrat from North Carolina, 
who, as chairman of the Rules Committee, held the necessary influence to create a 
separate suffrage committee.  Pointing out that this was the only request NAWSA had 
made during the “war session” of Congress, she implored the President to come to her 
aid.  Gardener, too, made use of women’s war service by adding, “With this added bit of 
legislative machinery working in our interests, as occasion permits, we can all the more 
freely and happily give of our services in other directions to our country.”401
 In a polite and carefully worded letter, Wilson complied with Gardener’s request 
and endorsed the idea of a separate committee to Pou.  The Congressman responded that 
he would heed the President’s advice and hold a vote on the matter with the Rules 
 
                                                 
 400 In 1913, disgusted with the unresponsiveness of the House Judiciary Committee, NAWSA (at 
Wilson’s suggestion), had petitioned the rules committee of the House for a separate woman Suffrage 
Committee.  Hearings were held and the Rules Committee ultimately split 4-4 on whether to make a 
favorable recommendation on their report.  Democrats were preparing to caucus over the matter when 
House Majority Leader Representative Oscar Underwood (D-AL) – a staunch anti-suffragist - called 
Democrats into an informal meeting and convinced the majority that suffrage was a state issue.  Therefore, 
he reasoned, a separate committee at that national level was unnecessary.  The issue died until Wilson’s 
intervention with Pou in May 1917.  Alana S. Jeydel, Political Women: The Women's Movement, Political 
Institutions, the Battle for Women's Suffrage and the ERA (New York: Routledge, 2004), 116-117. 
 
 401 Gardener to Wilson (May 10, 1917), LWWP.  
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Committee.  The committee ruled favorably on the resolution on June 6.402  Still, the 
creation of a new committee had to be approved by vote of the full House.  Gardener 
again called on the President to use his influence.  She asked that he try to persuade 
Representative James Heflin or Carter Glass, both Democrats, to vote in favor of the 
measure.403  Wilson again complied and was successful.  He wrote to Heflin, urging him 
to support the new committee.  The representative from Alabama wrote back that he 
personally favored a states’ rights approach to suffrage, but, “after reading your letter 
several times and thinking over the situation, I have concluded to follow your suggestion 
and not oppose the creation of a committee in the House on Woman Suffrage.”404
Wilson’s contributing role in this matter was of no small significance.  With a 
separate committee in place, the federal amendment moved smoothly through the 
committee process in late 1917, resulting in its favorable report and eventual successful 
vote in the House in January 1918.  The newly created committee’s report in January was 
the first time a favorable report on suffrage was issued by a House committee since the 
51st Congress met from 1889-1891.
  The 
House finally voted and approved the new committee by a close vote on September 24.   
405
                                                 
 
  While not nearly as exciting or dramatic as arrests 
and hunger strikes, NAWSA quietly scored a major victory in its long-fought struggle to 
 402 Wilson to Pou (May 14, 1917), Life and Letters.  For Pou’s response, see Pou to Wilson (May 
17, 1917), LWWP. 
  
 403 Gardener to Wilson (June 10, 1917), LWWP. 
  
 404 Heflin to Wilson (June 28, 1917), LWWP. 
  
405 Ibid., 120. Jeydyl notes that the House Committee on Woman Suffrage had a distinctly 
different composition than the House Judiciary Committee.  The former consisted almost entirely of pro-
suffrage representatives (10-3 in the 65th Congress and 11-1 in the 66th Congress) while the latter was 
traditionally dominated by an anti-suffrage southern chairman (i.e. anti-suffragist Representative E.Y. 
Webb of North Carolina was the Judiciary Chair from 1914-1918) and consisted primarily of anti-suffrage 
members. 
 
183 
 
eliminate a legislative roadblock to the federal amendment.  By cooperating with 
NAWSA in convincing Pou to push the creation of the committee and convincing Heflin 
to cast an affirmative vote, the President played a major role in one of the crucial battles 
of the larger federal amendment war.  
 In his struggle to ensure the autonomy of U.S. troops in Europe and his ongoing 
struggles with Congress over other pieces of war legislation during the summer of 1917, 
Wilson was unwilling to support suffrage as a war measure.  When members of the 
NWP, accompanied by representatives of the Progressive, Labor, and Socialist 
movements, urged him in May to press the federal amendment at the existing session of 
Congress he refused.406  Catt declined to join the May deputation to the president and, in 
fact, declined to ask him to push the federal amendment at all during the “war congress.”  
In July, though, Gardener wrote to Wilson advancing NAWSA’s wish that he would use 
his opening speech to the new Congress in December to support the federal amendment 
as a war measure.407  In this one case, the president failed to comply with NAWSA’s 
wishes.  His speech to Congress on December 3rd contained no mention  of suffrage.  Catt 
was unfazed.  She had interpreted his remarks to her in November as a tacit endorsement.  
In early January, her confidence in Wilson was rewarded when, on the day before the 
vote in the House, he finally provided a public endorsement of the federal amendment.408
 The President’s primary focus during 1917 was U.S. entry into the war.  Suffrage 
histories sometimes miscalculate the relative importance of their subject.  Wilson’s 
attitude toward suffrage during 1917 must be placed into context with the world-changing 
 
                                                 
 406 Diary Entry (May 14, 1917), Life and Letters, Vol 7. 
 
 407 Gardener to Wilson (July 19, 1917), NAWSA Records, Box 32, Reel 21. 
 
408 “Wilson Backs Amendment for Woman Suffrage,” New York Times, November 9, 1918, 1. 
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issues that dominated his thinking during the year.  To the extent that he involved himself 
with suffragists at all, he did so in concert with Catt’s strategy for securing the federal 
amendment and in spite of the hostile actions of the NWP.  Wilson and Catt’s vision for 
the proper suffrage strategy changed over the course of 1917 as events unfolded.  
Importantly, their vision evolved jointly. 
 The evidence suggests that there were three decisions NAWSA made in 1917 that 
contributed to the eventual success of the federal amendment.  First, they led the charge 
in denouncing the militancy of the NWP.  As a result, NAWSA’s chastisement of the 
pickets made it easier for the Wilson Administration to deny the pickets their right of free 
speech.  Nonetheless, NAWSA preserved the suffrage movement’s reputation and its 
political standing by distinguishing themselves from the White House pickets that the 
majority of Americans (and, more importantly, members of Congress whose votes would 
eventually be needed) abhorred.   Wilson undoubtedly looked even more favorably on 
NAWSA as a result of his annoyance with the NWP campaign against him, but the NWP 
never posed enough of a threat to “force” him into the arms of NAWSA or into support 
of the federal amendment.  That transition occurred largely in spite of the NWP 
campaign. 
 Secondly, NAWSA recognized the need to win more suffrage states before they 
could have a chance at success at the federal level.  Knowing that the President and 
Congress would not, in all likelihood, give the federal amendment serious consideration 
during the “war congress” they chose to focus their efforts on state campaigns.  As a 
result, they won victories across the nation and dramatically increased the number of 
Congressmen responsible to equal suffrage constituents.  As political scientist Eileen 
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McDonagh demonstrated in her 1989 study of House roll call voting on the 19th 
Amendment, the single most important factor in determining whether representatives 
would vote in favor of the federal amendment was whether or not they came from a state 
that had granted suffrage.  In her analysis, state-level suffrage was more important in 
determining representatives’ votes than either regional or party identification.409
 Finally, Catt convinced NAWSA’s leaders to choose to actively support the war, 
simultaneously strengthening their own hand and the hand of the President when it came 
time to stake their claim as equal citizens.  To be sure, Catt and other NAWSA leaders 
recognized that suffrage was a right they deserved apart from their war service – most 
had been working for suffrage for multiple decades and their arguments during the war 
years were almost always a mix of natural rights and expedient claims.  Still, the reality 
of the situation dictated that they use all practical arguments to support their claim.  Right 
or wrong, the fact of women’s enormous contributions to the successful prosecution of 
the war was a major contributing factor in the nation’s willingness to support the federal 
amendment. 
  When 
the House voted on the federal amendment in 1915, only 47% voted in the affirmative.  
Just three years later, 67% of representatives voted in favor of the amendment.  The 
biggest reason for this dramatic change was the increase in suffrage states – a change that 
only occurred as a result of NAWSA’s continued emphasis on state-level suffrage work. 
 What was the result of these three critical decisions?  By the end of 1917, eight 
more states had been added to the national total of those that had granted women either 
full or partial suffrage.  The President’s support in the state campaigns had been critical 
                                                 
 
409 McDonagh, Issues and Constituencies in the Progressive Era: House Roll Call Voting on the 
Nineteenth Amendment, 1913-1919, 120 and 130. 
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to their success.  Likewise, his influence had helped to secure a separate committee on 
woman suffrage in the House of Representatives.  This removed a major legislative 
hurdle for suffragists as they attempted to bring the federal amendment to a vote.  Finally, 
by January 1918, they had succeeded in persuading the President to lend his voice to the 
growing chorus that demanded equal suffrage for all American women through passage 
of a constitutional amendment. 
 From January 1918 until final ratification of the 19th Amendment in August 1920, 
Wilson was an unwavering advocate for the cause.  Presidential support did not equal 
quick victory.  Chapter Seven will explore the challenges facing Wilson and the 
suffragists in the final years of the battle for the federal amendment.  The following 
chapter, though, will pause to consider those who opposed suffrage.  Specifically, it will 
examine the actions of the nation’s organized female anti-suffragists.  The anti-suffragists 
failed to prevent Wilson from joining ranks with the suffragists, but they succeeded in 
shaping the terms of the national debate and the strategy of the suffragists.  A full history 
of the federal woman suffrage amendment demands consideration of both their failures 
and successes.    
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CHAPTER 6 
FIGHTING FOR WILSON: THE IMPACT OF THE ANTI-SUFFRAGISTS 
 
 The preceding chapters have recounted Wilson’s gradual shift from complete 
opposition to suffrage, to a position of states’ rights and – finally – to support of the 
federal amendment.  For us to fully understand this transition, though, the activities and 
influence of those who opposed woman suffrage must be taken into account.  Like their 
pro-suffrage counterparts, the opponents of woman suffrage battled on a number of fronts 
to defeat both state and federal suffrage measures.  However, only two groups – southern 
Democrats and female anti-suffragists – openly petitioned the President.  They were 
ultimately unsuccessful in halting Wilson’s drift into the pro-suffrage camp, but the 
arguments they developed and publicized were effective in framing the boundaries of the 
national debate over woman suffrage.  This was especially true in the case of the 
organized female anti-suffragists, whose aura of respectability allowed them to be more 
overt in their appeals than other anti-suffrage forces.410
The opponents of woman suffrage can be roughly divided into four categories, 
with the caveat that significant overlap exists among these categories.  The first – a 
  This chapter will outline the 
opponents of woman suffrage, with particular attention to those who waged an ultimately 
unsuccessful campaign to influence the President.  Additionally, it will show how anti-
suffragists effectively shaped the debate and forced their suffrage counterparts to make 
difficult and often divisive tactical decisions. 
                                                 
410 Throughout this chapter, I will use the term “anti-suffragists” to refer specifically to women 
who joined organizations and campaigned to block any measure that would have extended the right to vote 
to women.  I will use other terms to refer to those individuals or groups that also opposed suffrage, but 
were not part of the organized female anti-suffrage movement. 
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category I will title “the interests” – tended to oppose women as voters because they 
feared that women would follow through on the suffragists’ promise to purify American 
society and political life.  The interests included the liquor industry (fearful of women’s 
association with prohibition), the cotton and textile manufacturing industries (fearful that 
women would support reform legislation that would drive up their labor costs), and the 
railroad owners (fearful that women would support regulation of large, powerful 
corporations).  The second category consisted of southerners who saw woman suffrage as 
a threat to white supremacy in the South.  Having just succeeded in disenfranchising 
black men via state constitutional amendments, southern white supremacists were loath to 
reopen the issue of voter qualification and/or eligibility in the South.411  Leading Cathloic 
Church clergy comprised the third category, basing their opposition on the belief that 
each sex had its own God-given distinct sphere of activity.412
                                                 
411  See Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of 
the One-Party South, 1880-1910.  This second category could be broadened to include those (primarily in 
the North) who opposed woman suffrage on the grounds that it would enfranchise non-English speaking 
immigrant women.  Anti-suffragists of this variety were typically native-born Americans who were deeply 
troubled by the waves of immigrants that arrived  in the United States in the late 19th century.  Immigrant 
men, they argued, usually settled in the cities and quickly became swept up by urban political machines.  
Uneducated and poor, they were ready to sell their votes to the highest bidder.  These nativists reasoned 
that enfranchising women would only amplify this problem.  I have not included this group of anti-
suffragists in the same category as the southern white supremacists because this line of anti-suffragist 
reasoning usually made its way into the public sphere via the speeches and writings of the female anti-
suffragists whom I consider in a fourth category.  For a superb review of the link between anti-suffragism 
and nativism, see Chapter Six: The “New Immigration” and Labor in Kraditor, The Ideas of the Woman 
Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920, 123-162.  See also, Ellen C. DuBois, "The Next Generation: Harriot 
Stanton Blatch and Grassroots Politics," in Votes for Women: The Struggle for Suffrage Revisited (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 159-173.  Both Kraditor and DuBois acknowledge and explain how, 
paradoxically, suffrage leaders, often sharing the same class and white, Protestant, Anglo-Saxon 
background of anti-suffrage leaders, articulated powerful arguments in favor of woman suffrage based on 
the same nativist sentiments.   
  The fourth and final 
category included over 700,000 women who belonged to the nation’s organized female 
 
412  James J. Kenneally, "Catholicism and Woman Suffrage in Massachusetts," The Catholic 
Historical Review 8, no. 1 (1967): 43. Kenneally points out that the Catholic opposition to suffrage was 
intertwined with opposition to the growth of the birth control movement.  Anti-suffragists went to great 
lengths to establish an association between the two movements.  Kenneally, 44-45. 
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anti-suffrage movement.  At the head of this final category stood the National 
Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage (NAOWS).413
Suffrage historians have scoured the historical record in an attempt to measure the 
impact of the interests.
   
414  There is no doubt that these groups played an instrumental role 
in persuading voters – often through illicit means – to vote against suffrage in a number 
of state referenda.  Leading suffragists were certain that the “liquor interests” stole the 
election in at least three states in 1912 alone.415  Given that these groups often operated in 
the shadows, the charges posed by the suffragists were difficult to prove.416  More 
importantly for this study, though, these groups did not overtly petition Wilson.417
                                                 
 
  The 
413 The categories employed in this analysis serve to establish a basic framework for the opponents 
of woman suffrage.  In no way are they meant to gloss over the very real and complex responses that 
individuals had to the suffrage issue.  Many opponents of woman suffrage could fit into several of these 
categories.  Conversely, there are those who could fit into one category, but who adamantly opposed 
members of another category.  For example, David Clark, leader of the Southern Textile Manufacturers 
Association and ardent opponent of federal child labor regulation, was pro-suffrage.  Likewise, Minnie 
Bronson, corresponding secretary for the National Association of Women Opposed to Woman Suffrage, 
was a long-time crusader for improved child labor laws.  Both of these figures defy the categorization 
scheme outlined above.  With the knowledge that oversimplification and generalization carry with them 
some cost, I offer these categories anyway as a means to grapple with a complex issue. 
 
414 For example, the following works each devote an entire chapter to the opponents of woman 
suffrage with particular attention to the interests: Kraditor, The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 
1890-1920, Flexner and Fitzpatrick, Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United 
States, Morgan, Suffragists and Democrats: The Politics of Woman Suffrage in America. 
 
415 Flexner and Fitzpatrick, Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United 
States, 252-253. The three states were Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin.  Histories authored by suffragists 
are filled with charges against the interests, especially in state referenda campaigns.  Catt and Shuler 
dedicated an entire chapter to the subject in Catt and Shuler, Woman Suffrage and Politics: The Inner Story 
of the Suffrage Movement. See also  Blatch and Lutz, Challenging Years: The Memoirs of Harriot Stanton 
Blatch, Harper, The History of Woman Suffrage, Vol. 5, 1900-1920. 
 
416  For an example of a “shadowy” scheme by the liquor interests to work against woman 
suffrage, see "Brewing Propaganda," The New Republic, Aug. 21, 1915, 62-64. The article details how 
certain brewing companies worked through the Texas Business Men’s Association and the Farmers’ Union 
news service to distribute “foul and misleading articles against suffrage.” 
 
417 For example, in her discussion of the railroad influence, Elna Green explains that 
representatives of the railroad industry were discreet and never publicly lobbied against suffrage.  Green, 
Southern Strategies: Southern Women and the Woman Suffrage Question, 49-50. Furthermore, Wilson’s 
papers do not contain any letters from representatives of the interests asking him to oppose suffrage.  
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absence of letters from these groups in Wilson’s papers should not be all that surprising.  
Despite their abhorrence of women voters, they generally eschewed overt lobbying 
against the cause.  Furthermore, Wilson was elected in both 1912 and 1916 on a reform 
platform.  The interests surely calculated that their entreaties to him to oppose suffrage 
for fear of the reforms that might follow would not have been well received. 
Members of the second category – southern white supremacists – were more 
hopeful that Wilson would understand their position.  Historian Elna Greene has 
established clear connections between those who led the charge for black 
disfranchisement in the South and those who worked to defeat woman suffrage.418  She 
concludes: “Just as they once had worked to redeem their states from Republican rule and 
then had disfranchised black voters to protect the Redemption, they then worked to 
prevent women from upsetting the political balance that they had worked to create.”419
Several moves by Wilson during his first administration gave southern Democrats 
who opposed suffrage even more confidence that he would never forsake them or the 
“Lost Cause.”  First, as outlined in preceding chapters, he maintained a staunch states’ 
 
Southern Democrats had good reason to believe that Wilson would support them in 
protecting the South’s unique racial hierarchy.  He was a native southerner and a man 
whose party’s political base was firmly grounded in their region. 
                                                 
 
418 A notable exception to this trend is Josephus Daniels.  Daniels served as the editor of the 
Raleigh News and Observer during the last decade of the 19th century and was one of the leading figures in 
the white supremacy and black disfranchisement movement in North Carolina.  As Wilson’s Secretary of 
the Navy, though, he was a consistent supporter of the woman suffrage movement and even worked to 
convince fellow southerners to support the federal amendment.  For Daniels’ role in the disfranchisement 
of blacks in North Carolina, see Gilmore, Gender and Jim Crow: Women and the Politics of White 
Supremacy in North Carolina, 1896-1920, 83-83 and 88-89.   
 
419 Green, Southern Strategies: Southern Women and the Woman Suffrage Question, 52.  For more 
on this, see Gilmore, Gender and Jim Crow: Women and the Politics of White Supremacy in North 
Carolina, 1896-1920, 203-224.. 
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right position throughout his first term.  Secondly, he made it clear that he was of a like 
mind with his Southern brethren when he supported members of his cabinet who chose to 
segregate their federal departments.  Finally, Wilson held a showing of William Dixon’s 
inflammatory and racist film, The Birth of a Nation, at the White House in 1914.  Dixon 
and Wilson had been classmates at John Hopkins, and Dixon later used the fact that the 
film had been shown at the White House to fight off attempts by civil rights organizations 
and censors to prevent the film from wider distribution.420
Before examining Wilson’s interaction with the southern opponents of suffrage, it 
is important to establish the unique nature of the suffrage movement in the South.  
Instead of producing a two-way contest between pro and anti-suffrage forces, states’ 
rights advocates created a three-way battle.
 
421
                                                 
420 For more on the impact of Wilson’s viewing of The Birth of a Nation, see Ibid., 137-138.  For a 
general assessment of Wilson’s approach to race relations during his first term, see Dawley, Changing the 
World: American Progressives in War and Revolution, 66. , Cooper, The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow 
Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt, 210-211. , Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 
64.   Link says that Wilson “stood firm against the cruder demands of white supremacists, but he and 
probably all of his cabinet believed in segregation, social and official.” Cooper contends that Wilson had 
“surprisingly mild racial views” given his southern background, but notes that “such views hardly impelled 
him to challenge discrimination against or neglect of blacks.” Quote from p. 210. 
  States’ rights suffragists were those who 
opposed a federal suffrage amendment but worked to convince individual states to grant 
women the right to vote through state constitutional amendments.  Unlike the federal 
amendment which would theoretically enfranchise all women regardless of race, the 
advocates of the state method believed that state amendments could be written in such a 
way as to enfranchise white women while still preventing blacks from voting. 
 
421 My description of the suffrage situation in the South as a three-way contest is based on the 
framework developed by Elna Green.  See Green, Southern Strategies: Southern Women and the Woman 
Suffrage Question, xiii. Green devotes the sixth chapter of this book to an examination of Kate Gordon – 
leader of the states’ rights faction in Louisiana. See also Paul E. Fuller, Laura Clay and the Woman's Rights 
Movement (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1975), Johnson, Kate Gordon and the Woman-
Suffrage Movement in the South, 365-392.  
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The extreme difference in how many southerners viewed federally-enforced 
versus state-controlled woman suffrage is critical to understanding Wilson’s interaction 
with southern members of his own party.  From the time of his 1912 campaign up until 
his vote in favor of suffrage in the New Jersey referendum of October 1915, Wilson 
claimed that he had not made a decision about his personal position on suffrage.  He was 
clear, however, that he was definitely opposed to a federal amendment; woman suffrage 
was a decision for the voters of each state.  This position was completely palatable to 
southern opponents of suffrage.  Even when Wilson revealed that he was personally in 
favor of the principle of woman suffrage by voting for the referendum in New Jersey, by 
remaining adamant about states’ rights, he was careful to not offend southerners.  His 
decision in New Jersey may have riled those southerners who opposed woman suffrage in 
any form, but Wilson’s states’ right caveat prevented an outright break with the South.   
So, up until the point at which he endorsed the federal amendment, Wilson did not 
find himself at odds with his southern brethren.  Once he crossed that line, though, he 
came into direct conflict with two factions: southerners who opposed woman suffrage in 
any form and the states’ rights advocates.  In other words, his conversion to the federal 
amendment placed him dramatically out of step with the majority of his own party in the 
South.  
While the reform climate of the early 20th century forced the liquor interests to 
run shadow campaigns against woman suffrage, white supremacists felt free to work in 
the open.  In speeches on the floor of Congress, southern congressmen clearly stated that 
they opposed woman suffrage because it threatened white rule in the South.  For 
example, Senator Oscar Underwood of Alabama explained to his colleagues in the Senate 
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that he would never support a federal amendment because it violated the principle of 
states’ rights – a principle that was essential to maintaining the racial hierarchy.  He 
declared, “We stand for these principles because we believe that the integrity of our race 
and our Government and the protection of our women require it.”422  This sentiment was 
echoed by Senator Ellison “Cotton Ed” Smith of South Carolina who evoked the memory 
of black voters during Reconstruction, saying, “In the enactment of the fifteenth 
amendment this principle of local self-government was revoked and, of course, disaster 
followed.”423
In the following chapter, we will see that Wilson was unable to allay the racial 
fears of key southern Senators as he lobbied them to support the federal amendment.  
Time and again, they explained to him that they could not (or would not) abandon either 
their outright rejection of woman suffrage or their states’ rights position.  Again, the 
following chapter will show that it was largely the issue of preserving white supremacy in 
the South that prevented Wilson from securing the necessary votes for the federal 
amendment to pass under a Democratic Congress.  This failure had important 
implications for the 1918 mid-term elections in which the Democrats lost control of 
Congress for the first time during Wilson’s two terms. 
  Despite appeals from the President and other members of their own party, 
Underwood and Smith never relented in their opposition to the federal amendment. 
Another group that worked against woman suffrage included leading members of 
the Catholic Church.  The Church did not officially stand in opposition to the suffrage 
movement, but some of its most prominent clergymen in the United States lent their 
                                                 
422 Congressional Record – Senate; 65th Congress., 2nd sess., 1918, 10931. 
  
423 Congressional Record – Senate; 65th Congress., 2nd sess., 1918, 10932. 
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names to the anti-suffragists.424
 Gibbons was careful to distinguish between his personal opinion and the position 
of the Church.  In April 1913, he publicly corrected suffragists who claimed that the 
Church was opposed to suffrage by releasing the following statement: “The mission of 
the Church is fine faith and morals.  In other matters, individuals decide for 
themselves.”
  For example, Cardinal James Gibbons - Archbishop of 
Baltimore, only the second American man to be named a Cardinal, and seen by many as 
the public face of Catholicism in the United States – repeatedly warned of the dangers of 
granting women the right to vote. 
425  Gibbons went on, however: “Personally, I am opposed to female 
suffrage because I am in favor of perpetuating the real dignity of woman . . . If she were 
to embark on the ocean of political life, it is very much to be feared that her dignity 
would be impaired, if not jeopardized.”426  Gibbons later sent a message of support to 
NAOWS during the anti-suffragists’ annual convention in December 1916.  In part, he 
derided the leaders of the suffrage movement, saying, “I regard ‘woman’s rights’ women 
and the leaders of the new school of female progress as the worst enemies of the female 
sex . . . I wish I could show them the ultimate result of participating in public life.  It has 
but one end – the abandonment, or at least the neglect of the home.”427
                                                 
424 Flexner and Fitzpatrick, Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United 
States, 290.   
  NAOWS 
reprinted his statement in a flyer that was widely circulated to its state organizations. 
 
425 “Not Against Suffrage. Catholic Church Takes No Attitude on Subject, Says Cardinal 
Gibbons,” New York Times, April 22, 1913, 3.  
 
426 Ibid.  
 
427  “A Message From his Eminence James, Cardinal Gibbons to The National Association 
Opposed To Woman Suffrage,” Pamphlet Issued by The National Association Opposed to Woman 
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 Even as some Catholic leaders provided assistance to the anti-suffragists and 
joined them in petitioning state legislature to reject suffrage referenda, they did not 
collectively work to influence Wilson.  In fact, by the time that the federal amendment 
had taken center stage in the suffrage battle, much of the Catholic opposition had begun 
to crumble.  Historian James Kenneally’s case study of Massachusetts reveals that 
Catholics in the Bay State eventually became advocates for suffrage as a result of 
changing social conditions and shifting lay attitudes.  Large numbers of working women 
saw the value of the ballot and key clergy members swayed popular opinion by switching 
their allegiance from the antis to the suffragists.428
While Catholic opposition began to fade during the second decade of the 20th 
century, the activities of the nation’s organized female anti-suffragists reached a fever 
pitch.  Unlike the interests and leading clergy members, this group worked hard to claim 
Wilson as an ally to their cause and struggled mightily to prevent his drift into the ranks 
of the suffragists.  More importantly, the rhetoric of the anti-suffragists forced their 
suffrage counterparts to alter both their arguments and their approach to Wilson.   
 
In the preface to the 1981 Norton Edition of her classic book, The Ideas of the 
Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920, Aileen Kraditor described several changes that 
she would have liked to have made to the original 1964 edition.  One of her most 
significant recommendations for change was the removal of the existing chapter on those 
forces that opposed suffrage and its replacement “with one that [took] the antisuffragists 
                                                                                                                                                 
Suffrage, December 7, 1916.  The Suffrage Collection, Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College, 
Northampton, MA (Hereafter referred to as SSC). 
 
428 Kenneally, Catholicism and Woman Suffrage in Massachusetts, 57.  For more on the increasing 
number of working class women who joined the suffrage movement, see Kraditor, The Ideas of the Woman 
Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920, 152-162. , Mari Jo Buhle, Women and American Socialism, 1870-1920 
(Chicago and Urbana: University of Illionois Press, 1981), 216-240.  
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more seriously, in both tone and content.”429
 A wealth of detailed studies now exists that place the anti-suffrage organizations 
at the center of their inquiries.  These studies have outlined the ideology, membership, 
strategy and tactics, alliances, and impact of the anti-suffragists, covering almost every 
aspect and angle of the anti-suffrage movement.  New research and analysis have shown 
that, while the anti-suffragists were generally defensive, always reacting to the relative 
intensity of the suffrage movement, the arguments of the latter had to be formulated in 
such a way as to counter the arguments posed by the former.  As one scholar puts it, the 
anti-suffrage experience illustrates the point that “countermovements are not solely 
reactive movements, but can impel movement innovation.”
  Kraditor voiced the hope that other scholars 
would study the women who opposed their own enfranchisement with greater respect for 
both their ideology and their impact on the woman suffrage movement.  Her call was 
answered by a number of scholars. 
430
Despite both the quality and quantity of anti-suffrage research in recent years, the 
relationship of the anti-suffragists to President Wilson remains under explored.  Suffrage 
historians have devoted a great deal of attention to understanding how and why Wilson 
eventually transformed into an advocate for the federal suffrage amendment.  Anti-
suffrage historians, however, have given this conversion relatively scant attention.  If 
Wilson is included in their scope at all, it is usually to point out that anti-suffragists 
expressed both public and private disappointment when the President announced his 
  
                                                 
429 Kraditor, The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920, vi.  
 
430 Susan E. Marshall, Gender and Class in the Campaign Against Woman Suffrage (Madison: The 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1997), 228. Susan E. Marshall, Gender and Class in the Campaign Against 
Woman Suffrage (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1997), 228.  
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support for the federal amendment.  To what extent anti-suffrage women had tried to 
influence or delay that announcement, however, is unclear.431  Wilson historians, sadly, 
rarely consider the suffrage movement, let alone the anti-suffrage movement.  The 
presence of an active anti-suffrage organization involving over 700,000 women during 
Wilson’s Administration is completely absent from their accounts.432
Anti-suffragists claimed Wilson as an ally to their cause while he was still the 
Governor of New Jersey.  In a 1912 circular entitled, “Opinions of Eminent Persons 
Against Woman Suffrage,” the Massachusetts Association Opposed to the Further 
Extension of Suffrage to Women (MAOFESW) listed “Governor Woodrow Wilson of 
New Jersey” as one of the “notable persons who have remonstrated against women 
suffrage.”
 
433
                                                 
431  For the most comprehensive works on the anti-suffragists, see Anne M. Benjamin, A History 
of the Anti-Suffrage Movement in the United States from 1895-1920: Women Against Equality (Lewiston, 
NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1991).; Thomas J. Jablonsky, The Home, Heaven, and Mother Party: 
Female Anti-Suffragists in the United States, 1868-1920 (Brooklyn, NY: Carlson Publishing, 1994).; Jane 
Jerome Camhi, Women Against Women: American Anti-Suffragism, 1880-1920 (Brooklyn, NY: Carlson 
Publishing, 1994).; Marshall, Gender and Class in the Campaign Against Woman Suffrage. Benjamin’s 
work is almost entirely narrative with minimal analysis, but she does carefully chronicle Wilson’s slide 
toward the pro-suffrage camp and suggests that this caused great frustration among the anti-suffragists.  
The three latter works offer greater analysis of the anti-suffrage movement’s ideology, membership, 
strategy and tactics, alliances, and impact.  However, none offer an in-depth examination of the 
movement’s relationship to Wilson or his response to the anti-suffragists’ entreaties.    
  When he adopted a states’ rights stance, the anti-suffragists continued to 
promote him as more closely aligned with their movement than with the suffragists.  An 
article appeared in the January 1915 issue of The Woman’s Protest (a monthly 
publication of NAOWS), entitled, “The Attitude of the President – and the Suffragists’.” 
 
432 A search of the most prominent works on Wilson (to include Arthur Link’s 5-volume series on 
the Wilson Administration) and John Milton Cooper, Jr.’s 2009 biography revealed zero references to anti-
suffrage organizations or the names of any of the movement’s leaders.   
 
433  “Opinions of Eminent Persons Against Woman Suffrage,” Circular published by 
Massachusetts Association Opposed to the Further Extension of Suffrage to Women (MAOFESW) 
(October 1912), The Suffrage Collection, SSC.  Founded in 1895, MAOFESW was one of the nation’s first 
anti-suffrage organizations and continued to be the largest and most active state organization for several 
years after the formation of NAOWS in 1911. 
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The article quoted a recent statement by Wilson in which he reiterated the states’ rights 
position that he had adopted during his 1912 presidential campaign.  The anti-suffrage 
analysis of his statement follows: 
Of course, the statement of the President’s views is diametrically opposed 
to both of the suffrage amendments [Anthony and Shafroth-Palmer] he has 
been asked to support . . . It certainly does not indicate a “flop” to “votes 
for women” to anyone but a hopeful Suffragist without a sense of humor.  
But this goes to illustrate the kind of straws the sinking suffrage agitation 
will attempt to clutch.  President Wilson believes that the woman suffrage 
question can be solved ‘most solidly and conclusively’ by the States under 
our present Constitution.  Strangely, this is exactly what Ant-Suffragists 
believe! And just what Suffragists do not want! 434
 
 
Just as the suffragists worked to portray Wilson as friendly to their cause long before he 
took substantive action on their behalf, so too did the antis continue to cling to him after 
he had started his migration toward the enemy’s camp. 
 When it was rumored that the President might vote in favor of the suffrage 
legislation in New Jersey, anti-suffragists hurried to squelch the report. 435
                                                 
434 “The Attitude of the President – and the Suffragists,” The Woman’s Protest (January 1915), 6. 
  The Woman’s 
Protest printed an article in the February 1915 issue citing statements from White House 
officials to counter the claim made by Anna Howard Shaw regarding Wilson’s favorable 
attitude toward the New Jersey amendment. Anti-suffragists could not still claim that 
Wilson was unalterably opposed to the principle of woman suffrage, but they refused to 
let him be portrayed as pro-suffrage.  The article stressed that, despite suffragists’ rumors 
to the contrary, “White House officials took pains this afternoon to make it clear that 
President Wilson had said nothing to a delegation of suffragettes earlier in the day which 
 
435 For Shaw’s opinion of the President’s stance, see “Wilson Encourages Suffrage Leaders: Dr. 
Anna Shaw, After White House Call, Thinks He Will Support Fight in New Jersey,” New York Times, Jan. 
15, 1915, 1.  
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could possibly be construed as a commitment of himself to the equal franchise legislation 
which is soon is to be voted upon in the New Jersey Legislature.”436
 Like their counterparts in the suffrage movement, the anti-suffragists put great 
stock in endorsements for their cause.  In addition to clinging to the President as an ally, 
they also claimed allegiance from members of his family.  During a speech to the General 
Federation of Women’s Clubs (GFWC) in April 1913, Wilson’s daughter, Margaret, was 
quoted by the New York Times as saying that she did not think woman suffrage was 
necessary for women’s influence to be felt in the public sphere.  The Woman’s Protest 
quickly reprinted the article under the headline, “Miss Wilson Thinks Vote 
Unnecessary.”
 
437  Just a few days later, though, the New York Times printed a second 
dispatch in which Margaret Wilson said she had been misquoted during the GFWC 
speech and that she was, in fact, “very much in favor of woman suffrage.” The suffragist 
press quickly countered the antis with an article in the Woman’s Journal and Suffrage 
News entitled, “Miss Wilson for Suffrage.”438
Earlier that year, the two camps had engaged in a similar turf war over the soon-
to-be First Lady, Ellen Wilson.  Following a report in early January 1913 from the anti-
suffragists that the President-elect’s wife supported their cause, The Woman’s Journal 
printed a front-page article under the headline, “Mrs. Wilson is Not an Anti.”  The article 
claimed that Ellen Wilson had told suffragist and Wilson supporter Annie Peck that she 
was unequivocally not an anti.  Ms. Peck concluded, “Although not avowed suffragists, I 
  Editor Alice Stone Blackwell used the 
article to chide the anti-suffragists for “chronic misrepresentation.”   
                                                 
436 “Suffrage in the President’s State,” The Woman’s Protest (February 1915), 16. 
 
437 “Miss Wilson Thinks Vote Unnecessary,” The Woman’s Protest (May 1913), 14.  
 
438 “Miss Wilson for Suffrage,” Woman’s Journal and Suffrage News (May 3, 1913), 141.  
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am confident that both Mr. and Mrs. Wilson are open to reason.”439
Having once been able to hold Wilson up as a “notable person” who remonstrated 
against woman suffrage, the anti-suffragists registered concern when it began to appear 
that he might give in to pressure from the suffragists.  As the preceding chapters have 
shown, Wilson began to figure more prominently into the calculations of NAWSA in 
1913 thanks to Alice Paul’s reinvigoration of the Congressional Committee.  Over the 
next several years, the federal amendment re-emerged as central to the suffrage 
movement.  In that the anti-suffrage movement was, by its nature, a reactionary 
movement, the increased attention of the suffragists to Wilson’s stance inspired the antis 
to ramp up their efforts to maintain his alliance. 
   The desire to claim 
prominent allies consumed both sides and Wilson and his family figured largely in their 
calculations. 
During the crisis with Mexico in the spring of 1914, a number of women’s 
organizations joined with pacifist groups to protest Wilson’s order for US Marines to 
invade Vera Cruz.  NAOWS not only refused to participate in the protests but also 
telegraphed the following resolution to Wilson: “Resolved, That we believe in leaving the 
decision of the policy of peace or war to the men of the nation, but in case of war we 
stand ready to render to the nation such service as American women have always 
rendered in like emergencies.”440
                                                 
 
  In reprinting this resolution in their journal, The 
439 “Mrs. Wilson is Not an Anti,”  Woman’s Journal and Suffrage News (Jan. 11, 1913), 9.  In 
addition to being an active suffragist, Annie Peck was a renowned American mountain climber.  In 1912, 
upon reaching the 21,000 foot summit of Mount Coropuna in Peru, she planted a “Votes For Women” flag.  
See “Miss Peck Returns from Andean Climb,” New York Times, Feb. 5, 1912, 18. 
 
440 “Two Studies in Patriotism,” The Woman’s Protest (May 1914), 20. Wilson’s secretary, Joseph 
Tumulty provided a bland, but polite response to this letter: “The President very much appreciates the 
tender of services which you make in your telegram of April 23d.  He is bringing your message to the 
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Woman’s Protest, the anti-suffragists contrasted their reaction to the Mexico crisis with 
that of their rivals.  Many leading suffragists had participated in a mass meeting at 
Cooper Union in New York – the result of which was a resolution calling on the 
President to withdraw troops from Mexico and “thus with true courage and a high sense 
of honor repair the harm he has already done.”441
The anti-suffragists were dealt a major blow in June 1914 when the General 
Federation of Women’s Clubs (GFWC) voted to endorse woman suffrage.  When 
NAOWS learned that a delegation of clubwomen planned to call on the President to 
present the GFWC’s resolution, they responded with a pre-emptive strike.  NAOWS 
President Josephine Dodge delivered a statement to the White House on June 28, 1914, 
two days before the suffrage delegation was scheduled to arrive.  Dodge’s letter to the 
President read, in part, “The suffragists are already quoting widely that 1,000,000 
clubwomen have indorsed woman suffrage, which is absolutely untrue . . . there are 
  This strategy employed by the anti-
suffragists during the crisis with Mexico – trumpeting their patriotism and deference to 
the “men of the nation” while highlighting the lack of such attitudes by the suffragists – 
foreshadowed the path that the antis would follow once the United States entered World 
War I.  Catt’s decision to pledge NAWSA to war support in 1917 was most probably 
influenced by anti-suffragist attacks on the suffragists’ patriotism during the 1914 
Mexican crisis. 
                                                                                                                                                 
attention of the Secretary of War.” Tumulty to Dodge, Reprinted under “Two Studies in Patriotism,” The 
Woman’s Protest (May 1914), 20. 
 
441 Ibid.  
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hundreds of thousands of women who belong to clubs that have indorsed it who are 
actively opposed to woman suffrage.”442
When the delegation of more than 500 suffragists met with the President two days 
later, reports surfaced that some of the women had grown impatient with Wilson’s 
insistence that suffrage was an issue to be settled by individual states and his refusal to 
state his personal opinion on the issue.  According to a report from the New York Times, 
some of the suffragists hissed when the President refused to allow them to cross-examine 
him.
 
443  Quick to capitalize on this apparent act of disrespect by their rivals, the anti-
suffragists fired off a sympathetic letter to Wilson.  NAOWS President Dodge, 
congratulated the President on his “judicial attitude” toward the suffragists, going on to 
say, “I wish also to express our regret that any body of women should have so presumed 
on your courtesy in receiving them as to subject you to personal questions.”444
In the wake of the 1914 mid-term elections, Dodge sent a more extensive letter to 
Wilson in which she pleaded with him to withstand the entreaties of the suffragists to 
support a federal amendment.  Citing the failure of suffrage referenda in five out of seven 
states that considered the question in 1914, Dodge wrote, “We are confident that the 
Chief Executive of this great nation will not lend his influence to the cause of a small 
minority of women who seek to gain their own ends by undemocratic disregard of both 
states’ rights and the will of the people.”
   
445
                                                 
442 Quoted in “Antis Address Wilson: Clubwomen Not all for Suffrage, Mrs. Dodge Writes,” New 
York Times, Jun. 29, 1914 , 9. 
  She concluded the letter by asking Wilson to 
 
443 “Wilson Won’t Let Women Heckle Him,” New York Times, July 1, 1914, 4.  
 
444 Dodge to Wilson (July, 4, 1914), LWWP. 
 
445 “To the President of the United States on a Matter of Public Policy,” The Woman’s Protest 
(December 1914), 5.  
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reaffirm his opposition to “national legislation designed to throttle the will of the people 
and the principles of local self-government, and impose upon women a political burden, 
to remain free from which the overwhelming majority consider and esteem a great 
privilege.”446
 NAOWS was clearly concerned in late 1914 that the President might be pressured 
to support the federal amendment.  But a more immediate concern for the coming year 
was what action Wilson would take on the suffrage referendum pending in his home state 
of New Jersey.  The President of the New Jersey Association Opposed to Woman 
Suffrage (NJAOWS), Mary Scudder Jamieson, wrote to her former governor in January 
1915 to ask that he oppose the pending legislation.  Jamieson boasted of her 
organization’s 11,500 members, many of whom were “well known in their home State in 
connection with large, charitable, benevolent and educational movements.”  She went on 
to say, “It would seem that due consideration should be paid to the convictions of women 
of such character and influence . . . who honestly believe that political equality will not 
be for the good of the state or for the elevation of the individual.”
 
447
 Jameison’s letter illuminates one of the anti-suffragists’ most common lines of 
attack against enfranchising women.  Women like Jameison and Dodge – both of whom 
were active in philanthropic work – believed that gaining the right to vote would damage 
women’s ability to influence change in that it would result in their loss of non-partisan 
status.  Although leading suffragists usually portrayed their rivals as sheltered patricians 
 
                                                 
 
446 Ibid.  
 
447  Letter from Mary Scudder Jamieson to President Wilson, quoted in “Suffrage in the 
President’s State,” The Woman’s Protest (Feb. 1915), 16. 
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who did not understand the challenges facing most women in the country, this charge was 
hardly accurate.  Many of the anti-suffragists were well-informed, concerned with 
contemporary issues, and heavily engaged in social welfare work.  Instead of seeking 
reform through the use of the ballot though, they sought to change society through their 
ability to influence male decision makers.  They believed women could be more effective 
by utilizing the traditional method of non-partisan, non-electoral influence over male 
legislators.448  There is an obvious class bias in this argument.  Anti-suffragists realized 
that, without the vote, only women with the social position and leisure to be involved in 
women’s clubs would influence their communities.  With full woman suffrage, all types 
of women (i.e. not necessarily the “right types”) would have influence and most of these 
women, the antis believed, would be swept up in the political machines.449
 There is no record of a reply from Wilson to the NJAOWS letter.  And he did not  
comply with the request to oppose suffrage in New Jersey, instead voting in favor of the 
 
                                                 
448 Leading suffragists generally refused to give their opponents credit for developing a 
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suffrage referendum in October 1915.450
 Even though the President had sanctioned the states’ rights position early in his 
first term and then showed that he personally favored the measure via his vote in New 
Jersey, the anti-suffragists hoped to stop the Democratic Party as a whole from moving in 
that direction.  In fact, they worked to stop both major parties from endorsing suffrage 
during the 1916 presidential election.  Prior to the national conventions in June, Dodge 
wrote to members of the platform committee from both the Democrat and Republican 
parties.  She passed on a resolution from NAOWS: “That we request the Committees on 
Platforms of the Republican and Democratic National Conventions convening at Chicago 
and St. Louis to make no mention of woman suffrage.”
  Wilson’s favorable vote in the New Jersey 
election meant that the antis could no longer claim him as an ally.  In fact, his action 
eliminated their ability to even portray him as neutral.  The only thing he gave them to 
hold on to was the fact that he maintained his states’ rights position – saying that he had 
voted in New Jersey as a private citizen and that he was still opposed to a federal 
amendment.  The anti-suffragists would cling to this last bit of support up until the time 
Wilson endorsed the federal amendment in January 1918.    
451
We trust that you will lend your influence to this end, so that our women 
may retain their present freedom from the maelstrom of politics, in 
accordance with the desire of the majority of both men and women; so that 
American women may continue to devote their splendid energies to the 
advancement of non-partisan and humanitarian enterprises without 
political bias; and that they may concentrate on the service of womanhood, 
 Dodge asked for their support 
in terms that encompassed all the standard anti-suffrage arguments:  
                                                 
450 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of Wilson’s decision to vote in favor of the referendum.  
 
451 Dodge to Thomas M. Bartlett (June 1, 1916), The Suffrage Collection, SSC.  Bartlett was a 
delegate to the Republican National Convention and a member of the Platform Committee. 
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childhood and the home through with they make their greatest contribution 
to the country and the common good.452
 
 
This request, of course, brought the anti-suffragists into direct conflict with both Catt and 
Wilson, who worked together to ensure the Democratic Platform included support for 
suffrage as a state measure.453  Later that summer, the antis were rebuffed by Wilson 
again when he agreed to speak at NAWSA’s annual convention in September 1916, but 
rejected a similar speaking offer from NAOWS.454
 Despite the clear indications that Wilson had allied himself with NAWSA, the 
anti-suffragists continued to remind him of their presence, dedication, and patriotism.  
NAOWS beat NAWSA to the punch in offering themselves to war service in early 1917.  
Just as Catt was sending out a call to NAWSA to take a favorable position on US entry 
into the war, Dodge wrote to inform Wilson that NAOWS had adopted the following 
resolution: “That we offer our services to the President and will serve in any way in 
which we can be of use.”
 
455
                                                 
 
  Anti-suffragists later trumpeted the fact that support for this 
resolution among NAOWS members had been unanimous, as compared to the strife that 
the war issue created among the suffragists.  One anti mocked Catt’s pledging NAWSA 
for war service: “It should not be forgotten, however, that her offer brought out a storm of 
452 Ibid.  
 
453 See Chapter 3.  
 
454 Anne M. Benjamin, A History of the Anti-Suffrage Movement in the United States from 1895-
1920: Women Against Equality (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1991), 223-225.  
  
455 Dodge to Wilson (Feb. 9, 1917), Reprinted in a pamphlet entitled “Woman Suffrage in Relation 
to Patriotic Service by Margaret C. Robinson,” (April 1917), Issued by the Public Interests’ League of 
Massachusetts, The Suffrage Collection, SSC. 
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opposition among her followers . . . and that various meetings of suffragists were called 
immediately to condemn her action.”456
 The NAOWS’ attitude toward Wilson – and toward the suffrage battle in general - 
seemed to change somewhat in the summer of 1917.  The new NAOWS President, Alice 
Hay Wadsworth, replaced the deferential tone that was the hallmark of correspondence 
between Josephine Dodge and President Wilson with a bitter and demanding tone .  The 
wife of James Wadsworth, the ardent anti-suffrage Senator from New York, Alice had 
previously been the president of the District of Columbia Association Opposed to 
Woman Suffrage.  Her sudden replacement of Dodge as the leader of NAOWS in July 
1917 came as a surprise to many and marked an important turning point in the 
organization’s history.
  
457
The organization had long insisted that suffrage was linked with radicalism and 
had often touted the anti-suffragists’ unflinching support for all of the President’s policies 
as a far superior form of patriotism than that practiced by the suffragists.  Still, under 
Wadsworth, the vitriolic nature of the anti-suffrage attacks attained new heights.  As one 
historian describes it, “anti-suffragism now took on the character of a frenzied religious 
  Under Wadsworth, NAOWS took a sharp turn to the right.   
                                                 
 
456  Pamphlet entitled “Woman Suffrage in Relation to Patriotic Service by Margaret C. 
Robinson,” (April 1917), Issued by the Public Interests’ League of Massachusetts, The Suffrage Collection, 
SSC. 
 
457 Historians who have studied the anti-suffrage movement have struggled to understand how 
Wadsworth happened to replace Dodge so suddenly.  According to Jablonsky, there were no signs of a 
power struggle prior to the presidential change.  Still, Dodge’s departure was followed by the departure of a 
number of other members of the inner circle, signaling that this was more than a routine transition.  See 
Jablonsky, The Home, Heaven, and Mother Party: Female Anti-Suffragists in the United States, 1868-1920, 
98.  
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inquisition.”458  In Splintered Sisterhood, Susan Marshall offers the most plausible 
explanation for the movement’s rightward lurch.  She posits that as Wilson appeared 
more and more willing to support a federal amendment and as a victory in the upcoming 
New York referendum appeared inevitable, many of the more moderate anti-suffragists 
resigned themselves to failure and departed the ranks of NAOWS.  Their departure left 
the most conservative anti-suffragists at the helm of the organization with no voices of 
reason there to protest when they abandoned any limits in their attempt to derail suffrage 
momentum with charges of radicalism and apocalyptic predictions.459
If Marshall is correct – and the evidence certainly seems to support her thesis – 
then it would seem that the nation’s leading anti-suffrage organization had given up on 
Wilson as an ally by the summer of 1917.  Given his increasing support to Catt and 
NAWSA over the first half of the year, their loss of faith was understandable.
 
460  If 
Dodge had always erred on the side of deference in the hope that Wilson might still 
support the antis, Wadsworth took a different tact.  She wrote to Wilson in late July 1917 
to protest his pardon of 16 NWP picketers.  Questioning his decision to permit “women 
of wealth, family, and position to violate the laws and go unpunished,” Wadsworth 
demanded, “Can it be necessary that to preserve peace within our borders in this time of 
stress and imperative need for progress, the machinery of government should be halted 
that these ‘flies on the wheel’ may bask in the light of publicity?”461
                                                 
458 Ibid., 99. For more on the transformation of NAOWS in mid-1917, see Kristy Maddux, "When 
Patriots Protest: The Anti-Suffrage Discursive Transformation of 1917," Rhetoric and Public Affairs 7, no. 
3 (2004): 292-293.  
  Wilson was 
 
459 Marshall, Gender and Class in the Campaign Against Woman Suffrage, 206-207.   
 
460 For Wilson’s assistance to and collaboration with suffragists in 1917, see Chapter 5.  
 
461 Wadsworth to Wilson (Jul. 23, 1917), LWWP.  
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apparently taken aback by the letter.  He passed it on to Tumulty with the following note: 
“This is a very awkward letter to answer.  I would be obliged if you would write to Mrs. 
Wadsworth saying that I have asked you to acknowledge the letter and express my warm 
appreciation of her sincere and candid letter.”462
Just a month after this exchange with Wadsworth, Wilson signaled his support for 
the pending suffrage legislation in New York.  When that legislation passed in November 
and New York joined the ranks of the suffrage states, the President’s congratulatory notes 
to NAWSA indicated that he would almost certainly endorse the federal amendment at 
the start of 1918.  If the anti-suffragists had sensed that Wilson was lost to their cause 
during the summer, they were all but certain of his treason by the end of the year.  Still, 
some held on to the hope that he would not take the final step of endorsing the federal 
amendment.   
 
When the Milwaukee Leader published the story of David Lawrence’s visit to 
Alice Paul in prison, NAOWS’ General Secretary Minnie Bronson immediately wrote to 
Wilson and asked him to refute the article.  It will be recalled from the previous chapter 
that the article in question alleged that Lawrence had been sent as a representative of the 
administration to cut a deal with Paul:  stop the picketing and the President will support 
the federal amendment.  Bronson was indignant that a Socialist newspaper had published 
this unbelievable story.  She requested that Wilson “stop any further circulation of this 
canard, and make it impossible for men . . . to intimate that the President of the United 
States “secretly favors” suffrage methods he has publicly condemned.”463
                                                 
 
  There is no 
462 Wilson to Tumulty (Jul. 24, 1917), LWWP.  
 
463 Bronson to Wilson (Dec. 22, 1917), LWWP.  
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record of a reply from Wilson on the specific issue of the Lawrence visit to Alice Paul.  
However, he gave an answer to Bronson’s broader question in early January 1918 when 
he made his first public statement in support of the federal amendment as it was headed 
for a vote in the House of Representatives.464
Even though the writing had been on the wall, leading NAOWS members were 
apparently devastated by the President’s announcement.
   
465  Bronson was so disappointed 
in the man that she had defended just a month earlier that she issued a public apology on 
behalf of NAOWS to Alice Paul for questioning the David Lawrence story.466  For 
NAOWS to admit it was wrong and to issue an apology to the leader of the dreaded 
picketers demonstrates just how much the President’s betrayal shook the organization.  
NAOWS did not correspond directly with Wilson ever again following his emergence as 
a supporter of the federal amendment.467
Several reasons emerge to explain why this well-organized and fairly 
sophisticated organization of anti-suffragists was unable to maintain Wilson’s alliance.  
First, NAOWS and its affiliated state anti-suffrage organizations did not see the President 
as the center of gravity in the suffrage battle.  Rather, the antis focused their efforts on 
  Neither did they attack him for his betrayal.  
Despite their disappointment and frustration, to attack the President during the war would 
have been too gross a violation of their rigid brand of patriotism.   
                                                 
 
464 “Wilson Backs Amendment for Suffrage,” New York Times, Jan. 10, 1918, 1. 
 
465 Jablonsky, The Home, Heaven, and Mother Party: Female Anti-Suffragists in the United States, 
1868-1920, 94.  
 
466 “Antis Make Apology: Withdraw Statement in View of President’s Action on Suffrage 
Amendment,” New York Times, Jan. 27, 1918, 15.  
 
467 Some other anti-suffrage organizations such as the Women Voters Anti-Suffrage Party and 
MAOFESW did write to Wilson, criticizing his decision to support the Federal Amendment.  See “Antis 
Send Protest to the President,” New York Times, Aug. 12, 1918, 8. 
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state referenda.468   In addition, NAOWS was slow to react to the suffragists’ shift in 
attention and effort toward the federal amendment.  The organization did not even move 
its headquarters from New York to Washington, D.C. until the summer of 1917.469
Finally, the failure of NAOWS to influence Wilson is explained by a fundamental 
flaw in their basic ideology.  The anti-suffragists consistently argued that women actually 
possessed more influence without the vote.  But this premise simply did not hold up to 
the political realities of the day.  If nothing else, Wilson could calculate political math.  
The preceding chapters have outlined how the votes of women from the enfranchised 
states served to push him toward support of a federal amendment.  His advisors - and 
leading suffragists like Catt – warned him repeatedly that he and the Democratic Party 
would suffer at the hands of women voters if he continued to withhold his support.  There 
were no such warnings about the danger of disregarding the nation’s anti-suffrage 
women.  A pro-suffrage cartoon from mid-1913 perfectly illustrated this flaw in anti-
suffrage thinking.  Under the title, “Getting Her Pigs to Market,” sit two pictures.  In one, 
an anti-suffragist bearing a club entitled “moral suasion” chases uncontrolled pigs around 
a yard.  The adjacent picture shows a suffragist whose pigs are moving in perfect order 
along a ramp labeled “the vote.”
  By 
that time, Wilson’s conversion to the cause of suffrage was almost complete.   
470
                                                 
468 For more on the anti-suffragists’ state and local focus and for an assessment of their impact in 
those campaigns, see Camhi, Women Against Women: American Anti-Suffragism, 1880-1920, 3 and 179-
197. , Jablonsky, The Home, Heaven, and Mother Party: Female Anti-Suffragists in the United States, 
1868-1920, 26.  See also Follet, Gender and Community: Kenosha, Wisconsin, 1835-1913. 
  Despite their belief in the power of moral suasion, 
 
469 Camhi, Women Against Women: American Anti-Suffragism, 1880-1920, 123-124.  
 
470  “Getting Her Pigs to Market,” Woman’s Journal and Suffrage News (Jul. 5, 1913), 1. 
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anti-suffragists who did not wield the vote simply did not figure into Wilson’s political 
calculus. 
 So, the attempt by the anti-suffragists to prevent Wilson from becoming a 
suffrage supporter must ultimately be viewed as a failure.  Still, the actions of this active 
movement have important implications for this study of Wilson’s conversion.  It is my 
contention that the specific strategy that Catt employed with the President played a 
crucial role in winning him over to the cause.  Key components of that strategy were 
developed in response to the challenges posed by the anti-suffragists.471  Specifically, 
Catt’s decision to disavow the campaign strategy of the CU and, later, the militancy of 
the NWP and to pledge NAWSA to war service must be viewed, in part, as a product of 
the battle with the antis.472
 Some general observations that support this point can be gleaned from a review of 
both suffrage and anti-suffrage publications during the period 1911-1920.  First, the two 
opposing camps were obsessed with one another.  They clearly scoured one another’s 
publications, looking for factual errors or faulty logic, and then attacked any such errors 
 
                                                 
471 Catt would later deny that the anti-suffragists factored much into her strategic choices.  She 
wrote, “Probably the worst damage that the women antis did was to give unscrupulous politicians a 
respectable excuse for opposing suffrage, and to confuse public thinking by standing conspicuously in the 
lime light while the potent enemy worked in darkness.” Catt and Shuler, Woman Suffrage and Politics: The 
Inner Story of the Suffrage Movement, 273.  
 
472  The anti-suffragists shaped the debate in other ways, too, but along lines that were less 
important to the Catt-Wilson relationship.  Two of the most prominent ways that antis shaped the debate 
included the race argument in the South (i.e. woman suffrage would undermine white supremacy) and the 
basis for granting women the right to vote (i.e. natural rights versus expedience).  For the former, see 
Lebsock, Woman Suffrage and White Supremacy: A Virginia Case Study, Green, Southern Strategies: 
Southern Women and the Woman Suffrage Question, 11 and 94-95.  For the latter, see Kraditor, The Ideas 
of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920, 42. , Marshall, Gender and Class in the Campaign Against 
Woman Suffrage, 228.  
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in their own publications or in mainstream media outlets.473  In The Woman Voter, a 
monthly publication of the NAWSA-affiliated Woman Suffrage Party of New York City, 
the editors devoted a section of every edition to the anti-suffragists.  Believing that the 
arguments and actions of the antis actually helped to reinforce the argument for suffrage, 
The Woman Voter cleverly entitled this monthly piece, “With Our Allies – the Antis.”474
 The near-obsession that these organizations had with one another raises the 
question of whether they sometimes focused too much on each other at the expense of 
lobbying the mostly-male voters who could actually affect the status of woman suffrage.  
For the suffragists, at least, this may be true.  But the amount of attention and the 
resources they devoted to combating the antis is evidence of the fact that – right or wrong 
- they viewed them as a real and powerful threat.
   
475
 The antis were quick to exploit the 1914 NAWSA/CU rift and to attack Paul and 
her followers for their campaigns to “hold the party in power responsible.”  Later, they 
railed against the NWP’s militancy in the picketing campaign.  In most cases, the antis 
simply conflated NAWSA with the CU/NWP, generalizing their attack to all suffragists.  
   
                                                 
473 For an example of this, see the debate between NAOWS and Anna Howard Shaw over use of 
the term “conservationist” in the August and September, 1913 issues of The Woman’s Protest.  In another 
instance, The Woman’s Protest listed 19 “pertinent questions” about woman suffrage and challenged 
suffragists to respond.  On behalf of NAWSA, Catt accepted the challenge and her answers were published 
in The Woman Voter.  NAOWS then used the following issue of The Woman’s Protest to dissect, refute, 
and attack Catt’s answers. See “A Challenge Accepted,” The Woman Voter (Jan. 1915), 19; “A Challenge 
Accepted: Part II,” (Feb. 1915), The Woman Voter, 20; and “’Votes Can Right No Wrong’ Says Suffrage 
Leader,” The Woman’s Protest (Mar. 1915), 11. 
 
474 The editors ran a contest for readers in which they were encouraged to send in ridiculous 
statements by anti-suffragists and/or their allies.  The submissions were called “pearls” and the journal 
awarded a year’s free subscription to the reader who submitted the best “pearl” each month.  For just one 
example of this monthly column, see “With Our Allies – the Antis,” The Woman Voter (Nov. 1916), 22. 
 
475 As further evidence of the close watch each camp kept on the other, see “Woman Suffrage and 
Its Allies,” a flyer circulated by the Massachusetts Anti-Suffrage Committee (Undated), and Letter from 
Alice Chittenden to The Editor (Dec. 8, 1915), NAOWS Papers, New York State Library, Albany, NY.   
Both of these documents contain handwritten critical comments from suffragists who apparently had 
collected them and sent them back to the headquarters of the suffrage camp. 
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For example, an anti-suffrage article published during the 1914 mid-term elections asked, 
“Who are the ‘conservative’ Suffragists, and who are the ‘radical’ Suffragists?  In what 
way can a Suffragist ever be considered as conservative?”476  The article went on to 
exploit the divisions within the suffrage movement’s ranks: “The country is confronted 
with the spectacle of several bands or groups of women quarreling among themselves, 
unable to determine whom they shall oppose or what they shall advocate, making 
speeches that contradict each other, and altogether creating a confusion which is sure to 
fail in accomplishing any definite results for ‘votes for women.’”477
 NAOWS branded all suffragists as militants following an encounter between CU 
agitators and President Wilson in New York in May 1915.  The CU members interrupted 
an event at the Biltmore Hotel and confronted Wilson with a letter demanding him to 
give a straight-forward statement of his personal opinion on suffrage.  In relating the 
event in a full-page article, the anti-suffragists opened with, “The recent militant methods 
of American Suffragists have created wide-spread comment.”
   
478
 Attacks like these almost certainly helped Catt make the important decision to 
distance NAWSA from the CU/NWP.  Her relentless campaign to distinguish NAWSA 
from Paul’s organization becomes even more understandable in light of anti-suffrage 
  Although the article 
went on to print Catt’s repudiation of the CU actions, it also stressed that the nation’s 
suffrage organizations were divided and could not contain the growth of militancy in 
their ranks. 
                                                 
 
476 “Conservatives and Radicals,” The Woman’s Protest (Oct. 1914), 4.  
 
477 Ibid.  
 
478 “The Rise of Militancy in America,” The Woman’s Protest (Jun. 1915), 16.  
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attempts to hold the former responsible for the actions of the latter.  Catt’s decision to 
pledge NAWSA to war service must be viewed in the same light.   
 The anti-suffragists took advantage of every opportunity to associate suffragism 
with Socialism and to charge that suffragists/Socialists represented twin threats to 
America.479  As has previously been described in this chapter, these attacks became 
increasingly personal and vindictive once Wadsworth assumed the NAOWS presidency 
in July 1917.480  Still, the association with Socialism was present in anti-suffrage rhetoric 
from a much earlier date.481  In testimony before Congress in 1913, former suffragist 
turned anti, Annie Bock, told the Senate Committee on Woman Suffrage, “Woman 
suffrage will expose the Nation to anarchy.  Gentlemen, do you believe any woman 
desires the vote so much that she will become an incendiary, a dynamiter, a murderer? Is 
there not some ulterior motive in all this? Sure; it is socialism.  The militants work in the 
revolutionary way; the sly nonmilitants employ the Fabian method.”482
                                                 
479 Buhle, Women and American Socialism, 1870-1920, 237. Buhle points out that, despite the 
large role played by Socialist women in the 1917 suffrage victory in New York, NAWSA leaders were 
reluctant to give credit to the Socialists because such an admission would play into the hands of the anti-
suffragists who worked constantly to brand all suffragists as Socialists and radicals. 
 Bock went on to 
make the familiar anti-suffrage charge that associated Socialists with treasonous 
behavior.  In reference to a specific suffragist who was also a Socialist, Bock said, “I 
 
480  For example, NAOWS petitioned the Senate to include the nation’s suffrage organizations in 
its 1918 investigation of the IWW.  Additionally, they characterized Catt’s formation of the League of 
Women Voters in 1919 as an attempt to spread the growth of Socialism.  See, “The New I.W.W. The 
International Women of the World,” Pamphlet issued by NAOWS (Mar. 1919), The Suffrage Collection, 
SSC. Also, see Marshall, Gender and Class in the Campaign Against Woman Suffrage, 207.  
 
481 For example, see “Woman Suffrage: A Socialist Movement,” Pamphlet published by the 
Illinois Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage, Reel 243, History of Women Collection, Library of 
Congress.  
 
482 “Woman Suffrage Address by Miss Annie Bock,” (August 9, 1913), 8; The Suffrage 
Collection, SSC. 
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don’t like her politics.  She stands for the red.  I stand for the red, white, and blue . . . 
Gentlemen, where do you stand?”483
 As Catt pondered which direction to move NAWSA in February 1917 –with the 
nation standing on the brink of entering the First World War – she was highly cognizant 
of anti-suffrage attacks against the suffragists’ patriotism.  The dedication of all the major 
suffrage journals to answering the antis’ charges is evidence of this.  Knowing that 
NAWSA would be castigated by the anti-suffragists if the organization adopted anything 
less than a “100 Percent Americanism” attitude, Catt urged her organization to support 
the President’s decision to go to war.  Just before Wilson made a formal declaration of 
war in April, she defended this break with her pacifist past, saying, “I am a pacifist, but 
not for peace without honor.  I’d be willing, if necessary, to die for my country.  The 
women of this country are, as a whole, patriotic, and if war comes they will prove it.”
 
484
 Catt’s need to prove that suffragists were loyal citizens was clearly influenced by 
the active anti-suffrage movement which stood ready to pounce on any chink in the 
suffragists’ armor.  As the previous chapter outlined, Catt and NAWSA’s silence over the 
violation of the NWP pickets’ civil rights was part of NAWSA’s broader complicity in 
sustaining the oppressive environment in wartime America.  The fact that the pressure of 
the anti-suffragists further encouraged NAWSA to abandon their better principles and to 
move toward even greater wartime nativism does not excuse Catt or NAWSA for doing 
just that.
   
485
                                                 
 
  Suffragists must be included in those held responsible for one of the ugliest 
483 Ibid, 6. 
 
484 Carrie Chapman Catt, “Organized Womanhood,” The Woman Voter (April 1917), 9.  
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chapters in American history with regards to intolerance for those who voiced dissent.  
Still, it is important to note that the suffragists’ decisions were driven, in part, by the 
extreme nativism and narrowly defined patriotism of the anti-suffragists. 
The fact that NAWSA did, in fact, decide to pledge itself to war service became 
increasingly important in 1918 as the federal suffrage amendment made its way to a floor 
vote in both the House and the Senate.  Wilson – along with many suffrage supporters in 
Congress – repeatedly pointed to the suffragists’ war service as they fought for the 
amendment’s passage.  The President’s actions during this battle in Congress, which 
ultimately culminated in the amendment’s passage and movement to the states for 
ratification, is the subject of the following chapter. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
485 As noted earlier in this chapter, most suffrage leaders tended towards nativism even before the 
war.  It is entirely possible that NAWSA’s leadership would have colluded in the “100 Percent 
Americanism” movement even in the absence of the anti-suffrage movement.  
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CHAPTER 7 
WILSON AS AN ADVOCATE, 1918-1919 
 
 On January 8, 1918, President Woodrow Wilson appeared before a joint session 
of Congress and gave one of the most famous speeches of the 20th century.  In soaring 
terms, he outlined America’s war aims and proposed a world peace based on the 
“Fourteen Points” which included his vision for the League of Nations.  The following 
day he met with a group of Democrats from the House and offered his first public 
endorsement of the federal woman suffrage amendment.  At first glance, these events 
seem more connected by calendar proximity than anything else.  Certainly the former has 
gone down in history as having much greater significance than the latter.  But closer 
inspection reveals a more considerable connection between the two events than one might 
expect.  As this chapter will show, the war, Wilson’s postwar vision, and the issue of 
woman suffrage became deeply intertwined in 1918.   
After publicly endorsing the federal amendment in January 1918, the President 
never backed away from full support of nationwide woman suffrage.  His newfound 
enthusiasm was consistent with his behavior throughout the suffrage campaign; it was 
based on the political value of the issue.  By the start of the new year, suffrage had 
gathered momentum as a powerful political issue through the addition of eight more 
suffrage states, the war being fought in the name of democracy, and women’s massive 
participation in the home front war effort. Wilson’s close advisors communicated a very 
different message to their leader heading into the 1918 mid-term elections than they had 
in the election years of 1914 and 1916.  They expressed concern about suffrage as a 
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political liability if the suffrage amendment failed to pass under a Democratic Congress.  
As this chapter will show, Wilson did everything in his power to avoid that liability.  
 Understanding Wilson’s motivation during this time period is a complex 
endeavor.  His foremost goal, as he told the nation and the world in his “Fourteen Points” 
speech, was to attain a peaceful, liberal world order.  Wilson’s vision included self-
determined capitalist nations governed by international law and safe from both traditional 
forms of imperialism and revolutionary socialism.  He believed that America had a 
mission to extend her national values to the rest of the world – a mission that could only 
be fulfilled within the stable boundaries of his postwar vision for world order.486  The 
significance of the 1918 mid-term elections was enormous for Wilson.  If the Democrats 
lost control of Congress, he knew that he would face tremendous Congressional 
opposition to American participation in the League of Nations – a key component of the 
postwar order.487
 It is precisely because this particular desire was so strong in Wilson that it is 
difficult to determine the degree to which his personal feelings about women as political 
beings changed, if at all.  As this chapter will reveal, he worked tirelessly to secure the 
  Wilson’s strong desire to win votes for Democrats in order to pursue 
his larger strategy for the war and the peace that would follow must be seen as the driving 
force behind all of his decisions leading up to November. 
                                                 
 
486Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution, vii, 5.  
See also, Lloyd E. Ambrosius, "Democracy, Peace, and World Order," in Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson: 
Progressivism, Internationalism, War, and Peace (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 
2008), 225-228. 
 
487 Thomas J. Knock, To End all Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992), 168-171. Leading Republicans immediately 
criticized Wilson’s Fourteen Points following his speech on January 8, 1918.  By mid-summer, according 
to Knock, they had made opposition to the League of Nations one of the pillars of their campaign strategy 
heading into the 1918 mid-term elections. 
220 
 
federal amendment under a Democratic Congress.  Was this purely an attempt to 
strengthen his party in order to pursue his foreign policy or was there a personal 
conversion involved? 
Wilson’s exposure to women in the public sphere had certainly increased during 
his six years in the White House.  The President more and more dealt with women fully 
engaged in matters of political import, not only in the form of suffragists, but also as 
members of the Woman’s Peace Party, the Women’s Trade Union League, and the 
Women’s Christian Temperance Union.  As the nation moved into war, he appointed 
women to the Woman’s Committee of the Council of National Defense and approved the 
enlistment of thousands of women in the American Expeditionary Force that deployed to 
Europe.488
It seems more than plausible to suggest that increased familiarity with women 
operating in the public sphere bred in Wilson a newfound respect for women’s 
capabilities.  Perhaps he finally tested some of those assumptions about women’s mental 
limitations that his Bryn Mawr graduate student complained of and found them in serious 
need of revision.  As Victoria Bissell Brown argues persuasively, “In the two decades 
that passed between Wilson’s stint at Bryn Mawr and his academic and political careers 
in New Jersey, American women defied, daily, the assumption that domestic life was 
incompatible with political life.”
   
489
                                                 
488 Susan Zeiger, In Uncle Sam's Service: Women Workers with the American Expeditionary 
Force, 1917-1919 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999),  137-138. 
  In the absence of any personal writings from Wilson 
 
489 Brown, Did Woodrow Wilson's Gender Politics Matter?, 131. Brown goes on to dispute the 
idea that Wilson came to support suffrage for political reasons but never truly underwent a personal 
conversion to the idea of women as voters.  She acknowledges that political considerations figured 
prominently for Wilson as he came to support the state-by-state method and, later, the federal amendment.  
Still, she argues, political motives are not incompatible with a sincere change of conviction.  It is 
“ridiculous,” according to Brown, to suggest that Wilson was really an anti-suffragist at heart but that he 
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that indicate a private conversion that matched his public enthusiasm for suffrage, we are 
left only with the proposition that such a conversion most likely occurred.  Setting aside 
the possibility of a private conversion, though, there can be no doubt about his advocacy 
for woman suffrage in the public sphere - advocacy that would see both victory and 
defeat during the course of his final two years in office. 
 Months before the first suffrage victory in Congress, Wilson had begun preparing 
for the battle that he knew would have to be fought.  Throughout the summer and fall of 
1917, he corresponded back and forth with members of his cabinet and suffrage 
advocates trying to determine where the House and Senate stood if the measure were to 
come up for a vote.490
 Two days before the vote, the women’s representative of the Democratic National 
Committee, Elizabeth Merrill Bass, who had been in close communication with the White 
House for several months, wrote to encourage Wilson to publish a public message of 
support for the amendment.  She made the political implications clear, urging, “Do not let 
us give [the Republicans] the advantage of our silence to carry with them into the 
congressional campaigns next year when asking for the votes of the enfranchised 
  His major concern during the months leading up to the start of the 
65th Congress was that the measure would be put to a vote before the necessary 
affirmative votes were secured.  Pro-suffrage Congressmen and Senators succeeded in 
blocking any premature votes in December, and by the first week of the new year, it was 
fairly evident that the first vote would come in the House on January 10. 
                                                                                                                                                 
“was willing to jeopardize womanhood, the American family, and the state by supporting woman suffrage 
and thereby gaining a few votes for the Democratic Party.”  Quote from p. 129.   
 
490 See Wilson to Burleson (July 19, 1917), J.A. H. Hopkins to Wilson (July 18, 1917), Gardener 
to Wilson (July 19, 1917), Maud Wood Park to Wilson (November 30, 1917), and Tumulty to Wilson 
(December 12, 1917), LWWP. 
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women.”491
 Wilson heeded her advice.  He made himself available to a group of Democratic 
members of the Suffrage Committee the following day and voiced his support for the 
federal amendment.  After the meeting, the Representatives handed a statement to 
members of the press that read, “The Committee found that the President had not felt at 
liberty to volunteer his advice to members of Congress in this important matter, but when 
we sought his advice he very frankly and earnestly advised us to vote for the amendment 
as an act of right and justice to the women of the country and the world.”
  In a theme that she would repeat for the next year, Bass stressed to the 
President the political importance of a suffrage victory under a Democratic Congress. 
492  The New 
York Times ran their story about the meeting under the headline “Wilson Backs 
Amendment for Woman Suffrage.”493
 The press statement included a list of Wilson’s four reasons for supporting the 
federal amendment.  Again, in the absence of private correspondence regarding his 
changed position, this statement provides important insight into the President’s rationale.  
Additionally, the themes articulated in this statement would serve as the basis of Wilson’s 
advocacy for the amendment for the next two years:  
  
First – The party platform, which declares woman suffrage to be a question for 
each State to decide was adopted before the present exigencies arose – exigencies 
which make it all-important that the women be allowed to vote.  Therefore, strict 
adherence to that platform cannot now be expected of Democrats.  Second – The 
President does not regard this as a matter of State rights, therefore it is to be 
differentiated from the prohibition amendment.  He holds that the matter of 
                                                 
 
491 Bass to Wilson (January 8, 1918), LWWP. 
 
492 Press Statement (January 9, 1918), Life and Letters, Vol. 7. 
 
493 “Wilson Backs Amendment for Woman Suffrage,” New York Times, January 10, 1918, 1. See 
also, “Wilson Favors Suffrage Vote; Says Changed Conditions Call for Federal Amendment,” Boston Daily 
Globe, January 10, 1918, 1-2. 
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suffrage is primarily a national question and a constitutional question and has 
been so decided in frequent decisions of the Supreme Court . . . Third – The 
President insists that if the members of Congress believe that the women should 
have the right to vote, they should accept the first favorable opportunity to grant 
them that right.  The manner of application of such a principle, he contends, 
should not be the main question.  Fourth – A large part of the civilized world is 
favorable to woman suffrage, many countries having granted it and England 
having promised it.494
 
  
Not surprisingly, three of Wilson’s four justifications were related to federal versus state 
action.  Wilson had used the party’s “states’ rights” position as a reason for not endorsing 
the federal amendment for the past two years, so he clearly felt compelled to defend his 
decision to now move away from that platform.  American entry into the war (“the 
present exigencies”) served as his justification and provided cover for other Democrats to 
do the same. In this first endorsement, he did not fully explain why women voters were 
necessary now that the nation was at war, but he would flesh out that argument over the 
course of the next year.   To call woman suffrage “a national question” marked a 
complete reversal of his 1912 position, when he opined to the governor of Massachusetts 
that “[suffrage] is not a national question but a state question.”495
 Reaction to the President’s statement was predictable.  Suffragists were elated.  
Catt and Paul both immediately released statements praising Wilson’s new stand.
  The final justification 
Wilson offered – the fact that other “civilized” nations had granted woman suffrage – 
reflects his belief that the United States had emerged as a world leader.  With that new 
role came new responsibilities, to include being ahead of others in preserving and 
extending democracy.   
496
                                                 
494 “Wilson Back Amendment for Woman Suffrage,” New York Times, January 10, 1918, 2.  
 
 
495 Wilson to Governor Eugene Noble Foss (August 17, 1912), LWWP. The correspondence 
between Wilson and Foss was also discussed in Chapter 2. 
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Within the Democratic Party, Wilson’s conversion to federal action received mixed 
reviews.  Elected officials from suffrage states (almost all of whom were pro-suffrage) 
were pleased, but a number of Southern Democrats reacted negatively.  One Southern 
congressman blasted the President’s abandonment of the states’ rights position, publicly 
accusing Wilson of “attempting to coerce Democrats into voting against their party and 
their personal convictions.”497  An editorial in the New York Times compared Wilson’s 
reversal on the federal amendment to the position flips of previous presidents and 
concluded that Wilson was no better and no worse than his predecessors.  Questioning 
the sincerity of his conversion, though, the Times’ editorialist suggested that Wilson came 
out in support mainly to “put the Democrats on a par with the Republicans in ‘the 
suffrage states.’”498
 The House of Representatives voted on the measure on January 10, 1918.  As the 
table below indicates and as Catt and NAWSA had always maintained, bipartisan support 
was a key element in the victory: 
 While criticizing him for his lack of principles, even the anti-suffrage 
Times concluded that Wilson’s move was good politics considering the importance of 
suffrage in the upcoming midterm elections. Regardless of the reaction, Wilson’s support 
was important in what turned out to be an extremely close vote. 
      
Republicans    165     33 
Yes   No 
Democrats    104   102 
Miscellaneous    
Total     274   136 
5       1     
 
                                                                                                                                                 
496 “Wilson Favors Suffrage Vote; Says Changed Conditions Call for Federal Amendment,” 
Boston Daily Globe, January 10, 1918, 2. 
  
497 “House for Suffrage, 274 to 136,” New York Times, January 11, 1918, 2. The Congressman 
making this charge was Representative Frank Clark of Florida, a staunch anti-suffragist. 
 
498 “After the First Battle,” New York Times, January 12, 1918, 10.  
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The final vote was less than a fraction over the necessary two-thirds. The newest suffrage 
state – New York – figured prominently into the result.  New York’s delegation, with 33 
ayes and only 3 nays, played a pivotal role in the first congressional triumph for the 
federal amendment. 499
 From January to October 1918, the Senate vacillated on whether or not to vote on 
the suffrage amendment.  Predictions about the outcome were so close that calling for a 
vote was extremely risky for both sides.  When it looked as if it might pass, anti-suffrage 
Senators would filibuster to block a vote.  When it appeared that it would fail, they would 
rush to try and get the measure voted on.  Wilson campaigned zealously throughout the 
eight-month period between victory in the House and the first vote in the Senate. The 
main point he used to try and persuade reluctant Senators to vote for the amendment was 
that the Democrats might lose control of Congress if the suffrage amendment did not pass 
before the November 1918 mid-term elections.  Wilson repeatedly wrote to Senators that 
he needed Democrats to maintain control of Congress in order to successfully prosecute 
the war and ensure a lasting peace in the post-war settlement. 
   With high hopes for another quick victory, suffragists turned 
their attention to the Senate.  Despite Herculean efforts by the President, their hopes for 
success in the Senate were not to be realized for more than a year. 
 Despite his full desire for the amendment to pass, Wilson was constrained in his 
advocacy by several factors.  First, he recognized that the line between executive interest 
and executive interference was both highly sensitive and extremely thin.  His 
correspondence with Senators during the spring and summer of 1918 demonstrates that 
he struggled mightily with how far and how hard he could push without crossing that line 
                                                 
 
499 “House for Suffrage, 274 to 136, Exact Two-Thirds Vote Required, With Clark’s Ballot in 
Reserve,” New York Times, January 11, 1918, 1.  
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and creating a negative backlash against the amendment.  Secondly, he fully realized the 
pressure that Southern Democrats were under to protect white supremacy by opposing the 
amendment.  Knowing that they may face dire consequences in future elections, Wilson 
attempted to provide cover for Southerners who would be willing to support suffrage.   
Finally, Wilson was aware that dedication to continued white supremacy was only 
part of the issue for some Southern senators.  Despite the intense efforts of NAWSA and 
NWP leaders to not allow the suffrage movement to become entangled with other 
progressive issues, the overlap in membership between suffrage groups and other 
progressive interests such as the prohibition and child-labor movements made the 
entanglement impossible to avoid.  Leaders of the liquor and cotton textile industries 
feared that women voters would provide massive support to progressive legislation that 
would curtail their ability to turn a profit.500
For Senators who came from states in which those interests had the most power, 
support for suffrage was political suicide.  Though they often publicly emphasized their 
racist opposition to suffrage over their economic concerns, Wilson was not ignorant of 
the additional reasons beyond race for their opposition to a federal amendment.  Nor did 
he choose to push those particular senators with as much vigor.  As the record shows, he 
focused his efforts on those Democrats who did not have to answer to powerful industry 
lobbyists. 
   
In March, Tumulty received word from the Senate that the suffrage amendment 
would be brought to a vote within the next few days.  He wrote a memo to Wilson 
voicing his fears that the amendment would not pass and that its failure would be laid at 
the feet of the Democratic Party.  Indicating the continued importance of NAWSA’s 
                                                 
500 The role of the “interests” in opposing suffrage is covered in more detail in Chapter 6.  
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close relationship with the Administration, Tumulty informed the President that Catt had 
called and expressed hope that the two Democratic Senators from Florida might vote in 
the affirmative if Wilson asked them to do so.  Wilson responded that he “would weaken 
my influence in a score of directions if I were to depart from the rule I have set myself 
and send for Senators, but I am eager to advise them to vote for the amendment if they 
will themselves give me an opportunity to do so.”501
In a letter that sheds fascinating insight into the lengths to which a president will go 
to not cross the line between interest and interference, Tumulty wrote back to Wilson 
with an elaborate plan to get Senator Duncan Fletcher from Florida to come see the 
President without having it appear that Wilson had ordered him to the White House.  
Tumulty met with the pro-suffrage Senator Henry Hollis (D-NH) and together they 
devised a plan that Tumulty then passed along to Wilson: 
  Anxious to not violate senatorial 
courtesy, he encouraged Tumulty to devise a way for the Senators to come to the White 
House without being “called.”   
You [should] send for Senators Fletcher and Ransdell, both of whom are members of 
the Committee on Commerce, which Committee has recently been investigating the 
Shipping Board and Hog Island.  Senator Hollis understands that you have not talked 
over shipping matters with Fletcher and Ransdell for some time and that they will be 
able to give you some valuable information that may speed up the shipping 
programme.  They are both great friends of the Administration and are anxious to 
serve.  You might very properly send for them at once to discuss the speeding up of 
the shipping programme.  If you do this, Senator Ransdell will call your attention to 
the situation in connection with suffrage and will give you a most excellent chance to 
discuss it with Senator Fletcher.  Senator Trammell [from Florida] has stated that if 
Senator Fletcher votes for suffrage, he will also.  This will enable us to put the matter 
over this week.502
                                                 
 
 
501 See Tumulty to Wilson and Wilson to Tumulty (March 12, 1918), LWWP. 
 
502 Tumulty to Wilson (March 14, 1918), LWWP.  Senator Joseph Ransdell was a pro-suffrage 
Democrat from Louisiana. There is nothing in Wilson’s papers to indicate that this meeting ever actually 
took place, however, a rumor circulated in the press that Wilson had swung over two unnamed Southern 
Democrats and that the amendment would pass if brought to a vote.  Opponents blocked the vote based on 
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Tumulty’s letter is instructive for a number of reasons.  First, it shows that senatorial 
courtesy was not just an excuse that the President used to avoid openly pressuring 
Senators to vote in a particular way – a charge repeatedly leveled by the NWP.  If 
Tumulty and Wilson, in their private correspondence, were willing to go to these lengths 
to respect the need for Senators to at least appear independent, then the fear of crossing 
that invisible line was surely real and not just a convenient excuse for inaction.  
Secondly, it indicates the remarkable amount of coordination that was required among 
Wilson, his staff, NAWSA leaders, and pro-suffrage Senators to try and secure the 
federal amendment.  Winning suffrage in the Senate was no small task. 
The vote in March was blocked by opponents who feared that the resolution might 
pass. The next time a vote appeared on the horizon was early May.  Following a request 
from Catt and similar urging from Bass, Wilson wrote to seven Democratic Senators 
urging them to support the amendment.  The letters show his struggle to secure their 
support without alienating them through pushing too hard.  To Senator Josiah Wolcott of 
Delaware he typed, “I am writing this letter on my own typewriter (notwithstanding a 
lame hand) in order that it may be entirely confidential and may not in the least embarrass 
you if you should find that you cannot yield to this very earnest request.”503
                                                                                                                                                 
those rumors.  If the rumor was based on Senators Fletcher and Trammell, it appears to have been 
unfounded.  Both Senators voted “nay” each time the measure came up in the Senate (October, 1918 and 
February and June 1919).   
  He went on 
to make a convincing connection between passing the suffrage amendment and winning 
Democratic victories in the mid-term elections.  His letter concluded, “The next Congress 
must be controlled by genuine dependable friends; and we may lose it, - I fear we shall 
 
503 Wilson to Wolcott (May 9, 1918), LWWP. 
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lose it, - if we do not satisfy the opinion of the country in this matter [of suffrage] 
now.”504
The rest of the letters Wilson sent carried a similar message.  The replies he received 
indicate the many fronts on which he had to fight the suffrage war.  Senator J.C.W. 
Beckham of Kentucky said that he opposed the federal amendment because it violated the 
principle of states’ rights and because he was personally opposed to women having the 
right to vote.  Senator Benjamin Tillman of South Carolina replied by saying that the 
women of his state did not really want the vote and that he would not be a party to 
forcing it on them.  A similar reason was offered up by Senator Atlee Pomerene of Ohio 
who pointed out that he had personally voted for a state amendment when serving in the 
Ohio legislature, but that the amendment had been defeated in his state.  Like Tillman, 
Pomerene argued that he would be contradicting the will of his constituents if he 
supported the federal amendment.  From Florida came replies from Senator Fletcher that 
he did not believe suffrage was an issue that would hurt the Democrats in the upcoming 
election and from Senator Trammell who claimed only that he had already pledged to his 
constituents to oppose the amendment.
 
505
In addition to these objections, Wilson heard from Senator Lee Overman of North 
Carolina who made it very clear why he could not vote for suffrage.  In addition to 
offering up the same reason as Tillman and Pomerene, Overman wrote, “I am sure it will 
   
                                                 
 
504 Ibid.  Wilson’s Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, a native of North Carolina, also tried 
to swing Southern Democrats to the federal amendment.    According to his diary, he met with Senator 
J.C.W. Beckham of Kentucky on May 8, 1918 and Senator Park Trammel on January 25, 1919.  Neither 
were ultimately persuaded by Daniels or Wilson.  Cronon, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 1913-
1921, 303 and 370. 
 
505 See Beckham to Wilson (May 9, 1918), Tillman to Wilson (May 10, 1918), Pomerene to 
Wilson (May 11, 1918), Trammell to Wilson (May 16, 1918), and Fletcher to Wilson (May 11, 1918), 
LWWP. 
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be exceedingly unwise at this time, from a political standpoint, for a North Carolina 
Senator to favor the passage of this measure, as our people believe it might result in a 
very dangerous inroad into our social condition, if adopted, and would give us a great 
deal of trouble in the future.”506  Overman’s reference to the threat of black voters was 
clear.  What he did not say, but what was surely a part of his thought process, was the 
way the powerful cotton textile industries would be alienated by his support of suffrage – 
the passage of which they saw as directly connected to increased federal regulation of 
cheap child labor.507
Wilson, exasperated over the situation, sent an uncharacteristically curt letter to Bass 
in late May.  Bass had written the President expressing her belief that there were at least 
six senators who could be influenced to change their votes if the President would make 
an appeal to them.  As always, she mentioned the difficulty of winning the mid-term 
elections if suffrage did not pass.  Wilson wrote back, “It was supposed as you say in 
your letter . . . that there were ’half a dozen possibilities’ in the Senate from whom we 
might draw sufficient support to put the federal amendment through, but as a matter of 
fact I have done my best to draw from that half-dozen and have utterly failed.”
 
508
                                                 
 
 
506 Overman to Wilson (May 21, 1918), LWWP. 
 
507 For Overman’s connection to the American Cotton Manufacturer’s Association, see Morgan, 
Suffragists and Democrats: The Politics of Woman Suffrage in America, 173. Morgan makes a nuanced 
argument about the connection between suffrage and cotton.  Pointing out that senators who were beholden 
to the cotton barons also opposed woman suffrage “is not necessarily to imply that a vote against Suffrage 
meant that the Senator concerned used the States Rights and/or the race issue merely as a cloak for 
sectional and personal economic gain.  More correctly, it is to catalogue another complex of fears and 
hopes stirred by the Suffrage issue.” Quote from p. 175.  For an overt discussion of the connection between 
woman suffrage and the regulation of child labor, see the exchange between Senator Beckham (D-KY) and 
Senator Key Pittman (D-NE) during the debate over the federal amendment in September 1918.  Pittman 
suggested that women voters would remedy the problem of child labor in North and South Carolina.  
Beckham knowledge of child workers in those states and quickly tried to change the subject.  
Congressional Record, 65th Congress (September 30, 1918), 10948. 
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Unable to secure the necessary votes in May, suffragists were able to get their 
advocates in the Senate to delay the vote again.  With this additional time to garner 
support, they began to push Wilson to support the amendment as a war measure.  They 
hoped that the pressure of a war measure would either cause at least two Senators to 
change their votes in order to not appear unpatriotic or that Southerners could argue to 
their constituents that threats to national security were more important than threats to 
white supremacy.  
While Bass continued to communicate her fears about the mid-term elections, 
Wilson also began to hear the same fear from other corners.  U.S. Representative Jouett 
Shouse of Kansas wrote to convey his concern that a defeat for suffrage in the Senate 
would do serious harm to the re-election bids of Democrats in the suffrage states.  Shouse 
called for Wilson to make another public statement of his support for the amendment and 
his encouragement of Democratic Senators to vote in its favor.  On the same day, Catt 
also wrote to the President urging him to make a public statement that granting equal 
suffrage in the United States was critical to the successful prosecution of the war under 
the stated aim of making the world safe for democracy.509
 Ultimately, Wilson agreed to make another public statement.  He did so through a 
publicity mechanism provided by Catt.  The French Union for Woman Suffrage had 
written to him in February asking for an expression of his opinion on woman suffrage.  
He drafted a response that he submitted to Catt for her review on June 7.  Catt wrote back 
indicating her general approval of the letter but asking that he add one crucial sentence: 
   
                                                                                                                                                 
508 See Bass to Wilson (May 21, 1918), LWWP and Wilson to Bass (May 22, 1918), Life and 
Letters, Vol. 8. 
 
509 Shouse to Wilson (June 8, 1918) and Catt to Wilson (June 8, 1918), LWWP. 
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“As America’s answer to this question, it is my earnest hope that the Senate of the United 
States will pass the suffrage amendment to our federal constitution before the end of this 
session.”  Wilson rewrote his response with the new sentence inserted exactly as Catt had 
written it, and the letter was reproduced in all the major newspapers in mid-June.510
 Hoping to capitalize on the publicity from the letter to the French women, pro-
suffrage Democrats tried to call for a vote in late June.  Wilson again wrote letters to 
secure the necessary votes.  He did not publicly call the amendment a “war measure;” 
however, his private correspondence to reluctant senators repeatedly stressed the link 
between the war and granting equal suffrage.  To Senator John Shields of Tennessee, 
Wilson stated, “I feel that much of the morale of this country and of the world, and not a 
little of the faith which the rest of the world will repose in our sincere adherence to 
democratic principles, will depend upon the action which the Senate takes in this now 
critically important matter.”
 
511
Despite Wilson’s willingness to privately argue for the amendment as a war measure, 
he had little success with Southern Democrats.  In his reply, Senator Shields not only 
rejected Wilson’s contention that the adoption of the suffrage resolution would in any 
way contribute to the successful prosecution of the war, but also reiterated that the fear of 
losing white supremacy was “controlling” him and the majority of his colleagues from 
Southern states.
   
512
                                                 
 
  Uundaunted, Wilson wrote back to Shields, “I do earnestly believe 
510 See Catt to Wilson (June 11, 1918) and Wilson to Catt (June 7, 1918), NAWSA Records.  For 
the publicity generated, see Bass to Wilson (June 19, 1918), LWWP.  For specific examples, see “Must Pay 
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511 Wilson to Shields (June 20, 1918), LWWP. 
 
233 
 
that our action upon this amendment will have an important and immediate influence 
upon the whole atmosphere and more of the nations engaged in the war.”513
 With the vote scheduled for June 27, Wilson made himself available to a group of 
Senate Democrats who came to ask his opinion on the measure.  Like the meeting with 
House Democrats before the January vote, this meeting was engineered solely for the 
publicity it would again give to the President’s message of support.  The Senators that 
attended were all pro-suffrage already, but they were able to report to the press 
afterwards that Wilson had been very enthusiastic about the measure passing under a 
Democratic Congress.
  His efforts 
were in vain.  Shields voted “nay” in October and again in February and June 1919. 
514
 What did have an effect was Wilson’s request to Senator Ollie James of Kentucky 
to give up his agreement to be paired with an anti-suffrage senator for the upcoming vote.  
With James’ agreement to give up his pair, the pro-suffrage forces believed they had 
enough votes to pass the resolution.  Thanks to Wilson’s intervention with James, a 
victory in the Senate appeared imminent.  Once again, though, opponents of the measure 
refused to let it come to a vote for fear that they would not be able to secure its defeat.
  Despite these efforts, the public pronouncement did not have 
the intended effect of convincing any reluctant Democrats to change their votes. 
515
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The Senate then adjourned until the beginning of September.  
 
513 Wilson to Shields (June 26, 1918), Life and Letters, Vol. 8. 
 
514 Appointment books (June 24, 1918), Life and Letters, Vol. 8. 
 
515 Wilson to James (June 24, 1918), Life and Letters, Vol. 8.  A paired vote is an agreement 
between two senators to be recorded on opposite sides of an issue.  Pairing is used when one or both 
members will be absent in order to cancel the effect of the absence.  By “giving up his pair” with the anti-
suffrage senator who was going to be absent, James added his vote in favor of the amendment and 
eliminated the possibility of the absent anti from registering any vote. 
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 The Senate’s failure to vote on suffrage before adjourning for the summer 
prompted Paul to resume the NWP campaign against Wilson and the Democrats.  It will 
be recalled from Chapter 5 that, following the release from jail of the final group of 
pickets in November 1917, the NWP had ceased picketing the White House.  Wilson’s 
endorsement and the passage of the federal amendment by the House in January 
convinced Paul to maintain a truce while working to secure victory in the Senate.  
Interestingly, as Catt and other NAWSA representatives corresponded and coordinated 
with the White House on a regular basis during 1918, the administration refused to 
collaborate with the NWP.516
In August, she orchestrated two protest meetings in Lafayette Square across from 
the White House in which NWP members held up banners condemning Wilson and the 
Senate Democrats.  A number of women were arrested and received 10-15 day sentences 
for the crime of “congregating in the park.”
 Frustrated with the Senate and irritated by the President, 
Paul ended her temporary truce.   
517
                                                 
 
  In September, Paul initiated a new tactic: 
burning the President’s words.  Wilson met with members of NAWSA on the morning of 
September 16 and assured them that he was doing his utmost to bring the amendment to a 
vote in the Senate.  Later that afternoon, NWP protestors rallied in Lafayette Square.  
Holding up a copy of the President’s promise to NAWSA, the NWP speaker reportedly 
516 In May, an NWP delegation asked to meet with the President to show him a poll they had taken 
of the Senate.  Tumulty advised Wilson against meeting with representatives of the NWP, noting that “Mrs. 
Catt, Mrs. Gardener, and the women of the other branch have been cooperating with the Administration in 
a most loyal way.”  Wilson concurred.  He instructed Tumulty, “Please say to [the NWP representatives] 
that I have been keeping in touch with the situation as closely as possible and am doing everything that is 
open to me to do.”  See Tumulty to Wilson (May 7, 1918) and Kent to Wilson (May 8, 1918), LWWP.  
 
517 “Suffragists Again Attack President,” New York Times, August 7, 1918, 1; “Seize Suffragists 
Near White House,” New York Times, August 13, 1918, 9; “Jail for 26 Suffragists; Ten and 15 Day 
Penalties for Women in White House Gathering,” New York Times, August 16, 1918, 9. 
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lit the paper on fire and threw it into an urn, declaring, “The President has given words, 
and words, and words.  Today, women receive more words.  We announce to the 
President and the whole world today, by this act of ours, our determination that words 
shall no longer be the only reply given to American women.”518
Clever visual rhetoric aside, these protests did nothing to move Wilson who was 
already doing everything within his power to secure the federal amendment.  Later in the 
year, the NWP would turn more of their attention to the Senate, picketing and burning the 
words of select senators on the steps of the Capitol.  In early 1919, they returned their 
attention to Wilson, burning him in effigy while he was participating in the peace talks at 
Versailles.  Paul also launched “The Prison Special,” a train tour across the country 
featuring NWP prison veterans.  Historian Sidney Bland refers to 1918-1919 as the 
“pathological phase” of the NWP’s existence.
 
519  With the exception of the ardent 
revisionists, most suffrage historians concur with Bland’s assessment and conclude that 
the NWP became a liability to the cause of suffrage in this time period.520
                                                 
 
  Evidence in 
preceding chapters showed that most Americans disapproved of NWP militancy in 1917 
even though the President was still not on record as supporting the federal amendment.  
518 “Suffragists Burn President’s Words,” New York Times, September 17, 1918, 13.  
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keep the militants happy in the company of each other.” 
 
520 For interpretations that still see NWP actions post-1917 as helpful to the cause, see Lunardini, 
From Equal Suffrage to Equal Rights: Alice Paul and the National Woman's Party, 1910-1928, 145-146. , 
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Evidence presented later in this chapter shows that the American public – and more 
importantly, potential political allies - moved beyond disapproval to disgust when the 
NWP continued to target the President after he had publicly and repeatedly declared his 
support for the measure.  While the NWP wrongly and unwisely attacked him for 
inaction in the summer of 1918, Wilson was actually hard at work securing support in the 
Senate, a task often made more difficult due to the abhorrence of the NWP among most 
Democrats. 
 In late August, Wilson was able to ensure additional support for the amendment 
by urging the appointment of a pro-suffrage senator to replace Senator James who had 
died earlier in the summer.  Wilson maintained a close correspondence with Governor 
Augustus Stanley of Kentucky who had the responsibility of appointing James’ 
successor.  In his initial letter to Stanley, the only issue that Wilson mentioned in 
connection with the appointment was that of suffrage.  He wrote, “It would be of great 
advantage to the party and to the country if his successor entertained views favorable to 
the pending constitutional amendment.”521  Stanley responded that he had appointed 
George B. Martin to succeed James.  He indicated that Martin was not personally in favor 
of suffrage, but he was reasonably certain that the new appointee would defer to the 
President and support the amendment.522
 When the Senate reconvened in September, the vote on the amendment was 
scheduled for October 1.  In concert, Catt and Wilson made a final push to secure the 
necessary votes from Southern Democrats.  On September 18, Catt wrote to Wilson, 
  Indeed, Martin helped to break the “solid 
South” by voting “yea” in October. 
                                                 
521 Wilson to Stanley (August 30, 1918), LWWP. 
 
522 Stanley to Wilson (September 7, 1918), LWWP. 
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“Every Senator knows that the vote of the Amendment depends upon Mr. Benet [of 
South Carolina] and he, if voting ‘aye’ on the first roll call, would virtually make the 
announcement that it will pass.”523
Wilson did his best.  He wrote to Benet on the same day that he received Catt’s 
letter.  Additionally, he coordinated a meeting with Benet and the governor of South 
Carolina in the Oval Office on September 23.  Benet was strongly opposed, but Wilson 
did not give up.  He wrote to him again three days later urging the amendment as a war 
measure: “On this ground I appeal to you to hold up the President’s hands at the time of 
all times when his responsibility to his own country and his obligations to the cause of 
world-democracy weigh most heavily upon him.”
  She went on to implore the President to seek Benet’s 
vote that she was certain would swing over several other Southern Democrats. 
524  Again, Wilson’s efforts went 
unrewarded as Benet voted “nay” just four days later.  During his final correspondence 
with Benet, Wilson also made one last appeal via telegram to five other Southern 
Democrats, all of whom refused to change their positions.525
The Senate recessed over the weekend of September 28-29 with the vote scheduled 
for Tuesday, October 1.  Knowing that they were two votes short of the two-thirds 
majority required for passage, Catt dashed off a desperation letter to Wilson on Sunday 
morning.  She informed him that the only way she could see to secure two more votes 
was for the President to publicly endorse suffrage as a war measure.  Catt asked the 
 
                                                 
 
523 Catt to Wilson (September 18, 1918), NAWSA Records.  Senator Christie Benet of South 
Carolina was appointed to the U.S. Senate to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Senator Benjamin 
Tillman.  Benet only served from July 6 to November 5, 1918 when an elected successor, William P. 
Pollock, took office.   
 
524 See Wilson to Benet (September 18, 1918), Appointment Books (September 23, 1918), and 
Wilson to Benet (September 26, 1918), Life and Letters, Vol. 8. 
 
525 Ibid. 
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President to write a letter stating his support of suffrage as a war measure so that the 
letter could then be printed in the newspapers prior to the Senate vote.  She hoped, 
although did not guarantee, that this step by Wilson would swing two senators around in 
support of the resolution.526
It was a busy Sunday for Wilson.  In addition to receiving Catt’s letter, Treasury 
Secretary McAdoo personally called on the President to urge him to appear before the 
Senate on Monday and make a final appeal for the suffrage amendment.  Two pro-
suffrage Senators came to see him in the afternoon voicing their support for McAdoo’s 
suggestion.
 
527
With only a few hours notice to Congress and to the media, Wilson appeared in the 
Senate chamber at 1 pm on September 30.  He spoke for just 15 minutes, but his speech 
marked the first public pronouncement of his support for suffrage as a war measure.  He 
said that the amendment’s adoption was “clearly necessary to the successful prosecution 
of the war and the successful realization of the object for which the war is being 
fought.”
  Despite his fear that such an act might cross the fragile line into the realm 
of executive interference, Wilson decided that it was the only hope for securing the 
needed votes.  He apparently believed that some Southern Democrats would feel safer 
explaining an affirmative vote to their constituents if they could say that they had been 
following the wishes of the President. 
528
                                                 
 
  The rest of the world was looking to “the great, powerful, famous democracy 
526 Catt to Wilson (September 29, 1918), NAWSA Records, Box 32, Reel 21. 
 
527 Appointment books (September 29, 1918), Life and Letters, Vol. 8. 
 
528 Congressional Record, 65th Congress (September 30, 1918), p. 10928-10929.  The speech was 
also reprinted in major newspapers.  For example, see “President Demands Ballot for Women,” Boston 
Daily Globe, October 1, 1918, 3; “President Urges Senate to Extend Suffrage,” Wall Street Journal, 
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of the West to lead them,” Wilson said, and he warned that “they will cease to follow or 
to trust us” if the Senate failed to adopt the federal suffrage amendment. He made 
repeated references to the injustice of withholding the full rights of citizenship from those 
who had sacrificed so much in their country’s time of need.  Noting that most of the 
allied nations of Europe had enfranchised women, Wilson asked, “Are we alone to ask 
and take the utmost that our women can give – service and sacrifice of every kind – and 
still say we do not see what title that gives them to stand by our sides in the guidance of 
the affairs of their nation and ours?”  He concluded with one final and exceedingly 
personal appeal that linked passage of the amendment with successful prosecution of the 
war: “The executive tasks of this war rest upon me.  I ask that you lighten them and place 
in my hands instruments, spiritual instruments, which I do not now possess, which I 
sorely need, and which I have daily to apologize for not being able to employ.”529
The speech did not have the intended effect.  In his memoirs, McAdoo regretted 
having the President appear before the Senate.  He recalled that the appeal was deeply 
resented by those who opposed the amendment and even offended some pro-suffrage 
senators who felt that Wilson had indeed crossed over too many lines of senatorial 
tradition and respect.
 
530
                                                                                                                                                 
October 1, 1918, 7; “Wilson makes Suffrage Appeal, but Senate Waits,” New York Times, October 1, 1918, 
1. 
  Southern Democrats, in particular, rejected Wilson’s attempt to 
portray a federal suffrage amendment as essential to winning the war.   
 
529 Ibid. Wilson also used the speech as a forum in which he could again distance himself and the 
mainstream suffrage movement from the NWP.  He went out of his way to say that his decision to support 
suffrage was in no way a result of the “voices of foolish and intemperate agitators [that] do not reach me at 
all.” 
 
530 William Gibbs McAdoo, Crowded Years: The Reminiscences of William G. Mcadoo (New 
York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1931), 498. 
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Senator John Sharp Williams of Mississippi found the idea of woman suffrage as a 
war measure laughable.  He told reporters that “he loved President Wilson as a brother, 
but when the President told him he could not outmaneuver Ludendorff or capture 
Palestine unless the women in Mississippi could vote, he declined to agree with him.”531 
Specifically raising the issue of race, Williams went on to say that winning the war “had 
[nothing] to do with the right of negro women to vote in Mississippi.”532 On the floor of 
the Senate, Senator Beckham of Kentucky also refuted the idea of the federal amendment 
as a war measure and said that it was, in fact, a distraction from real war measures: “Our 
whole attention and energy should be directed to the successful prosecution of this war 
and not to a matter like this which can well wait until the minds of the people are in a 
calmer and better condition to deal with such a radical change in a fundamental question 
of government.”533
Joining with his Southern comrades, Senator Underwood of Alabama predicted 
calamity should the measure pass.  Citing states’ rights as the foundation of the Republic, 
Underwood described the federal amendment as “this instrument that may be the final 
overthrow of the very life and integrity of these state governments.”
  
534
                                                 
 
  When another 
senator suggested that the Southern states could disenfranchise black women just as 
easily as they had enfranchised black men, Underwood bristled: “The Senator would buy 
our votes with an assurance that conditions may remain as they are, and have us abandon 
the great fundamental principles of government that [Southerners] have maintained from 
531 “Suffrage Beaten in Senate by Two Votes,” Boston Daily Globe, October 2, 1918, 2.  
 
532 Ibid.  
 
533 Congressional Record, 65th Congress (September 30, 1918), 10949.  
 
534 Ibid., 10929.    
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the beginning . . . Our votes are not for sale at any price.  We stand for these principles 
because we believe that the integrity of our race and our Government and the protection 
of our women require it.”535  According to Josephus Daniels, Senator Thomas Martin of 
Virginia, an intense rival of Wilson’s, but a usually loyal Democrat, “was hot with 
indignation at the President’s bringing up woman suffrage in the stress of war and trying 
to persuade Senators that such action would help with the war.”536
Whether senators were offended or not, the vote status did not change.  As predicted, 
when the votes were cast on the following day, the resolution fell two votes short of a 
two-thirds majority: 
  
        
Republicans    32   12 
Yes   No 
Democrats    
Total     62   34 
30   22     
 
The breakdown of the vote showed that the overwhelming reason for the resolution’s 
failure was the opposition of Southern Democrats – 19/22 opposed Democrats were from 
the South.  The three additional Democrats that voted “nay” were staunch anti-
                                                 
 
535 Ibid., 10931.   Sadly, the Senate debate over the federal amendment reveals national acceptance 
of the disenfranchisement of African Americans in the South.  When pro-suffrage senators tried to 
convince their Southern counterparts to support suffrage, they almost always did so by assuring them that 
they could just as easily disenfranchise black women.  Some even offered up analysis that showed how 
enfranchising only white women would actually strengthen white supremacy in the South.  Senator James 
Phelan (D-CA) assured his Southern comrades, “So by extending the suffrage to women you do not change 
the present condition, deplorable as it may be in the eyes of the men of the South.  You simply increase the 
electorate by the addition of women; and if they are less literate than the men, or if they hold no property . . 
. there is very little likelihood of their ever exercising the suffrage . . . The amendment, I am told, will 
increase by 20 per cent the voting white population in the South as a whole.  So the South will be stronger.  
Where, then, is the danger?”  Ibid., 10944.    
 
536 Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 1910-1917, 524. According to Daniels, Wilson and 
Martin shared a deep-seeded antipathy of one another that stretched back to Wilson’s time as governor of 
New Jersey.  Still, Daniels recalled in his memoirs, “Though he didn’t like Wilson and though as a 
standpatter he did not approve of many of Wilson’s policies, and personally did not like the most 
progressive ones, Martin piloted some of the most important Wilson measures through the Senate . . . He 
followed the lead of the chosen party leader as he expected Democrats in Virginia to [do].” Quote from p. 
525.  Suffrage, of course, serves as an exception to the tendency outlined above. 
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prohibitionists.537
Wilson was well aware of the political liability the failure had created for Democrats 
from suffrage states facing reelection the following month.  He was also aware that his 
plans for the post-war settlement depended greatly on maintaining a Democratic majority 
in Congress.  In an angry letter to Senator Williams of Mississippi in the days 
immediately following the vote, he wrote, “I must frankly say that I was very much 
grieved that the Senate did not respond to my appeal about woman suffrage the other day, 
because I knew what I was talking about when I spoke of the effect it would have upon 
our moral influence on the other side of the water and the effect is going to be very 
serious.”
  The need to maintain white supremacy and the power of the cotton 
textile industry in the South combined with the power of the liquor industry in certain 
northern states was too strong a coalition for even the President to overcome.    
538
 So concerned was Wilson with losing control of Congress that in late October he 
issued a press statement in which he asked voters to set aside their partisan affiliation and 
to return a Democratic majority in both the House and Senate.  He explained, “This is not 
time either for divided counsels or for divided leadership.”  A Republican majority in 
either chamber would not only obstruct his ability to prosecute the war, Wilson said, but 
also, “be interpretative on the other side of the water as a repudiation of my 
leadership.”
  As the mid-term elections would show, the effect was serious, indeed. 
539
                                                 
 
  This desperate gamble backfired terribly.  As one Wilson biographer 
537 Morgan, Suffragists and Democrats: The Politics of Woman Suffrage in America, 126.  Anti-
Prohibitionists were Senator Reed of Missouri, Senator Hitchkock of New Hampshire, and Senator 
Pomerene of Ohio.  For details of their activity as “wets,” see Ibid., 165.It is interesting to note that there is 
no record of Wilson directly trying to influence two of these three Senators, suggesting that he was 
sympathetic to their need to not alienate the political support they received from the liquor industry. 
 
538 Wilson to Williams (October 5, 1918), Life and Letters, Vol. 8. 
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noted, “No single act of Wilson’s as president would spark more criticism at the time and 
lead to more retrospective repudiation.”540
Voters went to the polls on November 5 and, for the first time in decades, restored a 
Republican majority in both the House and the Senate.  In the House, Democrats lost 23 
seats.  Republicans gained a 49-47 advantage in the Senate by garnering six seats and 
only losing one.  Suffrage was an issue in some of the Congressional campaigns, but 
other powerful currents also caused a backlash against the Democratic Party.  Chief 
among them were Wilson’s post-war peace plans that violated the isolationist sentiments 
of many Western voters.   Democrats also wrestled with the strong perception among 
mid-Western wheat farmers that the Wilson administration showed favoritism to the 
South by fixing wheat prices to their detriment but allowing cotton prices to go 
unregulated to the tremendous profit of Southern cotton growers.
  Failure to secure the suffrage amendment was 
surely part of Wilson’s calculus as he surveyed the Democrats’ chances in the weeks 
before the election and made the decision to issue such a radical call.  Ultimately, it was a 
call that voters answered in a most adverse way. 
541
The October Senate defeat of the suffrage bill caused both NAWSA and the NWP to 
alter their traditional election year strategies for the 1918 mid-term elections.  NAWSA 
launched campaigns against anti-suffrage Senators in New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
539 “Text of President Wilson’s Appeal,” New York Times, October 26, 1918, 1.  
 
540 Cooper, Woodrow Wilson: A Biography, 445. While most Wilson historians contend that 
Wilson’s call to “adjourn politics” just days before the midterms actually inflamed passions of the 
Republicans and contributed significantly to their midterm victory, Cooper disagrees.  According to 
Cooper, “Wilson’s actions made a bad partisan situation marginally worse, but opposition to him already 
bordered on and sometimes crossed over into hatred.”  Quote from p. 446.  Cooper goes on to contend that 
foreign policy was a relatively minor issue in the midterms.  Republicans won in most places based on 
domestic and local issues. 
 
541Seward W. Livermore, "The Sectional Issue in the 1918 Congressional Elections," The 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review 35, no. 1 (June 1948): 38. Livermore points out that 21/23 of the lost 
House seats came from the West and mid-West, as did 4/6 of the lost Senate seats.  See p. 58. 
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Massachusetts, and Delaware.  Catt made it clear that this was not a break from their 
policy of remaining non-partisan – they campaigned against Democrats and Republicans 
alike – but that it was a deeper plunge into the political fray than the National had 
previously taken.542  A more radical policy shift was that taken by the NWP.  While 
continuing their campaign to “hold the party in power responsible” by urging Western 
women to vote against Democrats, they also decided to work for the election of a 
Democrat in New Hampshire who was pro-suffrage and running against the incumbent 
anti-suffrage Republican.543
Through their combined – though not coordinated – efforts, the two suffrage 
organizations contributed to the defeat of the Republican Senator Weeks in 
Massachusetts by the pro-suffrage Democrat David Walsh.  When J. Heisler Ball, the 
Republican senatorial candidate in Delaware, announced his support for the federal 
amendment just two weeks before the election, suffragists successfully threw their entire 
energies into defeating the incumbent anti-suffrage Democrat, Senator Willard 
Saulsbury.
 
544
                                                 
 
  The required two additional votes in the Senate were now guaranteed for 
the 66th Congress.   
542 Harper, The History of Woman Suffrage, Vol. 5, 1900-1920, 641. See also, “Suffrage Will Win, 
Mrs. Catt Declares,” New York Times, October 5, 1918, 11.  Asked by reporters what NAWSA would do 
following the defeat of the federal amendment in the Senate, Catt replied, “There will be no idler in the 
suffrage ranks.  Specifically, what we are going to and where we are going to do it, we don’t purpose to 
say.  However, I will say this: We shall do a very considerable amount of campaigning in States where men 
are running for Congress. We know, of course, the attitude toward suffrage of every candidate for the 
national Congress, and we shall see to it, as far as possible, that the candidates who are in favor of suffrage 
shall be elected.” 
 
543 For the campaign to galvanize enfranchised women to vote against Democrats, see Statement 
of Alice Paul (October 24, 1918), NWPP, Reel 2.  For plans to support a Democrat in New Hampshire, see 
NWP Treasurer to Miss Evelyn Ryce (October 19, 1918), NWPP, Reel 2. 
 
544  Morgan, Suffragists and Democrats: The Politics of Woman Suffrage in America, 132-133. , 
Harper, The History of Woman Suffrage, Vol. 5, 1900-1920, 641. 
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The question remained whether the Democrats would be able to make one more 
effort to pass the resolution during the 65th Congress and at least claim partial credit for 
the victory.  The November election also saw state suffrage victories in Michigan, South 
Dakota, and Oklahoma, which increased the number of presidential electors for which 
women could vote to 339, as compared with only 92 in 1916.  The women’s vote in the 
1920 presidential election would be significant and both parties now began to jockey for 
that vote.  Democrats had hurt themselves with their failure to pass the amendment in 
October.  They would inflict further damage to their long-term interests by failing again 
in February. 
 Wilson was incensed with the refusal of Senate Democrats to heed his call for 
passage of the suffrage amendment.  The tenor of his correspondence suggests that his 
anger was not so much about prolonging the injustice of unequal suffrage, but about the 
political damage done to the party.  The most pressing thing in the President’s mind was 
his plan for U.S. involvement in a league of nations after the war.  Without a Democrat-
controlled Congress, his ability to execute that plan would be greatly hindered.  Without 
the support of women voters, winning back the presidency in 1920 would be almost 
impossible. 
Even before the mid-term elections, he began to work the Senate again in the hope 
that the amendment would pass during a later session of the 65th Congress.  Less than two 
weeks after the failed October vote, he wrote to the Governor of South Carolina in an 
attempt to discern the suffrage stance of the newly elected Senator, William P. Pollock, 
that would replace Senator Benet, stating, “I was so deeply disappointed in the action of 
Senator Benet about the suffrage amendment . . . It is a matter of the utmost consequence 
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that the amendment should be adopted by the Senate, and any representations that I can 
legitimately make to Senator-select Pollock, I should like very much to convey.”545
An early November memo written by Tumulty for the President outlining the major 
issues for the next year further demonstrates the importance of the suffrage issue to 
Wilson’s administration.  Under the heading “things to be attended to at once,” Tumulty 
listed suffrage as the number one issue.  He explained, “The policy of the Democratic 
Party should be to put [the federal amendment] over now and thus obtain the credit for it.  
If we wait, the Republicans will surely put it over in March and we will have the name of 
defeating it.”
   
546
Suffrage leaders encouraged the President to press the amendment on the Senate 
before he left for Paris – a request with which Wilson willingly complied.  In his State of 
the Union message, given just days before he sailed for Europe, Wilson said: 
  Now that suffrage could serve as a wedge issue between parties, the 
stakes over who could claim credit for its passage were considerably raised. 
And what shall we say of the women, - of their instant intelligence, quickening every 
task that they touched; their capacity for organization and cooperation, which gave 
their action discipline and enhanced the effectiveness of everything they attempted. 
Their contribution to the great result is beyond appraisal.  They have added a new 
luster to the annals of American womanhood.  The least tribute we can pay them is to 
make them the equals of men in political rights as they have proved themselves their 
equals in every field of practical work they have entered, whether for themselves or 
for their country.  These great days of completed achievement would be sadly 
marred were we to omit that act of justice.547
 
 
Publicly, women’s war service figured prominently in Wilson’s appeal, but the 
importance of suffrage to party politics was the resounding theme of his private petitions. 
                                                 
 
545 Wilson to Manning (October 10, 1918), Life and Letters, Vol 8. 
 
546 Memorandum by Tumulty (November 9, 1918), LWWP. 
 
547 State of the Union Message (December 2, 1918), LWWP.  For NAWSA’s request for mention 
of suffrage in the speech, see Gardener to Wilson (November 27, 1918), LWWP. 
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 The Governor of South Carolina had assured Wilson that Senator-select Pollock 
would vote in favor of the federal amendment.  Consequently, he needed to secure only 
one more vote for the measure to pass in the 65th Congress.  Before leaving for Europe, 
he focused his efforts on Senator Williams of Mississippi and Senator Edward Gay of 
Louisiana, neither of whom agreed to change their positions.548  He remained in constant 
contact with Tumulty about the suffrage situation while in Paris, inquiring, “Is their 
anything else that I can do that might help to bring about the passage of the suffrage 
amendment?”549
 A confidential letter from Williams to Wilson in mid-January made it clear that 
his position was immovable.  In addition to the fear of decreased white supremacy in the 
South, Williams communicated his ongoing displeasure with the NWP’s latest series of 
protests.  A potential candidate to cast the one additional vote in favor of suffrage, 
Williams responded to the President’s request for assistance by saying that he would 
never vote for suffrage “as long as they keep up their infantile and asinine bonfire 
performances in Lafayette Park.”
 
550
 When the amendment finally came to a vote on the Senate floor on February 10, it 
was more a formality than anything else.  All interested parties were aware that the 
resolution was still one vote short of the necessary two-thirds.  The only changed vote 
  To the bitter end, the post-1917 tactics of the NWP 
did more harm than good for the suffrage movement. 
                                                 
 
548 See Wilson to Williams (November 29, 1918) and Wilson to Robert Ewing (December 2, 
1918), LWWP. 
 
549 Wilson to Tumulty (January 10, 1918), LWWP. 
 
550 Williams to Wilson (January 15, 1919), John Sharp William Papers, quoted in Morgan, 136.  
For details of NWP activities in January and February 1919, see Lewis to Mrs. George H. Day (January 20, 
1918), NWPP, Reel 2. 
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from October was that of Senator Pollock who provided the keynote speech.  His address 
to the Senate was an eloquent tribute to women’s war service and to the President’s 
leadership of the nation during the war.  He explained that he felt it was his duty as a 
Democrat to heed the President’s call and support the suffrage amendment.  Additionally, 
he appealed to his fellow southerners by claiming that white supremacy in the South 
would not be threatened by extending suffrage to women.  Pollock explained, “The black 
man could not control the white man, and the Negro man and the Negro woman 
combined can not any the more control the white man and the white woman 
combined.”551
 Despite Pollock’s appeal, the outcome was as expected.  The amendment failed to 
pass by a vote of 63-33, one vote short of the required two-thirds majority.  With nearly 
three weeks to go before the 65th Congress officially adjourned, pro-suffrage Democrats 
scrambled to try and get one more vote.  When rumors emerged that they had the votes, 
Republicans filibustered to block a vote before Congress adjourned on March 4.  Fully 
aware of and disgusted with the manner in which party politics were driving the train, 
Catt later explained:  
 
Friendly Democrats [contended] that the Northern opposed Senators were merely 
postponing action in order to throw to the Republicans whatever political credit 
might accrue from the passage of the Amendment in the Sixty-sixth Congress, and 
Republican Senators accusing the Democrats of attempting to cover their years of 
opposition to federal suffrage action, by the appearance of support at the eleventh 
hour.  Both accusations contained much truth, and the sorry fact was that the Sixty-
fifth Congress adjourned with the Amendment not yet submitted.552
 
 
                                                 
 
551 Congressional Record, 65th Congress (February 10, 1919), 3055. 
 
552 Catt and Shuler, Woman Suffrage and Politics: The Inner Story of the Suffrage Movement, 337.  
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Barring unforeseen deaths of pro-suffrage Senators, the amendment was guaranteed to 
pass in the Republican-controlled 66th Congress.  Its failure during the 65th Congress was 
a defeat for Wilson personally and for the Democrats as a party.   
 Both parties wanted an early vote on the suffrage amendment during the 66th 
Congress.  Wilson and his staff took several actions to try and give credit to the 
Democratic Party for the eventual suffrage victory.  First among these was the President’s 
call for a special session of Congress to meet May 19, 1919.  Within two days of 
convening, the resolution to send the federal suffrage amendment to the states for 
ratification passed in the House by a vote of 304-89.553
 Wilson was back in Europe by the time the 66th Congress convened.  In another 
attempt to claim Democratic credit for the victory, Tumulty wrote to the President that 
suffrage organizations were beginning to publicly declare that victory in the Senate was 
not assured, despite what had seemed a guarantee after the November 1918 elections. 
Tumulty urged Wilson to secure the vote of Senator William Harris of Georgia, a 
Democrat who had been elected largely as a result of Wilson’s support during his 
campaign.
  As usual, the Senate was not as 
swift. 
554
                                                 
 
  Harris was vacationing in Europe at the time, and Tumulty was convinced 
that, if the President could get his vote and have him make a public statement to that 
553 Harper, The History of Woman Suffrage, Vol. 5, 1900-1920, 644.  
 
554 Wilson had intervened in Georgia’s Democratic primary in the fall of 1918.  Condemning the 
incumbent Democrat, Senator Thomas Hardwick, for consistent opposition to Wilson’s policies, the 
President urged voters to support Harris.  The appeal was apparently effective.  Harris carried 114 of 
Gerogia’s 152 counties. Cooper, Woodrow Wilson: A Biography, 436-437.  Wilson also inserted himself 
into a number of other primary races that fall.  According to Cooper, “Wilson’s involvement in the 1918 
primaries would become the only successful party purge by a president in American history . . . He was 
playing for larger stakes than just settling scores with opponents in his own party.  This was the final, 
knockout blow in his fight for supremacy among Democrats.” Quote from p. 437. 
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effect, the newspapers would report that it was the Democrats, rather than the 
Republicans that had secured the passage of the resolution.555
 Wilson met with Harris on May 8, and the newly elected Senator informed him 
that he would vote for the federal amendment.  Leading newspapers from across the 
country carried stories about Harris’ pledge in the days following this meeting in Europe.  
As Tumulty and Wilson had hoped, almost all newspaper accounts quoted Democratic 
sources who claimed Harris’ vote was the one that would put the amendment through in 
the special session of Congress.
 
556
As the final vote would show, Republicans would not allow full credit to go to their 
opponents.  There were four more votes in favor of suffrage on June 4 than there had 
been on October 1, 1918.  Two votes were from Democrats and two were from 
Republicans.  The debate over which party should get credit did not end in June 1919.  
Just a few days before the Senate vote, when the actual date had been shifted for the third 
time, an exasperated Mary Hay summed up the feelings of many suffragists who were fed 
up with being the pawns in a game of partisan politics.  Hay wrote to a comrade, “All 
men are liars – Rep. and Dem – at least they get that way when they go to the Senate.”
   
557
 When the roll was finally called in the Senate on June 4, 1919, the results were as 
follows: 
 
                                                 
 
555 Tumulty to Wilson (April 30, 1919) and (May 2, 1919), LWWP. 
 
556 For Wilson’s meeting with Harris see Diary Entry of Dr. Grayson (May 8, 1919), LWWP.  For 
information about Harris’ statement and its coverage in the press, see Tumulty to Wilson (May 9, 1919) 
and Wilson to Tumulty (May 13, 1919), LWWP.  See also, “Georgia Senator to Swing Suffrage; Harris 
Said to Have Informed Wilson That He Will Support the Amendment,” New York Times, May 10, 1919, 7; 
“Suffrage Champions Certain of Success; Senator Harris of Georgia Announces He Will Vote for 
Amendment,” Los Angeles Times, May 10, 1919, 12. 
 
557 Mary Garrett Hay to Maud Wood Park (June 1919), Woman’s Rights Collection, Mary Garret 
Hay Series, Reel 1, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe College, Cambridge, MA, available online at 
http://womhist.alexanderstreet.com/lobby/doclist.htm.  
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Republicans    40    9 
Yes   No 
Democrats    
Total     66   30 
26   21     
 
Senator Pollock’s “aye” vote from February had been cancelled by his successor, Senator 
Dial, who voted “nay.”  The four changes from October were Walsh of Massachusetts 
and Ball of Delaware – both newly elected with the support of suffragists during the 1918 
mid-term elections.  These two were joined by Senator Harris who had been persuaded 
by Wilson and Senator Hale, a Republican from Maine who changed his vote because his 
state had passed into the ranks of the “suffrage states” since the October vote.558
 Victory in Congress, sweet though it was, only meant that suffragists could now 
turn their attention to the ratification campaign that needed to be fought in the states.  The 
Wilson Administration, of course, did its best to put a positive spin on the victory for the 
Democratic Party.  Both parties, in fact, jockeyed in the press to claim credit for the 
amendment’s final passage.
 
559
Perhaps the most interesting thing to take away from the last stage of the suffrage 
battle in Congress is the fact that Wilson’s ability to influence members of his own party 
had its limits.  When the political survival of certain senators depended more on their 
constituents who feared any threat to white supremacy or their contributors who feared 
the economic damage women voters might inflict than it did on the support of the 
  But those who studied the results of the Senate vote could 
see that it was mostly in spite of the Democrats that the resolution passed.   
                                                 
 
558 Harper, The History of Woman Suffrage, Vol. 5, 1900-1920, 646-648. , Morgan, Suffragists and 
Democrats: The Politics of Woman Suffrage in America, 140. 
 
559 For an example of the debate over which party should get credit for passing the amendment, 
see “Federal Woman Suffrage,” New York Times, June 6, 1919, 12.  
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President, they placed personal interests above the President’s request for support.  As a 
result, the Democratic Party suffered the backlash of pro-suffrage voters in both the 1918 
mid-term elections and the 1920 presidential election.   
This is not to say that Wilson’s conversion to the federal amendment was 
inconsequential.  On the contrary, evidence in this chapter reveals that the President 
helped to secure key votes at critical moments.  And his public endorsement of the 
federal amendment – with its explicit approval for all Democrats to abandon the “states’ 
rights” platform of 1916 – opened the door for a number of Southern Democrats in both 
houses to change their positions.  But Wilson’s conversion alone was not enough.  The 
single most important factor in the amendment’s ultimate victory at the national level was 
the series of victories won in the states from 1917-1919.  Eleven new states enfranchised 
women during this two year period, largely as a result of Catt’s “Winning Plan” to 
simultaneously work for suffrage at the state and federal level.  The combination of 
increased representation from suffrage states and Wilson’s support finally tipped the 
scales in favor of the federal amendment.  The rising “tide” of suffrage that Wilson had 
described to the assembled NAWSA members in Atlantic City in September 1916 finally 
crested nearly four years later. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Victory in Congress was not the final hurdle for the federal woman suffrage 
amendment. In order to become part of the Constitution, the amendment required 
ratification by 36 out of 48 states.  This was no small task.  Suffragists across the nation 
once again strapped on their armor and marched into the political fray for this final battle.  
The ratification campaign lasted more than a year, ending only when Tennessee became 
the thirty-sixth state to ratify (by a margin of only one vote) in late August 1920.560  
Aspects of the ratification process are both fascinating and illuminating, and it is an 
important part of the overall history of the federal amendment, but President Wilson 
played only a minor role.  He returned from Europe in July 1919, shortly after the 
suffrage victory in Congress.  During the next several months, his primary focus was the 
battle over U.S. membership in the League of Nations.561  He suffered a debilitating 
stroke in early October and practically vanished from public life for more than six 
months.562
Wilson had recuperated enough by the spring of 1920 to offer some support for 
ratification.
   
563
                                                 
560 For a detailed history of the ratification campaign, see Harper, The History of Woman Suffrage, 
Vol. 5, 1900-1920, 649-655. , Flexner and Fitzpatrick, Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement 
in the United States, 308-317.  
  Most importantly, he answered one of Catt’s final calls for assistance.  At 
 
561 Cooper, Woodrow Wilson: A Biography, 414.  
 
562 For more detail on how Wilson’s physical condition left him incapacitated, see Chapter 23: 
Disability in Ibid., 535-560. See also, Knock, To End all Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New 
World Order, 263. , Clements, The Presidency of Woodrow Wilson, 197-202. 
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her request, he telegraphed the governor of Tennessee, successfully urging him to 
convene a special legislative session to consider ratification of the amendment.564
Colby certified the federal woman suffrage amendment in the privacy of his own 
home in Washington, D.C. at eight o’clock in the morning on August 26, 1920.  The 
signing took place without any ceremony or spectators, despite the request of the 
National Woman’s Party to send a delegation and to have the event filmed by movie 
cameras.  Miffed at the denial of their request, an NWP spokesperson later told reporters, 
“It was quite tragic.  This was the final culmination of the women’s fight and women, 
irrespective of factions, should have been allowed to be present when the proclamation 
was signed.”
  For 
this study which is principally concerned with how and why Wilson came to support the 
federal amendment and with his role in pushing the measure through Congress, the story 
largely ends with the decisive vote in the Senate in June 1919.  Still, the events 
surrounding the actual certification of the 19th Amendment by Secretary of State 
Bainbridge Colby in August 1920 illustrate some of this study’s larger points. 
565
                                                                                                                                                 
563 Specifically, Wilson wrote letters to urge ratification upon Democratic leaders in West 
Virginia, Louisiana, Delaware, and North Carolina.  See Wilson to Julius Edgar Frazier and Milton Burr 
(March 1, 1920), Wilson to Jared Young Sanders  (April 10, 1920), Wilson to John Milliken Parker (May 
18, 1920), Wilson to John J. Mulvena (June 1, 1920), Wilson to Thomas Walter Bickett (June 24, 1920), 
LWWP.  Ratification was defeated in all four of these states. 
  Colby’s rejection of the NWP demands to be represented at the signing 
ceremony was no fluke.  According to Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, NAWSA 
leaders had explicitly asked Wilson’s cabinet members to ban the NWP from any signing 
ceremony.  Daniels recorded in his diary on August 25, “Mrs. Helen Gardener [NAWSA 
 
564 Wilson to Albert Houston Roberts (June 23, 1920), LWWP.  For Roberts’ reply, see Roberts to 
Wilson (June 25, 1920), LWWP. 
 
565 Abby Scott Baker, quoted in “Colby Proclaims Woman Suffrage; Signs Certificate of 
Ratification at His Home Without Women Witnesses,” New York Times, August 27, 1920, 1.   
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Corresponding Secretary] phoned that she had asked Colby not to have any of the 
Picketting [sic] crowd of women present.”566
While the NWP received a cold shoulder from Wilson Administration 
representatives, Catt and NAWSA were afforded their customary warmth from the White 
House.  President and Mrs. Wilson invited Catt and Gardener to the White House on the 
afternoon of August 26.  In reporting on Catt’s visit to Wilson, the New York Times noted 
that the NWP, “known as the militants, and a rival organization to that headed by Mrs. 
Catt, was not represented.”
   
567
Later that night, Colby told the NAWSA members who had assembled for the 
jubilee at Poli’s Theatre, “There never was a man more deeply or profoundly convinced 
of the justice of the suffrage cause than Woodrow Wilson.  And there never was a party 
leader who held his party with more stern, austere and unbending insistence to the 
  The President accepted a memorial appreciation book 
from the two NAWSA leaders.  He informed them that he would not be physically able to 
attend their jubilee meeting that night but had given Secretary Colby a message to read 
on his behalf.   
                                                 
 
566 Cronon, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 1913-1921, 552. Daniels apparently thought 
Gardner was being catty.  The next sentence in his diary reads, “The female of the Species . . .”  One can 
almost see him shaking his head at the fact that – even in what should have been one of the suffrage 
movement’s most glorious moments – bitter factionalism persisted.  Colby appears to have made a 
conscious decision to avoid the potential fallout from inviting NAWSA but not the NWP.  When 
questioned by reporters, Colby explained, “It was decided not to accompany this simple ministerial action 
on my part with any ceremony or setting.  This secondary aspect of the subject has regretfully been the 
source of considerable contention as to who shall participate in it and who shall not.  Inasmuch as I am not 
interested in the aftermath of any of the friction or collisions which may have been developed in the long 
struggle for the ratification of the amendment, I have contented myself with the performance in the simplest 
manner of the duty devolving upon me under the law.”  “Colby Proclaims Woman Suffrage; Signs 
Certificate of Ratification at His Home Without Women Witnesses,” New York Times, August 27, 1920, 3. 
 
567  “Colby Proclaims Woman Suffrage; Signs Certificate of Ratification at His Home Without 
Women Witnesses,” New York Times, August 27, 1920, 3.  
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performance of a duty dictated by high principle.”  Colby went on the relay the following 
message from Wilson: 
Will you take the opportunity to say to my fellow citizens that I deem it one of the 
greatest honors of my life that this great event, the ratification of this amendment, 
should have occurred during the period of my administration.  Please say also that 
nothing has given me more pleasure than the privilege that has been mine to do 
what I could to advance the cause of ratification and to hasten the day when the 
womanhood of America would be recognized by the nation on the equal footing 
of citizenship that it deserves.568
 
 
Paul and her NWP followers were not involved in NAWSA’s jubilee at Poli’s Theatre.  
Earlier in the day, though, Paul had released a press statement heralding final certification 
and predicting that, “August 26th will be remembered as one of the great days in the 
history of the women of the world and in the history of this republic.”569
                                                 
568 Ibid.  
  She also 
announced that the NWP headquarters would remain open for the time being while the 
leaders planned a convention to determine the organization’s future. 
 
569 Ibid. Paul’s prediction of the lasting significance of August 26th did not come to pass.  Within 
both public memory and the historical profession, the history of the woman suffrage movement quickly 
became a footnote to the overall narrative of American political history.  Some of this is due to what 
historian William O’Neill called “the failure of feminism” – the fact that women did not do as many 
suffragists promised and use their vote to reform society.  Additionally, he argues, they failed to use the 
ballot as a launching pad to improve their own status in society.  Describing the post-suffrage decade, 
O’Neill writes, “The women’s rights movement expired in the twenties from ailments that had gone 
untreated in its glory days.  Chief among them was the feminists’ inability to see that equal suffrage was 
almost the only issue holding the disparate elements of the woman movement together.  Once it was 
resolved, voters who happened to be female were released from the politically meaningless category of 
‘woman.’  This allowed their basic allegiances to come into play.”  O'Neill, Everyone was Brave: A History 
of Feminism in America, 264. Nancy Cott disputes the idea that feminism lost steam in the 1920s.  Instead, 
she argues that what happened in the 1920s was the emergence of a broader feminist agenda: “What 
historians have seen as the demise of feminism in the 1920s was, more accurately, the end of the suffrage 
movement and the early struggle of modern feminism.”  See {{8 Cott, Nancy F. 1987/s8-10;}} I would 
argue that there is more to this story of historical exclusion than women’s failure to “do anything” with the 
vote.  The history of woman suffrage was initially ignored and later relegated to the fields of women’s 
history and/or social history because political historians did not see gender politics as real politics.  One of 
the chief aims of this study, building on the work of a generation of suffrage scholars, has been to show just 
how much gender politics played a crucial role in the broader political developments that took place during 
Wilson’s two terms.  By integrating suffrage history with the standard political histories of Wilson, I have 
attempted to answer the call made by Victoria Bissell Brown for political historians to take gender politics 
more seriously.  See Brown, Did Woodrow Wilson's Gender Politics Matter?, 153-154. 
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The events of August 26, 1920 serve as a metaphor, to some extent, for the final 
years of the suffrage battle.  From the newspaper accounts, it is clear that Wilson was a 
staunch advocate of the federal amendment.  Colby’s speech at the jubilee – and the 
message that he relayed from the President - illustrates the desire of Democrats to claim 
responsibility for the passage of the amendment, indicating the way in which woman 
suffrage had developed into a key issue between political parties. It is also clear that Catt 
and NAWSA maintained a positive and mutually supportive relationship with Wilson and 
his administration while Paul and the NWP remained antagonistic to the end.  Gardener’s 
note to Daniels highlights the depth of the rift between NAWSA and the NWP.  All of 
these issues – Wilson’s conversion to suffrage in the midst of his larger turn toward 
progressivism, his increasing tendency toward national solutions, the amendment’s rising 
stock as an issue of political value for both parties, and the different political strategies of 
NAWSA and the NWP – have served as the basis of this study.   
Few scholars disagree with one of this study’s fundamental points: Wilson was 
converted to supporting the cause of the federal suffrage amendment early in his second 
term.  Exceptionally, Victoria Bissell Brown dates his conversion even earlier, arguing 
that Wilson’s affirmative vote for suffrage in the New Jersey state referendum in October 
1915 signaled his acceptance of the fact that women were in public life to stay.  Brown 
argues:  
The story of Wilson and suffrage, between his vote in the New Jersey referendum 
in the fall of 1915 and his support for a federal amendment in January 1918, is not 
a story about whether the president believed in woman suffrage . . . The post-1915 
story is about method, timing, and tactics; it is about deference to the racial and 
gender politics of the South and the direction of the Democratic party; and it is 
about war and protest and the rage Wilson felt at suffragists who were unwilling 
to keep the home fires burning and his loyalty to those suffragists who were.570
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I could not agree more with Brown’s eloquent assessment of what the post-1915 story is 
really about.  But implicit in her argument about the significance of the October 1915 
vote is the idea that once Wilson voted yea in New Jersey, his transition from a states’ 
rights suffragist to federal amendment advocate was a foregone conclusion.  I disagree.   
Wilson was unwilling to advocate for the federal amendment as President and the 
leader of the Democratic Party until he was convinced that a majority of Americans 
wanted woman suffrage and that it would hurt his party to stand in the way of its eventual 
passage.   And he only became convinced of those things once NAWSA and its state 
affiliates began to win more states in 1917.  In other words, there appears to be a 
misplaced sense of inevitability in this part of Brown’s argument.571
Prior to the 1918 mid-term elections, suffrage was not an issue with enough 
power to swing a significant number of voters in one direction or the other.  With only 
minor concessions to the suffrage movement, Wilson was able to win re-election in 1916.  
  Regardless of the 
timing, the real disagreement among scholars begins with the questions of what brought 
about Wilson’s conversion and what effect his advocacy had on the amendment’s 
eventual passage.  This study has attempted to answer both of those questions. 
                                                                                                                                                 
570 Ibid. 142.  
 
571 This may seem like quibbling, but there is a larger point here about the danger of suggesting 
that anything associated with the federal woman suffrage amendment was inevitable.  Remember that the 
final roll call in the Senate in 1919 only passed by one vote.  And remember, too, that ratification turned 
into a larger and closer battle than many anticipated.  Only 13 out of 48 states needed to reject ratification 
in order for the amendment to fail and when the nine states of the solid South almost immediately did so, 
suffragists were left with a margin of only four states.  My point is that getting a federal women suffrage 
amendment during Wilson’s administration was a close call at every turn.  Without engaging in too much 
counterfactual history, it is probably not unreasonable to suggest that – should the amendment have failed 
under Wilson – the largely pro-suffrage Republican Party that swept the 1920 elections would have quickly 
facilitated passage and ratification of the federal amendment.  Still, that is impossible to know for certain.  
And even if it is a valid assumption, delaying woman suffrage for another presidential election cycle would 
certainly have brought with it important second and third order effects.  Any suggestion of inevitability 
obscures the Herculean challenges faced by – and more importantly, overcome by - the suffragists.   
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His vote for the New Jersey suffrage referendum, his support for the states’ rights plank 
in the 1916 Democratic platform, and his proclamation of openness to a federal 
amendment at the Atlantic City NAWSA Convention in September 1916 were enough to 
convince most pro-suffrage Democratic voters that he was an ally.  Those same actions 
were moderate enough to not alienate anti-suffrage elements within the Democratic Party, 
especially Southerners fearful of the federal amendment’s potential to undermine white 
supremacy in their states.   
In a direct rebuke to the NWP campaign strategy in 1916, enfranchised women in 
the West demonstrated that they were not single-issue voters.  Evaluating Wilson and 
Hughes across the spectrum of their policies and beliefs, the majority of women voted in 
line with their traditional party affiliations.  Those who broke ranks tended to support 
Wilson because of his efforts to keep the United States out of the war in Europe and his 
increasing support for a number of progressive measures.  
What changed between the November 1916 election and the start of the 1918 
mid-term election campaign season that made suffrage a more powerful political wedge?  
First, and perhaps most importantly, the United States became directly involved in the 
war in Europe.  NAWSA leaders, following Catt’s guidance, made a critical decision to 
commit their organization to war service alongside suffrage work.  Their contributions to 
national defense through home front service strengthened the arguments they had been 
making for decades that equal sacrifice deserved equal citizenship.  This is not to say that 
they explicitly altered the basis of their demand for suffrage.  They continued to ask for 
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suffrage on the basis of natural rights, but they were not above using women’s reform 
work and/or patriotism as an additional reason.572
Helen Gardener articulated this dual reasoning to Wilson in a letter sent a few 
months before the first vote in the Senate.  She explained: 
 
We do not ask, and do not want [suffrage] given as a ‘reward’ for war work and 
war sacrifice.  Those are our loyal duty and pleasure to give even under the 
humiliation of disfranchisement, but how much more whole-heartedly, cheerfully, 
joyfully we can and will make those duties our first thought and pleasure when we 
can feel that we are a part of the government which we gladly sacrifice so much to 
protect and to make safe!  I doubt if even you can grasp how deep that feeling is 
in women.573
 
 
Whether women wanted suffrage as a reward or not, that is certainly part of the reason 
why male elected officials decided to grant it to them.  Wilson increasingly emphasized 
women’s contribution to the war when he urged members of Congress to support the 
federal amendment.  Likewise, the Congressional debates on the amendment are filled 
with pro-suffrage Congressmen heaping accolades on the sacrifices of women engaged in 
war service. 
 The other significant change during 1917 was the increase in the number of 
suffrage states.  Eight more states had granted women either full or partial suffrage, and it 
was clear to both parties that, unlike in 1914 and 1916, enfranchised women would make 
a significant difference in the 1918 mid-term elections.  The increase in the number of 
suffrage states was in no small way connected to Wilson’s support.  In close coordination 
                                                 
572 For an excellent discussion of how the argument for suffrage evolved from one based on 
natural rights (the argument from justice) to the claim that woman suffrage would benefit society (the 
argument from expediency), see Kraditor, The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920, 43-74. 
Importantly, Kraditor notes that both types of argument persisted throughout the suffrage struggle: “The 
claim of women to the vote as a natural right never disappeared from the suffragist rationale, but the 
meaning of natural right changed in response to new realities, and new arguments enumerating the reforms 
that women voters could effect took their places alongside the natural right principle that had been the 
staple plea of the suffragists in the early days of the movement.” Quote from p. 44-45. 
 
573 Gardener to Wilson (June 17, 1918), NAWSA Records, Box 32, Reel 21. 
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with NAWSA - the only suffrage organization still working on state campaigns - Wilson 
encouraged state legislatures across the country to pass suffrage referenda.  Shedding his 
hesitance to become involved in internal state affairs, he wrote letters, gave statements to 
the press, and encouraged individual legislators and governors to extend the franchise to 
women. 
 Members of the NWP, and the revisionist scholars who emphasize the importance 
of the NWP strategy, would argue that the other significant change in 1917 was the 
militant picketing campaign and subsequent publicity surrounding the pickets’ arrest and 
imprisonment.  The actions of the NWP, they insist, made it impossible for Wilson to 
continue to talk about fighting a war for democracy abroad while denying democracy at 
home.  According to this argument, the civil disobedience of the pickets was so 
embarrassing to the Wilson Administration that the President realized the only way he 
could remove the NWP thorn from his side was by supporting the federal amendment. 
 This study challenges that revisionist position.  Wilson was troubled by the 
pickets mostly because of the embarrassment that they caused to the suffrage movement 
as a whole.  His correspondence with members of Congress, NAWSA leaders, and the 
press all indicate that he hoped the general public’s distaste for the pickets would not 
create irreparable harm to the suffrage cause, which he increasingly supported.  
Moreover, press coverage of the pickets, especially outside of New York and 
Washington, D.C., was primarily negative.  Only a tiny minority of Americans pressured 
Wilson to stop the arrests, imprisonments, and forced feedings of NWP members.  
Despite the pickets’ willingness to suffer injustice at the hands of the government, there 
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was no great public outcry at their mistreatment.  Wilson’s conversion over the course of 
1917 came largely in spite of the actions of the militants. 
 Once Wilson for the first time asked Congress to pass the federal amendment in 
January 1918, he never wavered from that position of support.  Illustrating the limits of 
executive influence, though, the amendment failed to pass in the Senate two times before 
finally succeeding under a Republican-controlled Congress in June 1919.   This study has 
established two factors that constrained the President’s ability to influence Congress.  
First, he had to wrestle with the thin line between executive interest and executive 
interference.  Senatorial courtesy required him to tread carefully on the sensitivities of 
those he sought to influence.  In addition, the solid base of the Democratic Party was 
located in the South where woman suffrage seemingly posed a threat to white supremacy.  
Wilson recognized that Southern Democrats were under immense pressure from their 
constituents to protect white supremacy at all costs. 574
                                                 
 
  The reality of the situation was 
that woman suffrage posed little threat to the Southern political system.  In fact, as even 
some suffragists unfortunately argued, had black women been as disfranchised as easily 
as black men had been, the power of white voters would have doubled when women were 
given the vote.  Nonetheless, fear outweighed fact. Anti-suffragists convinced voters that 
woman suffrage would destroy white political hegemony.  Public perception mattered 
more to Southern Senators than the political reality.  Despite his best efforts, Wilson was 
574 Wilson, himself, was no champion of black civil or political rights.  A southerner by birth and 
by ideology, he held similar views of the need for white supremacy in the South as did the members of his 
party in Congress.  Still, his work on behalf of the federal suffrage amendment indicates that he felt 
confident that white supremacy was not threatened by granting women the right to vote. 
263 
 
largely unable to overcome their fears of losing future elections by supporting the federal 
amendment.575
 Paul repeatedly argued that Wilson was not pushing his party hard enough.  Her 
rationale for targeting the President, first in the 1916 election and later with the picketing 
campaign, was that he had the power to compel his party, which up until 1918 controlled 
both houses of Congress, to support the federal suffrage amendment.  Close scrutiny of 
Wilson’s actions as an advocate of the amendment from 1918 all the way through final 
ratification in 1920, though, indicates that Paul failed to grasp Wilson’s limitations on 
this particular issue with Southern Democrats in the Senate.  Owing more to the white 
constituents that elected them, those Senators were immune to pressure from the 
President.   Wilson’s efforts to swing their votes in favor of the federal amendment - and 
he indeed expended great effort with these men -  were ultimately in vain. 
 
 In many ways, the contrasting approaches of NAWSA and the NWP represent 
two very different understandings of the nature of federal authority – and, in a broader 
sense, the national state – in the early 20th century.  By 1916, NAWSA and NWP leaders 
alike recognized the need for federal action if all women were to be enfranchised.  And 
this was in keeping with the post-Civil War trend for citizenship to be determined at the 
national rather than the state level.  But NAWSA leaders remained more realistic about 
                                                 
 
575 In a telling exchange that illustrates this dynamic, Senator Lee Overman (D – NC) sent the 
following response to a Wilson entreaty for him to urge ratification upon the members of the North 
Carolina state legislature:  “Now, Mr. President, as you know, I have been loyal to you and supported you 
in everything, except upon the question of woman suffrage . . . If you were fully acquainted with the 
conditions as they prevail in this state I am sure you would understand my position and not request of me to 
exert my influence for ratification of the amendment.  I went before the people [in a primary election in 
early June 1920], being opposed by a gentleman who was a most ardent suffragist who advocated the 
ratification of the amendment.  The result of the primary was that I received 94,000 and my opponent only 
23,000 – the largest majority any man ever received in this state.  My position was endorsed by the people; 
therefore, I cannot, in justice to myself and to my people, take a contrary position so soon after the primary, 
all of which I know you will fully appreciate.”  Overman to Wilson (June 25, 1920), LWWP.  
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the persistence of states’ rights ideology and more aware of the limits of federal power 
and authority.  Paul and her followers built a strategy more based on how things ought to 
be than on how they actually were.  The interaction among local, state, and federal 
authorities has received considerable attention in recent works of political history.576
 Why did Wilson eventually become willing to push for a national solution to the 
issue of woman suffrage?  In the end, his personal acceptance of the principle involved 
coupled with party politics and simple electoral math made suffrage an issue worthy of 
Wilson’s attention and devotion.  His transition on suffrage paralleled his principled yet 
expedient transition on other progressive measures such as the Adamson Act and the 
Keating-Owen Child Labor Bill.  Under Catt’s leadership, NAWSA played the bipartisan 
political game more effectively than the NWP.  Without alienating the Republican 
support that would be required to win in Congress and, later, in the state ratification 
campaigns, Catt endeared NAWSA to the President and gained his support in critical 
battles for state referenda, the creation of a separate House Suffrage Committee, and, 
finally, the federal amendment itself.  NAWSA wisely decided to continue pursuing state 
referenda.  Additionally, they distanced themselves from the actions of the NWP and 
simultaneously engaged in war service and suffrage work.  As a result, NAWSA leaders 
  
While this study does not directly dialogue with those works, the experience of the 
suffragists has much to offer as historians continue to grapple with the evolving nature of 
the state in the 20th century. 
                                                 
 
576  For an example of this approach, see Thomas J. Sugrue, "All Politics is Local: The Persistence 
of Localism in Twentieth-Century America," in The Democratic Experiment (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2009), 301-236.  See also, Meg Jacobs and Julian E. Zelizer, "The Democratic 
Experiment: New Directions in American History," in The Democratic Experiment (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2009), 1-19.  For a summary of recent work that reconsiders the state, see Margot 
Canaday, The Straight State: Sexuality and Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2009), 4-7. 
265 
 
put the suffrage movement in a position to secure the federal amendment before the end 
of Wilson’s second term. 
 A political analysis of the suffrage movement leads to a version of the story that 
sometimes lacks inspiration.  Wilson, more often than not, acted out of cold political 
reality rather than out of a sense of justice.  Catt, seeking all expedient means to further 
her cause, was more than willing to ignore the civil rights violations committed by the 
government against the NWP pickets.  Paul wrongly pursued a policy of militant 
harassment of the President even while he was exerting his utmost influence to secure the 
federal amendment.  Perhaps most egregiously, both the President and the two suffrage 
organizations were willing to sacrifice the rights of black citizens in order to gain 
suffrage for white women.   Fortunately, history is not necessarily concerned with 
identifying heroes and villains.  As one historian explains, historical judgment “requires 
attention to the nuances of context and to an awareness of limits.”577
                                                 
577 Harvard Sitkoff, A New Deal for Blacks: The Emergence of Civil Rights as a National Issue: 
The Depression Decade (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 329. Sitkoff offers this insight in the 
midst of his assessment of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s record on civil rights for African Americans 
during the New Deal.  On the Roosevelt Administration’s failure to do more to improve race equality, 
Sitkoff writes, “[Their failures] stain the record of the Roosevelt Administration, as well as that of every 
individual and organization that should have done more to seek to alter the situation.  The odds against their 
succeeding do not constitute a sufficient excuse for their timidity, half measures, and concessions.  In moral 
terms, the horror of racism makes a mockery of lauding anyone as a humanitarian who compromised with 
its existence, as Roosevelt did repeatedly.”  This is a scathing indictment – and one that could easily be 
tweaked to apply to Wilson on his hesitant approach to woman suffrage. But Sitkoff goes on to discuss the 
context in which FDR sought to make even minor positive changes in the status of blacks, specifically 
noting that “For three centuries racism had infected the national mind as well as the body politic.” ( p. 330).  
He does not offer excuses for FDR, but does provide sufficient context to help understand why FDR made 
the decisions that he did.  Sitkoff’s assessment is an outstanding model for balanced historical judgment 
and I have done my best to emulate his approach in this study. 
   Without excusing 
or ignoring any of the less-than inspiring aspects of the suffrage struggle, this study has 
sought to deepen our understanding of the context in which these historical actors made 
their decisions.  
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Even without actively seeking heroic figures, though, one cannot help but come 
across them when studying a movement that was, at its most grassroots level, about 
political liberty and democratic principles.  I continue to find myself inspired by letters 
like the one from a young suffragist campaigning alone in Montana who wrote back to 
the NWP headquarters, “Often I ride all night from one town to the next.  It is very uphill 
work here in Montana.  Every place I go seems harder.  Sometimes I wonder if it is worth 
all the money and effort, but Miss Burns said it was one of the most important states so I 
suppose it is worth while.”578  Likewise, one cannot help but be moved by the report from 
another suffragist that she was sure a certain senator had told her he would vote “yea” on 
the amendment, but that she could not remember any of the specifics of their 
conversation because he was just one of 14 members of Congress she had interviewed on 
that particular morning.579
Even if it was the result of political compromises and pressures and capitulation 
to racism in many cases, that magical day that Beulah Amidon imagined when writing to 
her comrades in jail in 1917 did come to pass.  Her words, meant to inspire those unjustly 
imprisoned for petitioning their government for a redress of legitimate grievances, travel 
through the years to remind us of the true basis of the battle:  “Can you imagine how it 
will be when that amendment actually passes?  Sometimes, when I am too tired to think, I 
just take a long breath and try to dream of a whole nation politically free --- and then 
there is nothing too hard to do to make the dream come true.”
 
580
                                                 
 
 
578 Clara Louise Rowe to Mrs. Jay Webster (May 31, 1916), NWPP, Reel 1. 
 
579 Report of Maud Younger (January 17, 1916), NWPP, Reel 1. 
 
580 Amidon to Picket-Prisoners (August, 23, 1917), NWPP, Reel 2. 
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